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Nulla Via Invia Virtuti Est*.
* Roman fragment without specific attribution “For Virtue no Path is Impossible.” 
“WHEN WE LEARN, in the history of religions about human sacrifices offered by primitive 
peoples to their gods when we read that the Incas, these relatively civilized Indians, immolated 
even their own children on the altars of their idols in a most cruel manner, allowing the priests to 
cut the breasts of the victims and to take out their hearts while yet palpitating; when we try in 
vain to understand how parents could themselves voluntarily bear such misery, we feel relief in 
the comfortable consciousness of living in an enlightened age under the blessings of a higher 
religion which impresses upon us the supreme duty of preserving the life of man. 
 But have we men of a Christian civilization really the right to relax morally?  May we 
really consider ourselves so greatly advanced in comparison with the aborigines of Peru?  Has 
our twentieth century not brought to mankind, together with the most prodigious achievements of 
technique, two world wars whose human sacrifices by far eclipse the child murder of the pagan 
Incas?  Can we refuse to comprehend these mothers and fathers whilst we ourselves are so proud 
to place the flower of our own youth on altars which differ from those of the Incas only in that no 
religion justifies the shedding of precious blood as a result of nothing but nationalistic folly? 
 He who, not as an active statesman but as a simple writer, tries to fulfill his duty in the 
struggle for world peace is no less responsible than the former.  He must, in order not to 
compromise the great ideal, accommodate his postulates to what is politically possible; that 
means, not to what was yesterday possible and, consequently, is today real – this is, Heaven 
knows, little enough.  Nor must his scheme point toward a goal which, if at all, can be reached 
only in a distant future; this is unreal and therefore  politically less than nothing.  A conscientious 
writer must direct his suggestions to what, after careful examination of political reality, may be 
considered as being possible tomorrow, although it, perhaps, seems not yet possible today.  
Otherwise there would be no hope for progress.  His scheme should involve no revolution of 
international relations but reform of their order by an improvement of the social technique 
prevailing in this field. 
 The specific technique of the order regulating the relations between States is the Law of 
Nations.  He who wishes to approach the aim of world peace in a realistic way must take this 
problem quite soberly, as one of a slow and steady perfection of the international legal order”.   
 Peace through Law, Hans Kelsen 
1I. INTRODUCTION
In the arena of human rights jurisprudence, without more, the last forty years have 
evinced greater developments, changes, formation, and transformation in the field of 
international law than in the preceding four hundred years.1 It is necessary to underscore and 
highlight that substantive legal precepts generally require the development of attendant 
procedural tenets to facilitate in the creation of a rubric that will render viable the strategic 
conception and tactical execution of these substantive principles.  Here it becomes necessary to 
specify and bring into sharp relief this article’s modest objective. 
 
There exist eight fundamental categories in which the United States’ contribution to the 
development of private procedural international law may be divided: 2
(i) The principle of comity, or the normative dictate greater than mere international 
courtesy but inferior to a binding obligation, which leads to eight precepts that find comity as an 
organizing first principle;3
(ii) The extraterritorial application of United States statutory (positive law) within the 
framework of procedural private international law;  
 
(iii) The metamorphoses from an absolute theory to a restrictive theory of foreign 
sovereign immunity; 
 
(iv) Civil actions against sovereign states and the procedural defenses raised by 
foreign sovereigns as to such claims;4
1 See, for example, Robert F. Drinin, Cry of the Oppressed:  The History and Hope of the Human Rights Revolution,
Harper & Row publishers; Human Rights in Cross Cultural Perspectives a Quest for Consensus, edited by Alison 
Brysk, University of California Press; and Richard A. Falk, Human Rights Horizons; The Pursuit of Justice in a 
Globalizing World, Rutledge Press.  It would be beyond the purview of this article to attempt to classify and 
delineate the multiple dimensions and specific legal disciplines that this development has had in the nature and 
character of contemporary international law. 
 
2 There are few efforts demonstrating sustained analyses that attempt to analyze conceptually United States 
procedural and international law.  Two works that merit noting took the form of courses taught at the Hague 
Academy of International Law by professors Harold Hongju Koh, International Business Transactions in United 
States Courts, 261 Recuil de Cours 9 (1996); and Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for 
Reasonableness, 245 Recuil de Cours 9 (1994).  Other works significantly developing the analysis of United States 
Procedural Contribution to International Private Law are less explicitly analyzed in extraordinary teaching materials 
such as Andreas Lowenfeld, International Litigation and Arbitration (3rd ed. 2006); Russell J. Weintraub, 
International Litigation and Arbitration (2nd ed. 1997); Charles Baldwin, Iv, Ronald A. Brand, David Epstein, and 
Michael Wallace Gordon, International Civil Dispute Resolution, (1st ed. 2004); Gary B. Born, International Civil 
Litigation in United States Courts (3rd ed. 1996). 
 
3 Under this category five precepts are essential; (i) reasonableness, (ii) uniformity, (iii) party-autonomy, (iv) 
judicial restraint, and (v) predictability or predictive value.
2(v) The original principles developed in the field of international arbitration;5
(vi) The methodologies for the “gathering of evidence” and “discovery” in the United 
States for purposes of assisting foreign tribunals;6
(vii) The recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and  
 
(viii)  The jurisdiction that United States Federal District Courts have exercised in the 
arena of human rights.7
The task of analyzing meticulously all eight procedural categories would take tomes and 
can hardly be reduced to a single effort.  The goal here is considerably more modest and, 
therefore, attainable.8 The solitary purpose of this analysis is to sharpen the contours of some of 
 
4 See, for example, 28 U.S.C. §§1330, 1332, 1391,1441, 1602 et seq. (the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 
“FSIA”). 
5 International arbitration finds itself in a unique historical moment that causes it to be in constant development and 
transformation consonant with the need to integrate principles of civil law systems (the Roman-Germanic tradition 
also commonly referred to as “continental law”) as well as common law doctrines governing the procedural rules to 
be applied by arbitrators in both the application of substantive law to the arbitral proceeding and the actual 
governance of the arbitration itself.  See, e.g.,Grabrielle Kaufmann-Kohler, Globalization of Arbitral Procedure, 36 
Vand J. TransNat’l L. 1313, 1322 (2003)  (highlighting that the development of liberal arbitral rules has precipitated 
the fashioning of rules that represent an attempt at converging procedural rules from different legal systems 
concerning, for example, the gathering of evidence such as those promulgated by the International Bar Association 
(IBA Rules on Evidence), the UNCITRAL arbitration rules, the “institutional rules” such as those of the ICC, AAA 
(ICDR), and the LCIA.  The absence of international tribunals with jurisdiction over private civil or commercial 
disputes among private parties has bestowed upon international arbitration, despite its long and distinguished history 
dating to the Greek Hellenistic Period (See Interstate Greek Arbitration Clauses 347-19 BC, by Sheila Ager), the 
status of a preferred and most reliable methodology for international dispute resolution.  Put simply, arbitration has 
bridged the gap caused by the absence of transnational courts of civil procedure vested with universal jurisdiction 
over commercial cross-border private disputes.  The American Law Institute’s (ALI) noble and laudable effort to 
craft transnational rule of civil procedure with the goal of creating a harmonious tapestry that integrates multiple 
legal systems beyond just those endemic to western sovereignties, but also systems that govern the administration of 
justice in the middle and far east, is understandably progressing at a pace that is directly inversely proportional to its 
marvelous and ambitious objective.  Economic globalization and the perennial development of porous economic 
barriers have given rise to the exigent need to create immediate and practical solutions amenable to cross-border 
international disputes.  Hence, economic globalization has rendered necessary the development of juridic 
globalization. International arbitration, at least in theory, comprises this paradigm.  It is the temporal bridge toward 
transnational courts of civil procedure.    
6 Title 28 U.S.C. § 1782 is perhaps the most important and transcending U.S. contribution to procedural 
international private law in this field. 
 
7 See e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (commonly referred to as the Alien Tort Claims Act). 
 
8 This article, for example, does not address sui generis United States procedural international law contributions in 
such important areas defining competency to adjudicate such as (i) general in personan jurisdiction, (ii) specific in 
personan jurisdiction, (iii) “tag” jurisdiction, (iv) the doctrine of forum non conveniens in the field of international 
law, nor (v) an in-depth analysis of the Alien Tort Claims Act.  Because, however, of the growing relevance and 
3the developments and most significant contributions to procedural international private law that 
repeatedly arise in the context of cross-border dispute resolution.  Even though some of these 
developments certainly are not “new”, if merely measured by the passage of time, their 
application and use in an international community pervaded by globalization and where these 
very doctrines are openly challenged on a recurring basis in international tribunals, perhaps for 
the first time in the juridic history of western legal systems, we are now obliged to analyze them 
anew in an unprecedented global economic configuration, and from a more novel perspective. 
 
It is also necessary to develop a principle or principles that may serve as organizing 
precepts bestowing conceptual coherence and, therefore, better analytical and practical 
application to these procedural norms that are virtually impossible to avert in the arenas of cross-
border litigation and international arbitration.9 In the following pages we shall explore a 
different proposed analytical rubric for the concept of comity that may serve as a protagonist and 
fulcrum of intelligibility and for unification of these seemingly disparate and only superficially 
related categories.  The proposition is doubtless challenging and perhaps even bold.  Yet, as with 
every first step, sometimes one can only reach a geographic destination in the west by traveling 
oversea from Palos de la Frontera towards the east, despite our visceral intuition and the 
suggestions of more visual appearances. 
 
It is the aim of this article to serve as a theoretical and practical point of departure for 
those jurists, commentators, and lawyers whose careers command constant recurring reference to 
rules of international private law in the defense or prosecution of cross-border civil disputes.  But 
for the revision of procedural international doctrines pursuant to a new prism purporting to 
promote unity, reasonableness, predictability, party-autonomy, judicial restraint, and doctrinal 
uniformity, these concepts would remain as free-standing fragmented norms less than suitable 
for a world order compelling judicial globalization.
II. FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES THAT GOVERN U.S. PROCEDURAL 
 INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
A. In Search of the Elusive Concept of Comity.
Even the most cursory analysis of (i) the extra-territorial application of United States 
statutory authority, (ii) assistance to foreign tribunals in the investigation, defense, or prosecution 
of civil or criminal actions, or (iii) in the very recognition of the exercise of the concept of 
sovereignty by a foreign sovereign the concept of comity cannot be obviated.10 This concept, 
 
importance of these doctrines in the context of procedural international private law, surface reference to them and 
the analysis of case studies here detailed is inevitable. 
9 Professor Koh, for example, has suggested that United States jurisprudence concerning international transactions is 
comprised of five basic principles:  party autonomy, national sovereignty, comity, uniformity, and the separation of 
powers.  Professor Koh explains that these principles bond and unite the critical judicial decisions issued in the last 
few years on the subject of international commercial transactions.  See Koh, supra at 27 and 32.   
 
10 The etymological root of the term comity is generally attributed to the Latin comitas. The Corpus Juris reads: 
4which centuries later still has managed to avoid a precise and universally accepted definition, 11 
constitutes the first and foremost premise in the application of the fundamental principles that 
govern private procedural international law in the United States 12 The first time that the concept 
of comity is even referenced in U.S. jurisprudence is in 1895.13 In that case, the U.S. Supreme 
 
Liber autem populus est is, qui nillius alterius populi potesti ast subjectus:  sive is foederatus est item, 
siveaequa foedere in amicitiam venit sive foedere comprehensum est, ut is populus alterius populi majestatum 
comiter conservaret.  Hoc enim adicitur, ut intelleigatur alterum populum superiorem esse, non ut intellegatur 
alterum non esse liberum. 
 
The Roman Digest, XLIX, xv, 7, 1 (Proculus; lib. VIII epistularum) observes that this passage conveys the 
general idea that one nation should respect the sovereignty of another nation by dint of “comitas,” in such a way that 
the respect should not constitute a factual basis from which to infer that the foreign sovereign recognized pursuant to 
the doctrine of comitas is not free or is subject to compulsion. 
 
11 See Joel R. Paul, Comity in International Law, 32 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1 (1991).  Professor Paul explains that the 
origins of the modern concept of comity is associated with a group of Dutch scholars of the XVII century interested 
in examining the extra-territorial application of the laws of one state within the territory of another sovereign (citing 
Hessel Yntema, The Historic Bases of Private International Law, 2 AM. J. COMP. L. 297 (1953).  This group of 
scholars included Paul and John Voet, Christian Rodenburg and perhaps the most significant of all, Ulrich Huber.  
Professor Paul adds that Huber’s theory of private international law as well as that of the other Dutch jurists came 
into being in the context of a historical moment when Holland had just obtained its independence from Spain and 
thus needed a legal methodology that would allow it to harmonize the laws of each Dutch province with the aim of 
promoting their unification while maintaining flexibility.  In his treaty on private international law, De Conflictum 
Legum, Huber set forth three principles to elucidate the manner in which foreign law is to be applied within the 
geographic territory of another sovereign; first, a territorial approach is identified pursuant to which all states are 
assumed to have sovereignty exclusively within, but never beyond, their national territory.  Second, a state has a 
sovereign’s authority over all persons found within its territory.  Third, and finally, in applying foreign law, courts 
are administering justice based upon comity such that the laws of one nation retain their force and effect everywhere 
so long as they do not prejudice the rights or privileges of other states or their colonies (citing Ernest Lorenzen, 
Huber’s De Conflictum Legum, 13 ILL. L. Rev. 375 (1919)).   
 
See also Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 9 (1966-67), detailing a comprehensive history 
of the doctrinal development of the concept of Comity and artfully suggesting that respect for the manifestation of 
the exercise of sovereignty pursuant to the equitable administration in a judicial system constitutes an obligation and 
therefore, more than mere discretionary courtesy.   
 
12 Even though Huber’s influence in continental Europe was admittedly rather limited, his theories did prove to be 
influential in the development of Anglo Saxon law primarily because of Lord Mansfield and Joseph Story see Paul, 
supra at 18. See J.H. Morris, The Conflicts Of Laws 211 (2d ed. 1980); CHESHIRE & NORTH, PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (11th ed. 1987). 
 
13 It is in the venerable chestnut referenced in every course on international procedural law, but rarely submitted to 
sustained analysis, Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 16 S.Ct. 139, 40 L.Ed. 95 (1895),  that an attempt is made to 
define the precept of comity.  The definition of comity that the Supreme Court articulated in that case has remained 
as a lapidary standard for its progeny.   Regrettably, these latter cases  have remained doctrinally stagnant, 
notwithstanding international economic developments that have nurtured the concept of comity and further suggest 
that the doctrine must acquire a more conceptually rigorous meaning if it is to be materially availing in the 
resolution of international disputes. 
 
5Court addressed the issue of deciding whether a final judgment issued by a foreign sovereign, 
here France, would be accorded per se complete full faith and credit indistinguishable from that 
afforded to interstate U.S. judgments.14 The specific facts configuring the case merit analysis. 
In Hilton v. Guyot, a French plaintiff sought to execute a judgment issued in France 
against U.S. citizens conducting substantial and not isolated commerce in France, in the United 
States (United States Federal District Court for the Southern District of New York).  
Significantly, the defendants had commercial property in France and affirmatively participated in 
the management of that property.  It was precisely that very management that gave rise to the 
material facts underlying the claim filed in France, and thus, the execution effort undertaken in 
New York.  After engaging in a painstaking analysis of the facts as averred by all parties, the 
Supreme Court observed that defendants premised their defenses on four specific theories in 
opposition to the recognition and enforcement of the French judgment.15 
First, defendants asserted that their appearance before French tribunals was not
voluntary.16 Second, defendants highlighted and underscored that the French tribunal allowed 
 
It has been suggested that the first time that the Supreme Court referenced the doctrine of comity among 
nations was in Emory v. Grenough, 3 Dall. 369, 370, N., 1 L.Ed. 640 (1797) citing a passage from a treatise by 
Ulrich Huber (1636-1694):  
 
By the courtesy of nations, whatever laws are carried into execution, within the 
limits of any government, are considered as having the same effect everywhere, 
so far as they do not occasion a prejudice to the rights of other governments, or 
their citizens.   
 
* * *
[N]othing would be more convenient in the promiscuous intercourse and 
practice of mankind, than that what was valid by the laws of one place, should 
be rendered of no effect elsewhere by diversity of law.  (2 U. Huber, 
Praelectiones Juris Romani Et Hodiemi, Bk, 1, tit. 3, pp. 26-31 (C. Thomas, 
L. Menke, & G. Gebauer eds. 1725) 
 
Although it appears to be close to a direct allusion to comity, it is important to note that the word “comity” 
nowhere appears in the opinion.  Moreover, unlike the very succinct formulation by Justice Marshall in Hilton v. 
Guyot, the opinion does not place into distinct focus the nature of comity as being more than just the mere courtesy 
accorded to foreign sovereigns but less than a normative binding obligation or legally cognizable juridic precept.  As 
more fully discussed, it is precisely in the careful crafting of this unique domain between two (2) polar opposite 
points that the genius and controversy of comity rests. 
 
14 Article IV of the U.S. Constitution provides that full faith and credit shall be granted to each state concerning 
those public acts, registers, and judicial proceedings performed in any other state. 
 
15 159 U.S. at 116-120. 
 
16 This proposition was summarily rejected by the Supreme Court inasmuch as both the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals and the Supreme Court were of a single voice in concluding that the record palpably established that 
transacting business systematically in France, enjoying common commercial ventures with the plaintiff, and sharing 
equal participation in the management of a commercial enterprise that constituted an essential part of the claims sub 
6plaintiffs to testify without penalty of perjury.  In this same vein, defendants also averred that 
they were foreclosed from cross-examining plaintiff and, therefore, the possibility of establishing 
the legal and factual insufficiencies of the claims was wrested from them.17 Third, defendants 
vigorously asserted that the contract at issue violated United States tax laws because the 
agreement did not require those goods sold to be invoiced consonant with their fair market 
value.18 Finally, defendants alleged that French law lacked reciprocity in the recognition and 
enforcement of foreign judgments.  As an eloquent and revealing example of this proposition, 
defendants relied upon the Royal Ordinance dated June 15, 1629, Article 121.19 
Upon observing that the case was not subject to any international treaty, covenant, or 
agreement concerning the recognition and execution of a foreign judgment, the Supreme Court 
sought analytical support in the concept of comity and enunciated for the first time the legal 
definition of this precept, which even today governs the relationship of international law among 
nations and private parties.  The following definition continues to be dispositive and a perennial 
source of controversy with respect to every case that has been decided since issuance of this 
definition in the arena of international law: 
‘Comity’, in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the one 
hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other.  But it is the recognition 
which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive, or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
 
judice, were more than enough to overcome the defense that defendants lacked personal volition and only pursuant 
to the juridic will of the French court did they find themselves defending claims before that tribunal.  Id. at 204. 
 
17 While in the common law system the rules of evidence accord parties the right to examine and cross-examine 
witnesses under penalty of perjury, the practice is not followed in the majority of civil code countries where the 
inquisitorial system only allows a judge to interrogate witnesses.  Put simply, the continental Roman-Germanic 
tradition places less weight on the rigors of party opponent conducted cross-examinations and the considerable 
sanction of perjury (a crime susceptible to immediate prosecution) as methodologies for ensuring a greater 
likelihood of eliciting truthful testimony.  In this cause, defendants unsuccessfully attempted implicitly and 
explicitly to challenge the entire French system of administering justice by placing in sharp relief the more salient 
differences between the common law and the civil law systems.  Id. at 204-205. 
 
18 The Supreme Court rejected this proposition asserting that based upon the procedural posture of the case, the 
contractual issue that defendants raised was but a diminimus part of the merits when the case was viewed in the 
totality of all material facts.  Id. at 205. 
 
19 The Royal Decree dated June 15, 1629, Art. 121, reads: 
 
“Judgments issued contracts or obligations recognized, in foreign kingdoms or sovereignties, based upon 
whatsoever charge or cause, shall not be binding or susceptible to execution in our kingdom.  Therefore, these 
contracts and documents shall only possess the binding effect conferred upon simple promises; and, notwithstanding 
final judgments, our citizens against whom such final judgments have been entered shall be able to challenge them 
in their entirety (de novo) and raise their rights and legal entitlements before our judges.”  Touillier, Droit Civil, lib. 
3, tit. 3, c. 6, sect. 3, no. 77.  (Translation by the author). 
7convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are 
under the protection of its laws.  (Emphasis in original).20 
The Supreme Court held that under the specific facts of this case that, (because, inter 
alia, want of reciprocity on behalf of France), a foreign judgment is not immediately recognized 
as binding even in the absence of fraud or other irregularities on behalf of the issuing foreign 
court when such a judgment is entered in a jurisdiction that rejects reciprocity among nations 
concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments.  Pursuant to these 
circumstances, a foreign judgment would be recognized by United States courts as prima facie 
proof of the validity of that judgment but not as an actual binding foreign judgment to be 
accorded the same full faith and credit that is granted to interstate U.S. judgments. 
B. The Creation of a New Normative Legal Principle.
Comity is unique in the development of jurisprudence.  The concept of comity gives rise 
to a penumbra situated between an absolute juridic obligation and the deference arising from 
mere courtesy that is accorded to an act of a sovereign.  This “new space” in jurisprudence may 
easily lend itself, as it has on multiple occasions, to irregularities, lack of uniformity, uncertainty, 
and want of predictive value concerning the recognition, enforceability, and binding effect of 
foreign judgments.  Likewise, it also has introduced these issues into analyses that U.S. courts 
have undertaken in other fields of procedural international private law, such as the extraterritorial 
application of United States legislative enactments. 
Notwithstanding these possible conceptual debilities in the interpretation of the doctrine, 
the concept is sufficiently flexible so as to be susceptible to application in numerous contexts 
that require a more rigorous juridic analysis instead of the viscerally reflexive and mechanical 
application of doctrines to complex issues arising from multi-faceted economic scenarios 
appearing and reappearing differently under diverse paradigms.  It is precisely by virtue of this 
extraordinary penumbra between light and shade, a new space occupying the previously ignored 
realm that separates a binding obligation and a mere courtesy, that the concept of comity finds a 
paramount place in the equitable administration of justice in the realm of procedural international 
private law.21 
The recognition and enforceability of a foreign judgment by dint of comity is not limited 
to circumstances where at issue is a final judgment representing the end of all judicial labor.22 
20 Id. at 163-164. 
 
21 The use of comity is applied (without limitation) in the extraterritorial application of U.S. law (jurisdiction to 
prescribe), in personam jurisdiction over foreigners, parallel proceedings or lis pendens international, the 
recognition and execution of foreign judgments, and the specialized field of providing judicial assistance to foreign 
tribunals beyond just the assistance contemplated by conventions and also to that assistance seeking to fulfill the 
twin aims of educating foreign sovereigns on U.S. Rules of Federal Procedure concerning discovery, such as 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26, 30, 33, and 34, and fostering reciprocity. 
 
8The jurisprudence concerning comity in the context of final judgments has been extended to non-
final interlocutory orders.  By way of example, in Nahar v. Nahar23 Florida’s Third District 
Court of Appeal faced a recognition and execution issue arising from a judgment entered in favor 
of a beneficiary who had challenged decedent’s will allegedly in favor of his widow and a child 
from a second marriage.  Both child and widow averred that it was necessary and critical that 
certain funds not be transferred from Florida to the Netherland Antilles.  The trial court issued an 
order in favor of the son who sought recognition by a Florida court of a Dutch order providing 
for injunctive relief. 
The Third District Court of Appeal articulated that in another opinion issued by the very 
court,24 decided five years earlier concerning the recognition and execution of an interlocutory 
foreign order, held: 
It is well settled that, as a general rule, only the final judgments of courts of a 
foreign country are subject to recognition and enforcement in this country, 
provided certain jurisdictional and due process standards are observed by the 
foreign court; non final or interlocutory orders of foreign courts, however, are 
generally not entitled to such recognition or enforcement.25 (Emphasis supplied). 
Despite this holding, the Third District also sought analytic support in the Restatement 
(Second) of Conflicts of Laws and concluded that the command in Cardenas was unavailing 
because of its lack of conceptual flexibility.  In accordance with this reasoning, the Third District 
adopted the rubric set forth in the Restatement (Second) that comports with the Supreme Court’s 
precepts enunciated in Hilton v. Guyot:
[I]t appears that any foreign decree should be recognized as a valid judgment, and 
thus be entitled to comity, where the parties have been given notice and the 
opportunity to be heard, where the foreign court had original jurisdiction and 
where the foreign decree does not offend the public policy of the State of 
Florida.26 
22 It is necessary to make clear that “the end of all judicial labor” refers to the exhaustion of all appellate remedies 
such that the final judgment may in fact be deemed final and binding in the country of origin. 
 
23 See 656 So.2d 225 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).  This case is the only state court proceeding referenced in this essay.  The 
illustrative academic import of the decision, however, commands inclusion. 
 
24 See Cardenas v. Solis, 570 So.2d 996 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990).  It is worth noting that in the federal system the 
recognition and execution of a foreign interlocutory order based solely on the concept of comity is rare.  See e.g. 
Pilkington Bros. P.L.C. v. AFG Industries, Inc., 581 F.Supp. 1039 (D.C. Del. 1984). 
 
25 Id. at 228. 
 
26 Id. at 229.  It merits noting that Sections 92 and 98 of the Restatement mandate that in practically all cases foreign 
judicial decrees should be recognized.  The text of these critical sections merit citation in their totality: 
 
9Bottomed on this analysis the Third District recognized the Dutch court’s interlocutory 
order for injunctive relief and issued an opinion transferring the formerly frozen funds from a 
U.S. bank account to an escrow arrangement under the auspices and control of the Dutch 
tribunal. 
This same analysis was applied to an order issued by a French court on behalf of plaintiff, 
a Barclays Bank, S.A. subsidiary located in France, against Greek citizens who had guaranteed 
loans that Barclays Bank issued against collateral (property) located in the United States, which 
collateral curiously was part of an apartment complex, now infamous, known as “Watergate.”  In 
this case27 the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia reversed the trial court’s 
findings and held that the French interlocutory order imposing an injunction on the Watergate 
property would be recognized in order to preserve the status quo ante while the merits of the 
case were adjudicated in France. 
Even though the court did not explicitly premise its analysis on comity, it did assert tenets 
having foundation in universally accepted principles of justice such as the equitable procedural 
administration of claims.  Specifically, the court held that “[t]here must be a balancing of the 
special equities in each case.”28 
A global economic environment progressively characterized by porous commercial 
barriers among sovereigns deeply comports with a jurisprudence that tends to be as flexible as 
possible and that, therefore, will be more amenable to the recognition and execution of binding 
 
§98 Recognition of Foreign Nation Judgments 
A valid judgment rendered in a foreign nation after a fair trial in a contested proceeding will be 
recognized in the United States so far as the immediate parties and the underlying claim are 
concerned. 
Comment: 
a. Valid Judgment.  The rule of this Section is limited to valid judgments, that is, to 
judgments which meet the requirements of §92… 
 
To aid the reader in determining which “judgments” are to be considered “valid” and thus 
entitled to comity the Restatement states: 
§92.  Requisites of a Valid Judgment 
A judgment is valid if 
(a) the state in which it is rendered has jurisdiction to act judicially in the case; and 
(b) a reasonable method of notification is employed and a reasonable opportunity to be heard is 
afforded to persons affected; and 
(c) the judgment is rendered by a competent court; and 
(d) there is compliance with such requirements of the state of rendition as are necessary for the 
valid exercise of power by the court. 
Comment: 
a. Meaning of “Judgment.”  As used in the Restatement of this Subject, “judgment” is a general 
term which includes not only judgments at law but also the orders, injunctions or decrees of equity 
courts, and the judgments of probate courts, admiralty courts and other special courts. 
 
27 Barclays Bank, S.A. v. Basil A. Tsakos, 543 A.2d 802 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 
28 Id. at 174. 
10 
final judgments and interlocutory orders issued by foreign sovereigns where due process and 
fundamental fairness have been preserved at the trial court level of the foreign jurisdiction.  The 
Supreme Court’s contribution in the now old and venerable Hilton v. Guyot case in 1895 
ironically finds greater geopolitical relevance today, over one hundred years after issuance of the 
opinion, by dint of articulating for the first time the concept of comity.  It would be inimical to 
the developing global economic paradigm to retreat from comity instead of using it as a 
conceptual point of departure facilitating procedural international law, i.e. the legal relationship 
among sovereigns and private juridic entities. 
C. Judicial Restraint or Sovereignty.
The definition of sovereignty has been developing since time immemorial, despite the 
academic prominence that the concept received based upon the writings of Jean Bodin.29 It 
follows that if the concept of sovereignty eludes definition with apodictic certainty, its use and 
abuse with respect to violations of the rights of nations also remains as a penumbral concern that 
merits sustained analysis.  The principle of judicial restraint needs to be emphasized as a United 
States contribution to procedural international law precipitating a revision of judicial self-
restraint in this field. 
The precursor to the development of the principle of judicial restraint with respect to 
foreign sovereigns was developed by the United States Supreme Court in 1897.30 The issue 
became ripe for Supreme Court adjudication pursuant to an appeal from the Second Circuit.  
Significantly, the Second Circuit found that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that the “acts 
of the defendant were the acts of the government of Venezuela, and as such are not properly the 
subject of adjudication in the courts of another government.”31 
A review of the factual contours of the case is illustrative.  At the inception of the 
revolution that Eduardo Crespo spawned in Venezuela in 1892, General Hernández, who 
supported the political party that Crespo led in opposition to the administration of President 
Palacio, detained a United States citizen who at the time had been hired by the Venezuelan 
government to work as an engineer in Ciudad Bolívar. When General Hernández assumed 
military and political control of the region where Mr. Underhill (the U.S. citizen) worked, 
Mr. Underhill petitioned General Hernández for a passport for purposes of leaving the city.  The 
petition was denied.  In fact, it was not until October 18 that the revolutionary government 
actually provided Mr. Underhill with a passport.  Upon receipt of the documentation 
Mr. Underhill fled the country.32 
29 See e.g. On Sovereignty, Jean Bodin, Cambridge University Press (translation by Julian H. Franklin), Eighth 
Printing, 2005. 
 
30 See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897). 
 
31 Id. 
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Immediately on arriving to the United States Mr. Underhill filed an action in the United 
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York that was dismissed by the court and 
affirmed on appeal by the Second Circuit.  The Supreme Court exercised its certiorari 
jurisdiction.  The Court observed that with respect to judicial precedent concerning the (i) issue 
of military arrests effectuated in the absence of war, (ii) viability of contractual relationships 
among individuals who sought to foster or aid insurrection, and (iii) right of revolutionary 
entities to frustrate global commerce with impunity typically denounced on the ground of piracy, 
were all irrelevant to the issues before the Court.33 
D. The Act of State Doctrine.
The judicial self restraint that the Supreme Court applied to affirm the Second Circuit’s 
holding gave rise to the embryonic precepts from which the doctrine commonly referred to as 
The Act of State Doctrine developed.34 Despite its modest conceptual origin, the development of 
the doctrine has been complex and exquisitely analytical. 
The standard for the application of the Act of State Doctrine at first appears to be clear 
and unambiguous because of its ostensible simplicity.  It is this very transparent test, however, 
that renders it extremely flexible and thus gives rise to considerable theoretical and practical 
uncertainty.  An analysis of the doctrine’s development, and pragmatic contours are readily 
definable.  All sovereigns have the legal right to engage in whatsoever acts or forbearances that 
may be deemed to be endemic to the exercise of sovereignty.  Accordingly, to the extent that the 
acts or omissions at issue are such that they defy exercise by an individual in her private capacity 
or a private juridic entity, such as the exercise of police powers, that are not typically found 
within the ambit of commercial undertakings that individual actors exercise, the sovereign shall 
be protected against private causes of action.35 
32 Id. 
33 On this point, the Court’s analysis requires citation in its entirety: 
 
The decisions cited on plaintiff’s behalf are not on point.  Cases respecting arrests by military 
authority in the absence of the prevalence of war, or the validity of contracts between individuals 
entered into in aid of insurrection, or the right of revolutionary bodies to vex commerce of the 
world on its common highway without incurring the penalties denounced on piracy and the like, 
do not involve the questions presented here.  Id. 
34 The Act of State Doctrine finds its roots and foundation in the Supreme Court’s analysis in Underhill v. 
Hernandez, despite the stark succinctness of that opinion.  As shall be detailed, this doctrine continues to develop 
and constitutes one of the most rudimentary doctrinal principles in the procedural defense of foreign sovereigns 
against civil actions. 
 
35 It should be noted that a U.S. court shall be obliged to refrain from interfering in the affairs of foreign sovereigns 
based upon the doctrine even when the acts or omissions at issue on behalf of the foreign sovereign are undertaken 
by a government instrumentality. 
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The doctrine was developed and amplified by the Supreme Court over eighty years after 
issuance of the Court’s opinion in Underhill v. Hernandez, in the two seminal cases of Banco 
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino36 and Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.37 
In the first of these cases, Sabbatino, the Court narrowed the issue before it as one that 
invited determining whether the doctrine would resist plaintiff’s allegations, which rested on a 
decree issued by the government of Cuba seeking the confiscation of certain property and the 
Cuban government’s unilateral appropriation of the rights to specific income generated by a 
transaction concerning the confiscated property at issue.38 The traditional formulation and 
iteration of the doctrine proscribes intervention on behalf of U.S. courts with respect to acts or 
omissions of a public character undertaken by a sovereign within its national territory.  An 
analysis of the operative facts comprising the Court’s inquiry is necessary because of its valuable 
contribution in shedding light on the theoretical underpinnings of the doctrine as well as on its 
practical application. 
In February and July of 1960, a U.S. corporation (Farr, Whitlock & Co.), executed a sale-
purchase agreement for Cuban sugar with a subsidiary of Compañía Azucarera Vertientes-
Camagüey de Cuba (“C.A.V.”).39 The brokers for the transaction, Farr, Whitlock, agreed to 
tender payment for the sugar in New York upon tender of a bill of lading.40 
On July 6, 1960, the United States congress amended legislation commonly known as 
The Sugar Act of 1948 so as to render viable the promulgation of a Presidential Decree 
(Executive Order) earmarked to reduce Cuba’s sugar quota.41 On that very date, President 
Eisenhower issued a decree for intervention that was made possible because of the referenced 
amendment.  In fact, also on that same date, Cuba’s Council of Ministers approved and adopted 
the “Ley Número 851,” which legislation vehemently characterized the reduction in the sugar 
quota as an act of aggression motivated by the United States’ unilateral political agenda.  
Therefore, Ley Número 851 purported to implement countermeasures in response to this 
perceived act of economic aggression against the Republic of Cuba.42 
36 376 U.S. 396, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed. 2d 804 (1964). 
 
37 425 U.S. 682, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1976). 
38 376 U.S. at 400-401. 
 
39 This corporation was organized under the laws of Cuba with venture capital invested by U.S. citizens. 
 
40 Id., at 401. 
 
41 Id.  The very scant legislative history does not reflect any economic motive or rationale as a governing principle 
for this effort.  Instead, it does create a factual basis from which to infer that the motives were political and 
repressive in character and nature.
42 This legislation provided Cuba’s President and Prime Minister (Fidel Castro Ruz) with plenary powers to execute 
at his discretion, without more, confiscatory enactments without providing the owner of any property unilaterally 
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Sometime between August 6 and 9, 1960, the sugar that comprised the subject matter of 
the contract was loaded onto the S.S. Hornfels, which was scheduled to travel to Morocco and 
was anchored in the Cuban port of Júcaro (Santa María).43 The ship sailed for Morocco on 
August 12.44 
Upon the transfer of consideration valued at the price of the sugar on board the S.S.
Hornfels from Banco Exterior in favor of Banco Exterior, a Cuban government instrumentality, 
provided instructions to its agent in New York, Societe Generale, authorizing delivery of the 
merchandise on the ship in exchange for $175,250.69 to be paid to Farr, Whitlock, which in turn 
was to tender payment in cash.45 Societe Generale’s offer to produce the requisite documents in 
exchange for the cash payment was rejected by Farr, Whitlock, which that same day was notified 
of an action filed by C.A.V. alleging that it was the true legal owner of the sugar and, therefore, 
the beneficiary of the funds.46 Finally, Farr, Whitlock executed a contract with C.A.V. and 
disavowed any agreement with Societe Generale.  Banco Exterior, was successful in persuading 
a federal district court in New York to issue injunctive relief in its favor and naming Sabbatino 
as trustee.  This order caused Farr, Whitlock to deposit the funds with the court where they were 
de facto frozen within the jurisdiction of the State of New York.47 
Banco Exterior filed an action in the U.S. Federal District Court for the Southern District 
of New York averring, inter alia, civil theft with respect to the funds that Farr, Whitlock had 
appropriated pursuant to the bill of lading.  The court held that it had personal jurisdiction even 
though the expropriation of the sugar at issue took place within Cuban national territory.  Also, 
the court ruled that “under merchant law, to civilized countries, Farr, Whitlock could not have 
asserted ownership of the sugar against C.A.V. before making payment.”  It concluded that 
 
expropriated with remuneration or compensation of whatsoever kind.  It is worth noting that even though a rubric 
purporting to provide systematic compensation for any confiscation or expropriation had been established, the 
likelihood of payment pursuant to this scheme was unlikely at best.  Id. at 402.  The United States State Department 
classified the subject Cuban legislation (Ley Numero 851) as “manifestly in violation of those principles of 
international law which have long been accepted by the free countries of the West.  It is in its essence 
discriminatory, arbitrary and confiscatory.”  Id. at 402-403. 
43 On the same date on which the S.S. Hornfels was loaded with the subject sugar cargo, the President and Prime 
Minister of Cuba, ostensibly acting pursuant to the normative mandate of Ley Numero 851, issued Resolucion 
Ejecutiva Numero 1.  This resolution provided for the expropriation of a number of properties, entities and rights 
that included C.A.V., the entity owned by U.S. investors.  As a direct and explicit consequence of this resolution, as 
a predicate for the S.S. Hornfels’s departure from the Cuban port, it became necessary to secure official authority 
from the Cuban government.  In an effort to obtain this authorization, on August 11, Farr, Whitlock signed a 
contract identical to the one here at issue with C.A.V., but now with a new seller: Banco Para el Comercio Exterior 
de Cuba, an instrumentality of the Cuban government.  Id. at 404-405. 
 
44 Id. at 405. 
 
45 Id. at 406. 
 
46 Id. 
 
47 Id. 
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C.A.V. had a property interest in the sugar “subject to the territorial jurisdiction of Cuba.”48 
(Emphasis added.) 
Despite reiterating the juridic viability of the Act of State Doctrine, the federal district 
court observed that the doctrine was inapplicable where, as in this case, it was alleged that that 
acts of a foreign sovereign violated international law under the theory that the expropriation 
underlying the litigation was in stark violation of recognized principles of international law.  The 
court also noted that under the facts of the case it was impossible for valid and binding 
ownership title to have been conveyed.  Hence, the court ruled that Cuba’s expropriation decree 
violated fundamental precepts of international law in three distinct and discrete ways: First, the 
expropriation was motivated by retribution and thus lacked a public character or purpose; 
second, the expropriation was intrinsically discriminatory, as it explicitly and directly 
discriminated against U.S. citizens; and, third, the expropriation lacked a functional methodology 
for indemnifying owners of confiscated property that had a commercially cognizable universal 
standard.49 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s ruling.50 The Supreme 
Court elected to exercise its certiorari jurisdiction on the ground that the issues that the Second 
Circuit addressed were of great importance and significance because they concerned the foreign 
relations of a country and, in particular, the role of the judicial branch in such a sensitive arena.  
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit and held that the Act of State Doctrine 
proscribed judicial intervention by United States courts in a case where an expropriation 
exercised by a sovereign occurred within the national territory of that sovereign.  The Court 
added that such a precept applied even where the expropriation at issue per se violated 
international law.51 
It is critical to note that the Supreme Court found ample analytic support in the ancient 
gem and precursor to the Underhill v. Hernandez case, Bland v. Bamfield,52 which was decided 
in England in 1674.  The Supreme Court deemed it necessary to articulate the longstanding 
principle on which the Court had rested its opinion approximately seventy years earlier:   
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every other 
sovereign state, and the courts of one country will not sit in judgment on the acts 
 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 406-407. 
 
50 Despite affirming the district court’s pronouncement, the Second Circuit emphasized that none of the three factors 
enunciated by the district court were sufficient to render the expropriation invalid pursuant to international 
jurisprudence.  Id. at 407. 
 
51 As later detailed, Justice Byron White disagreed with the majority and issued a twenty-page dissenting opinion 
that merits consideration.   
 
52 3 Swans, 604, 36 Eng. Rep. 922.  As referenced, the Underhill opinion issued in 1895. 
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of the government of another, done within its own territory.  Redress of 
grievances by reason of such acts must be obtained through the means open to be 
availed of by sovereign powers as between themselves.53 
Based upon this analytical framework, the Supreme Court noted that notwithstanding the 
antiquity of the Underhill decision, its holding had been stated and restated on multiple 
occasions in the Court’s opinions.54 Curiously, in amplifying the Act of State Doctrine, the 
Court made clear that the doctrine does not apply by compulsion based upon “the inherent nature 
of sovereign authority, as some of the earlier decisions seem to imply or by some principle of 
international law.  If a transaction takes place in one jurisdiction and the forum is in another, the 
forum does not by dismissing an action or by applying its own law purport to divest the first 
jurisdiction of its territorial sovereignty; it merely declines to adjudicate or makes applicable its 
own law to parties or property before it.”55 
The opinion also establishes that it is self-evident that private international law does not 
apply to those cases where the actions or omissions at issue represent the practice followed by 
the majority of the members of the community of nations.  The greater part of foreign sovereigns 
who have issued judicial opinions on the question of the Act of State Doctrine have chosen not to 
foist inflexible rules or judicial rubrics.56 In stating that neither the inherent nature of 
sovereignty, nor principles of international law, constitute a basis for the use of the Act of State 
Doctrine, the Supreme Court held that the doctrine does find normative support in constitutional 
principles that arise from the fundamental relationship among the different branches of 
government comprising a political system.57 Irrespective of this fundamental analysis, it appears 
established that the use and development of the Act of State Doctrine constitutes the exclusive 
subject matter of federal jurisprudence because both the judicial and the executive branches of 
 
53 Underhill, supra, at 521. 
 
54 See e.g., United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937); Shapleigh v. 
Mier, 299 U.S. 468 (1937); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 
U.S. 304 (1918); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 
55 Id. at 421-422. 
 
56 Id. at 422.  The Court stated: “No international arbitral or judicial decision discovered suggests that international 
law proscribes recognition of sovereign acts of foreign governments [citing Oppenheim’s International Law, Section 
115aa (Lauterpacht, 8th ed. 1955)] and apparently no claim has ever been raised before an international tribunal that 
failure to apply the act of state doctrine constitutes a breach of international obligation.  If international law does not 
proscribe the use of the doctrine, neither does it forbid application of the rule even if it claimed that the act of state 
in question violated international law.  The traditional view of international law is that it establishes substantive 
principles for determining whether one country has wronged another.”  Id. at 422. 
 
57 Id. at 423.  This proposition is premised on the reasoning that in applying the doctrine, the judicial branch is 
opining on the legitimacy and validity of acts and omissions undertaken by foreign sovereigns.  Consequently, 
pursuant to one school of thought, such activity undertaken by the judicial branch may hamper rather than galvanize 
the foreign policy objectives that the executive branch may have fashioned for the United States, as well as the 
political goals of the community of nations.  Id. 
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government may apply the doctrine depending upon the factual specificity of a particular case 
and the foreign policy concern at issue.58 
After distancing itself from the five propositions59 that defendants raised, the Court 
explained that “[h]owever offensive to the public policy of this country and its constituent states 
an expropriation of this kind may be, we conclude that both the national interest and progress 
toward the goal of establishing the rule of law among nations are best served by maintaining 
intact the act of state doctrine in this realm of its application.”60 
Put simply, because the Act of State Doctrine proscribed any challenge to the legitimacy 
and validity of the Cuban expropriation decree under the facts of the case presented, the Supreme 
Court reversed the Second Circuit’s holding and remanded with instructions for the district court 
to take whatsoever steps may be necessary to implement the Court’s mandate. 
E. The Separation of Powers
In Sabbatino the Supreme Court predicated its analysis and holding on a principle of 
conceptual unity extracted from the elements of U.S. civil procedure jurisprudence.  Curiously, 
notwithstanding the proliferation of pages where the Court enunciated in painstaking detail its 
reasoning, conclusion, and dissenting opinion, the word “comity” only appears once in the 
entirety of the opinion.  Nonetheless, the Court expressly emphasized that neither the inherent 
nature of the principle of sovereignty, nor any precedent before a judicial or arbitral tribunal, 
justified application of the Act of State Doctrine.  
This very penumbra between judicially established precedents and settled principles of 
law, as with the time honored doctrine of sovereignty, is conceptually indistinguishable from the 
space that the Supreme Court fashioned seventy years earlier in Hilton v. Guyot. In this latter 
case, the Court found it necessary to create a new juridic category that found absolutely no 
support in traditional concepts of legally binding obligations, international courtesies, or 
 
58 This policy may be enacted by executive decree (State Department) or legislatively (congress). 
 
59 First, that by virtue of Banco Exterior Nacional de Cuba, as a government instrumentality, the government of 
Cuba lacks standing to file an action in the United States based upon the principle of comity because of Cuba’s 
status as a foreign sovereign hostile to the United States.  Id. at 410.  Second, defendants averred that Cuba had only 
expropriated contractual rights from the venue where those rights theoretically were reposed: New York.  Hence, it 
is New York law that would govern and apply to any judicial proceeding.  Id. at 411.  Third, defendants also alleged 
that because the subject matter of the expropriation was sugar, the complaint was one that sought the 
implementation of a foreign sovereign’s political policy.  Such actions are not deemed justiciable by U.S. courts.  Id. 
at 412.  Fourth, it was asserted that even in the absence of a generally accepted standard for gauging the legitimacy 
of an expropriation, such as the one sub judice, the cumulative effect of (i) retaliation, (ii) discrimination, and (iii) 
lack of a viable formula for compensating the owners of the expropriated property, all overwhelmingly suggest a 
violation of private international law.  Fifth and final, defendants alleged that the economic pressure that would 
necessarily follow from the proposed exception [the “Bernstein doctrine”] to the Act of State defense would 
materially impair the protection of U.S. investments overseas.  Id. at 419. 
 
60 Id. at 420. 
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deferences concerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign interlocutory or final 
judgments.  The same rubric of comity cloaked with the mantle of constitutional principles 
underlying governments constituted by the separation of powers has served as an analytical 
fulcrum for the construction of a framework that would allow for the application of this doctrine 
without that application being deemed an obligation or a courtesy endemic to the doctrine of 
sovereignty and with origins traceable to international law precedent. 
Comity assumes and emphasizes that neither normative principles having compulsory 
configurations nor courtesies of a diplomatic ilk suffice for purposes of governing and 
jurisprudentially organizing the legal relationships among nations and the attendant disparate 
legal systems.  Therefore, it becomes necessary to obviate the very first principles and premises 
of private international law (i.e., obligation  and courtesy) so that a new theoretical and practical 
paradigm of analysis may be developed to its final conclusions and consequences in the 
theoretical arena towards a principle of unification that shall lend itself to fostering uniformity, 
reasonableness, predictability, party autonomy, and judicial restraint.  The negation of traditional 
precepts so that new principles may be developed to their extreme and final consequences 
bestows upon the principle of comity an appearance akin to the fundamental premise of 
contemporary modern geometry, which despite the inevitable consequences of disavowing the 
symmetry of Euclidean aesthetics, takes as an organizing principle the proposition that parallel 
lines in fact do meet and intersect, contrary to the Fifth Postulate contained in the Elements.61 
The nature of its formal and non-substantive use ascribed by courts to the concept of 
comity is yet to be explored in depth and detail.  To date, the use of the concept of comity has 
lacked substantive normative foundation as in the compulsory concept of an “obligation.”  By 
definition the courts also have rendered the concept of comity bereft of any substantive content 
comparable in any way to the concept of “courtesy” as a diplomatic norm.  In addition, comity 
also fails to comport with the principle of “equity”. 
 
Equity finds its origins in the “justice” that royal courts would administer in 
extraordinary and exceptional cases of last resort.  Comity is simply not rooted in precepts of 
solomonic “justice.”  Comity is far afield from this plain standard.  Its formal expression, like a 
formulistic syllogism without content, provides a new prospect and opening for the analysis and 
 
61 The First Book of Euclid’s Elements sets forth the renowned Fifth Postulate:  
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That, if a straight line falling on two straight lines causes the interior angles, of the straight line falling on 
the two straight lines, to be less than two 90° angles each on the same side of the line, the two straight lines, 
if indefinitely extended would intersect on that same side where the angles measure less than 180°, or two 
right angles [translation by the author]. 
 
18 
practical application of issues in the arena of conflicts of international law as ancient as the 
nature of men and of legal conflicts themselves. 
 
Here we attempt to begin the process of providing the unique concept of comity with a 
normative foundation and a substantive analytical framework that may contribute to the 
unification of private procedural international law.  As a predicate, however, tracing the contours 
of the use of the principle as a quasi formal precept is necessary.   
 
The use of comity cloaked in an analytical rubric is found rather clearly in the Supreme 
Court’s analysis in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba.62 Notably, it is in 
Justices Marshall, Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun’s descending opinion that we may first glean 
an application of comity as a unifying principle in a pragmatic setting.  The majority opinion 
instead appears to lose itself in a less than lucid analysis discussing the Act of State Doctrine in a 
purported commercial scenario pursuant to which the Court details the sovereign as an entity that 
acted in the same manner as would a private individual and not in conformance with acts and 
omissions attendant to the task of administering a sovereignty.   
 
In Alfred Dunhill, the Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling and held that 
the Republic of Cuba could not find immunity for its acts or forbearances in the Act of State 
Doctrine when it refused to reimburse three creditors who asserted claims over funds that were 
purportedly owed to them based on the Cuban government’s expropriation of five (5) cigar 
manufacturing plants owned and operated by Cuban citizens.  While the Court’s analysis at first 
glance appears to be ostensibly clear, it is opaque in its recurring use of different doctrines 
despite a very narrow analysis that was supposedly focused on the solitary issue of determining 
the circumstances pursuant to which the Act of State Doctrine would be applicable where a 
sovereign refuses to recognize a debt arising from the expropriation or confiscation of property.63 
62 425 U.S. 682, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed.2d 301 (1976). 
 
63 As already referenced, here the government of Fidel Castro took control of five cigar manufacturing plants 
belonging to Cuban nationals.  When the government assumed control of the manufacturing plants, it 
appointed “interventores” (the equivalent of receivers) charged with operating the plants in a commercially 
viable protocol.  Id at 605.  The subject plants had kept accounts with U.S. purchasers open.  One of these 
accounts pertained to Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. During the 18 month window period between the 
“nationalization” of the plants and the imposition of the U.S. embargo on all trade with Cuba, the U.S. 
importers of tobacco received product from the plants.  These importers also transferred payment in 
consideration for the purchase of the product to Cuba in the normal course of business.  The plants’ former 
owners fled Cuba to the United States and filed an action against the U.S. importers alleging: (i) trademark 
infringement, (ii) restitution for payments tendered for shipments sent prior to the government’s 
intervention in the plants, and (iii) payment of funds due and owing for product shipments post-
intervention.  The District court allowed the government of Cuba to intervene in these disputes.  Id at 685-
686.  The former plant owners alleged that their property had been confiscated without any just 
compensation let alone, and that the United States should not condone such confiscations.  Finally the 
former owners added that even if they were unable to recover their manufacturing plants, inventories, and 
other properties pursuant to a final judgment issued by a Federal Court of competent jurisdiction, at least 
they would be entitled to recoup a liquidated sum owed to them.  Id at 687. 
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It is critical to underscore that the Court’s point of departure in reversing the Second 
Circuit’s ruling rested on two fundamental premises.  First, it observed that “[n]o statute, decree, 
order or resolution of the Cuban government itself was offered in evidence indicating that Cuba 
had repudiated its obligations in general or any class thereof or that it had, as a sovereign matter, 
determined to confiscate the amounts due to three of the foreign importers.”64 Second, the Court 
found analytic support in the old chestnut  authored by Justice Marshall where a distinction was 
drawn between (i) public and governmental acts undertaken by a sovereign, and (ii) private and 
routine commercial activity transacted by private individuals.65 
In an effort to develop this line of reasoning and apply it to the issue before the Court, the 
majority noted that the line dividing the limit and parameters of the Act of State Doctrine from a 
foreign sovereign’s refusal to honor a commercial debt, must to be emphasized.  Accordingly, 
such debts, the majority reasoned, should not be deemed beyond the purview of U.S. Courts.66 
Here the Supreme Court highlighted its opinion concerning the State Department’s 
pronouncement and the potential inconsistencies that may arise were there to be a doctrinal 
conflict arising from the application of the Act of State Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy.  
Without abandoning the premise that commercial activities susceptible to execution by private 
actors are private and, therefore, beyond the Act of State Doctrine’s ambit, the Court concluded 
that in order to avoid “embarrassing conflicts with the executive branch”67, and inconsistencies 
 
The District Court held that the former owners had a right to receive payment for shipments realized prior 
to the intervention and that the Republic of Cuba had every right to receive payments tendered post-
intervention.  This ruling purported to be premised on application of the Act of State Doctrine because, as 
the Court reasoned, post-intervention commercial activities proscribed all interference by U.S. Courts 
concerning acts legitimately undertaken by foreign sovereign concerning property within its own national 
territory.  Id at 686-687. 
 
64 Id at 695.  
 
65 The Court specifically cited Justice Marshall’s opinion in Bank of the United States v. Planter’s Bank of 
Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904, 907 (1824): 
 
It is, we think, a sound principle, that when a government becomes a partner in any 
trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the transactions of that company, of 
its sovereign character, and takes that of a private citizen.  Instead of communicating to 
the company its privileges and its prerogatives, it descends to a level with those with 
whom it associates itself, and takes the character which belongs to its associates, and to 
the business which is to be transacted.  Id at 695-696. 
 
66 Id at 698.  Citing a letter dated November 26, 1975, from the United States Department of State stating 
through its Legal Advisor  that “we [the Department of State] do not believe that the Dunhill case raises an 
act of state question because the case involves an act which is commercial, and not public, in nature.”  
(emphasis supplied)  
 
67 Id at 698. 
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between the judicial and the executive branches of government, it would not amplify the doctrine 
so as to encompass a foreign sovereign’s commercial debt.  The Court cited the now famous 
“Tate Letter”68 as an example of the Department of State’s Policy favoring a restrictive rather 
than an absolute immunity with respect to the amenability of foreign sovereign to be haled into 
U.S. Courts.69 
Regrettably, the Court engaged in a less than rigorous analysis that indiscriminately 
borrowed from at least three different doctrines (act of state, foreign sovereign immunity, and 
comity) without formally distinguishing among them or otherwise identifying their substantive 
character.   
 
F. The conceptual distinction between the doctrines of Foreign Sovereign 
Immunities and Act of State
The categorical dilemma that the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alfred Dunhill presents is 
clear enough. The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunities70 is materially distinct in its 
underlying tenets and juridic purpose from the Act of State Doctrine.  Quite remarkably, none of
the parties to the Dunhill of London case raised at all foreign sovereign immunity as a legal 
theory in the proceeding.  In fact, the Court sua sponte introduced the doctrine and its analysis as 
part of the effort to broaden the Act of State Doctrine so as to bring within the scope of this 
doctrine acts and omissions on the part of a foreign sovereign within its national territory that are 
beyond the classic doctrinal immunity paradigm.  The conceptional mistake is serious and 
sufficiently significant that it did not pass without mention in the dissenting opinion. 
 
68 During the first part of the Twentieth century some foreign sovereigns abandoned the classical theory of 
absolute foreign sovereign immunity in favor of a more liberal restrictive theory.   This “new” more 
flexible theory does not accord immunity to foreign sovereigns with respect to commercial activities but 
still preserves immunity protection as to public acts.  In 1952 the State Department adopted the restrictive 
theory of foreign sovereign immunity in a letter authored by its Legal Advisor, Mr. Jack Tate.  See Gary B. 
Born, International Civil Litigation In United States Courts 2001-2002 (3rd  ed. 1996).  
 
69 The Court stated: 
 
[T]he United States abandoned the absolute theory of sovereign immunity and embraced the 
restrictive view under which immunity in our Courts should be granted only with respect to causes of action arising 
out of a foreign state’s public or governmental actions and not with respect to those arising out of its commercial or 
proprietary actions.  This has been the official policy of our Government since that time as the attached letter of 
November 26, 1975, confirms: 
 
‘Moreover, since 1952, the Department of State has adhered to the position that the commercial 
and private activities of foreign states do not give rise to sovereign immunity.  Implicit in this 
position is a determination that adjudications of commercial liability against foreign states do not 
impede the conduct of foreign relations, and that such adjudications are consistent with 
international law on sovereign immunity.’  Id.
70 This doctrine is analyzed in considerable detail in Section ___. 
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Analysis of the dissent demonstrates the anomalies inherent in the reasoning of the 
Court’s majority opinion.  The dissenting Justices underscored that “[u]nder any realistic view of 
the facts of this case, the intervenor’s retention of and refusal to return funds paid to them by 
Dunhill constitutes an “act of state,” and no affirmative recovery by Dunhill can rest on the 
invalidity of that conduct.  The Court of Appeals so concluded, and I would affirm its 
judgment.”71 
Put plainly, the dissent beyond cavil asserted that the Act of State Doctrine can be 
triggered only by a “statute, decree, order, or resolution” of a foreign government, or that the 
presence of an act of state can only be demonstrated by some affirmative action by the 
sovereign.72 This observation comports with the logical necessity of having substance prevail 
over form.  It is common for sovereigns to exercise their sovereignty  pursuant to formal means, 
such as executive or legislative enactments or other measures reduced to a formal decree.73 It 
would be a material mistake, however, to equivocate non-formulistic acts or forbearances with 
the doctrine’s inapplicability, particularly because sovereigns commonly also exercise acts and 
omissions endemic to the administration of their sovereignty pursuant to less formulistic 
methodologies. 
 
It is the actual content of the act and not its form that is determinative in the applicability 
of the Act of State Doctrine.  Here the dissent is conceptually clear and demonstrates greater 
internal consistency in its analysis than the majority issuing the opinion for the Court. 
 
Equally disconcerting is the majority opinion’s premise that the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity does not extend immunity to foreign sovereigns acting as private entities or 
in commercial matters.74 The dissent rightfully observed that the Court never adopted the 
restrictive theory and, therefore, within the confines of the opinion there is no judicial basis from 
which to infer that such a theory can be imposed on the Act of State Doctrine. 
 
It remains settled, based upon the dissent’s analysis, that the doctrine of sovereign 
immunity and the act of state doctrine, although related in some fundamental ways, differ in their 
respective objectives and methodologies of application.75 Foreign sovereign immunity provides 
 
71 Id at 716. 
 
72 Id.
73 Id at 719. 
 
74 Id
75 It is important to note that the corollary to the Act of State Doctrine, at least within the ambit of free 
enterprise in foreign commerce, is the precept providing that an individual or corporate entity forced to act 
in a specific manner as a result of a particular governmental decree would be protected as if the acts of this 
private individual or entity were those of a sovereign acting within the confines of its national territory and 
exercising acts or omissions inherent in governance within its geopolitical territory.  The compulsory 
character of a sovereign mandate itself gives rise to the protection of private individuals or entities that 
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a foreign sovereign named as a defendant with immunity simply by virtue of the sovereign’s 
status as a sovereign per se, without any further analysis or consideration.  This standard is worth 
emphasizing when submitted to analysis within the conceptual framework of the act of state 
doctrine.  Notably, the act of state doctrine does not confer immunity upon a foreign sovereign 
simply because of a defendant’s status.  Instead, the act of state doctrine is but a tenet that 
advises the Court as to the applicable substantive law of the jurisdiction at issue.   
 
This precept had been eloquently articulated by the very Court in Sabbatino when 
observing that the act of state doctrine “although it shares with the immunity doctrine a respect 
for sovereign states, concerns the limits for determining the validity of an otherwise applicable 
rule of law.”76 The act of state doctrine is rooted in the ancient axiom asserting that the acts of 
sovereigns, pursuant to specific scenarios, shall be deemed political issues that are not 
cognizable by U.S. courts.77 In First National City Bank,78 Justice Brennan succinctly identified 
 
stems from the act of state doctrine.  See e.g., Interamerican Refining Corp. v. Texaco Maracaibo, Inc., 307 
F.Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970) (holding that it was a complete defense to antitrust suit that plaintiff’s 
suppliers and traders were compelled by regulatory authorities in Venezuela to engage in concerted boycott 
designed to deny plaintiff, the Venezuelan crude oil required for operation of plaintiff that planned to 
process low cost Venezuelan crude in a bonded refinery in Bayonne, New Jersey.  Indeed, the Court here 
noted that “[w]hen a nation compels a trade practice, firms have no choice but to obey.  Acts of business 
become effectively acts of the sovereign.”)  (Id at 1298, F.N.18).   
 
Also, mere sanction or political sympathy expressed on behalf of a sovereign with respect to specific acts 
or omissions of a private corporation will not be deemed sufficient to ensure act of state protection to the 
private entity.  See United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268, 47 S.Ct. 592, 71 L.Ed. 1042 (1927) 
(rejecting the proposition advanced by plaintiffs that a conspiracy organized in the United States with the 
aim of monopolizing sales to the United States was not susceptible to act of state protection simply because 
an element of the subject conspiracy had been favorably approved by foreign official).   
 
This distinction between the compulsion of private entities by sovereigns and acts committed by private 
persons that have met with official government approval was of decisive importance in United States v. The 
Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cases P 70, 60 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). 
 
Finally, there is a third permutation that needs to be highlighted.  A final judgment under specific 
circumstances, may be deemed an act of state triggering immunity.  It is typically recognized that judicial 
pronouncements concerning the rights of private parties in litigation cannot be construed as the acts of a 
sovereign.  Parallel to this precept it also has been observed that court rulings do not per se constitute the 
methodology used by sovereigns to protect public interests.   
 
76 Id. at 438.  When examined through the prism of an “applicable law” concept rather than an immunity 
arising from the character or title of a sovereign, the analysis with respect to act of state doctrine significantly 
distances itself from the test used in applying the foreign sovereign immunity rubric.  If two nations do not have a 
treaty addressing venue or choice of law, it still remains clear that even the most rudimentary principles of 
international law accord the act of state doctrine a presumption of validity extending to the acts or omissions of a 
sovereign undertaken within its national territory.  The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunity, however, without 
ever considering the merits of a cause, simply presupposes that a sovereign is not susceptible to being sued in a civil 
proceeding filed in a federal district court.  This difference between the doctrines is material and substantial.   
 
77 Id. 
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five propositions to consider in determining if a foreign sovereign’s acts undertaken within its 
own national territory constitute a political issue or question.79 The five prong standard is 
practical and succinct: (i) the absence of consensus with respect to applicable international rules, 
(ii) a paucity or lack of standards by dint of treaty or other agreements, (iii) the existence and 
recognition of a foreign sovereign, (iv) deference accorded to issues of national importance, and 
(v) the executive branch’s ability to secure a just and adequate remedy for all U.S. citizens who 
may have been prejudiced.80 
When carefully considered significant and substantive differences are brought into sharp 
relief with respect to the reasoning and methodology applied in Sabbatino, and Alfred Dunhill of 
London, Inc.  As a point of departure, it is necessary to observe that neither case finds analytic 
support in the concept of comity. Sabbatino, despite its fleeting reference to the doctrine, holds 
that acts undertaken by a foreign sovereign within its national territory that affect both foreigners 
and U.S. citizens perfectly comport with the act of state doctrine and, therefore, the doctrine was 
applied as a defense to the expropriation there at issue.  The Court in that case held that the 
doctrine is viable and binding even in the presence of averments asserting that the expropriation 
at issue was (i) precipitated by political retribution, (ii) established without a methodology for 
just compensation, (iii) motivated only by the objective to sanction, and (iv) lacking in 
foundation in international law.  Indeed, the owners of the property vehemently asserted that 
because the expropriation was in stark violation of international law, the act of state doctrine was 
wholly inapplicable.  This proposition notwithstanding, the doctrine was held to constitute an 
absolute defense in favor of the expropriation.   
 
Scarcely twelve years later, a reconfigured Court,81 but well aware of the holding in 
Sabbantino, completely distanced itself from the governing standard applied to the act of state 
doctrine, and elects not to analyze the material differences between the objectives and the 
application of this doctrine, and instead engages in judicial restraint refraining from application 
of the doctrine pursuant to the novel principle that no “statute, decree, order, or resolution”82 was 
issued by a foreign sovereign (in this case Cuba).  The analysis in Sabbatino is completely 
irreconcilable with the majority’s reasoning in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc.  The only link 
between the two analyses is found in the dissenting opinion in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. 
There is no juridic foundation justifying the imposition and formulistic transfer, without 
more, of the exceptions that proscribe application of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunities 
to the governing standard for application of the act of state doctrine.  This conceptual error 
 
78 See, First National City Bank, supra at 788.   
 
79 Id.
80 See First National City Bank, supra, at 788.   
81 The Sabbantino Court consisted of justices Black, Brennan, Clark, Douglas, Harlan, Stewart, Warren, and 
White.  Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Burger, Marshall, Powell, Rundquist, Stevens, Stewart, and White served on 
the Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. Court.   
 
82 Id. at 696. 
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pervades the holding in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. and thus ignores the underlying policy 
purposes and particularities of both doctrines.  The doctrine of foreign sovereign immunities, 
with its seven exceptions,83 is only concerned with the status of a party to the proceeding as 
either a sovereign or a non-sovereign entity.  This analysis is simple enough.  Is the entity at 
issue recognized by the community of nations as a sovereign?84 If the answer is in the 
affirmative, then the step to follow is determining whether the activity is covered by one or more 
of the seven (7) cognizable exceptions to the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunities.   
 
The act of state doctrine limits itself to determining whether the foundation of a judicial 
proceeding is constituted by a political question or issue. This analysis has spawned an elaborate 
rubric85 that rests on five elements.  That standard does not foreclose consideration of the 
particular facts at issue to determine whether an act is capable of being performed by a private 
party instead of being exclusively endemic to a sovereign’s exercise of sovereignty.  In the 
context of the Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. case, not even this latter observation was enough to 
justify application of the doctrine even though the act of “expropriating” can only be executed by 
a sovereign.  It cannot be sufficiently underscored that the act of state doctrine does not consist in 
prescribing a procedural immunity to sovereigns but rather concerns the determination of the law 
applicable to the facts underlying the proceeding. 
 
Curiously, the majority opinion in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. also omitted reference 
to the distinction between jurisdiction (foreign sovereign immunity) and the issue of applicable 
law (act of state doctrine).  The Court did emphasize the need to mention, quite in passing, this 
distinction but only accords to it the dignity of a footnote.86 Therefore the two principles that 
 
83 As shall be noted, the most notable and significant of these exceptions is the commercial activity exception.
84 It is impossible to define with mathematical precision the community of nations. Nonetheless, a persuasive, 
if not governing, polestar would be those nations officially recognized by the United Nations.   
 
85 Citibank, supra, at 788; Sabbatino, supra, at 472-76.   
86 The Court limits its observation on this most important issue as follows: 
 
The dissent states that the doctrines of sovereign immunity and act of state are 
distinct the former conferring on a sovereign ‘exemption from suit by virtue of 
its status’ and the latter ‘merely (telling) a Court what law to apply to a case.’  It 
may be true that the one doctrine has been described in jurisdictional terms and 
the other in choice-of-law terms; and it may be that the doctrines point to 
different results in certain cases.  It cannot be said, however, that the proper 
application of each involves a balancing of the injury to our foreign policy, the 
conduct of which is committed primarily to the Executive Branch, through 
judicial affronts to sovereign powers, compare: Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. at 
35-36, 65 S.Ct. at 532-533, 89 L.Ed. at 735 (sovereign immunity), with Banco 
National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, [citation omitted] (act of state) against the injury 
to the private party, who is denied justice through judicial deference to a raw 
assertion of sovereignty, and a consequent injury to international trade.  The 
state department has concluded that in the commercial arena the need for 
merchants ‘to have their rights determined in Courts’ outweighs any injury 
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would be dispositive for purposes of a comprehensive analysis concerning the viability of the 
application of the act of state doctrine were ignored, or in the jurisdictional context of foreign 
sovereign immunity, arbitrarily applied in defining a doctrine that has a different methodology of 
application and an equally distinguishable goal from that of the act of state doctrine.  The Court 
also rejected application of the act of state doctrine where international law had been 
transgressed.  The analysis in Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. signals a lack of deference 
conferred to the acts of a sovereign (the Republic of Cuba87) that is rooted in the very principle 
of comity.   
 
Significantly, the Court cannot arrive at its holding based upon a normative principle of 
jurisprudence constituting an obligation.  Neither did the Court ignore the participation of a 
sovereign in the proceeding, and at least at a very superficial level, it did make reference to the 
respect typically accorded to sovereigns.  Notwithstanding this observation, the Court did not 
premise its holding on concepts of courtesy.  Instead, the true decisive factor can be found in the 
very penumbra occupying the realm between obligation and courtesy, in the new juridic space 
that renders viable legal analysis and the need to dispense with recourse to static doctrines that 
by definition are incapable of embracing different juridic and meta-juridic precepts arising from 
the very particularity of facts that define the limits of each case.88 
to foreign policy.  This conclusion was reached in the context of the 
jurisdictional problem of sovereign immunity.  We reach the same one in the 
choice of law context of the act of state doctrine.  425 U.S. at 706, fn 18 
(emphasis supplied).   
 
87 It should be observed that in contrast with Sabbatino, where the Republic of Cuba was an implicit party to 
the case by virtue of its instrumentality (Banco Exterior de la República de Cuba), here the Republic of Cuba itself is 
an actual party to the litigation as a defendant/receiver.  This formulistic posture, without more, underscores the 
need to study in greater depth and detail the facts at issue, particularly when one of the parties to the proceeding is 
an actual sovereign and not a sovereign’s representative having the status of agent or instrumentality.   
88 In 1990 the Supreme Court decided Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 
400, its most recent pronouncement on the act of state doctrine.  In W.S. Kirkpatrick, defendant (Kirkpatrick) 
pursuant to a bribe secured a contract for the construction and furnishing of an aerial/medical center in an Air Force 
base in Nigeria.  The plaintiff (Environmental Tectonics Corp.), another bidder, upon learning of the bribe reported 
Kirkpatrick to the United States Embassy in Lagos, pursuant to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. A criminal 
prosecution ensued as a result of investigations conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigations.  Parallel to the 
criminal proceeding, plaintiff filed an action in federal district court against Kirkpatrick.  493 U.S. at 402-403.  The 
Federal District Court required and received an opinion from the Department of State of the United States 
concerning the application of the act of state doctrine and proceeded to decide the case on summary judgment.  The 
Court dismissed the action upon holding that the act of state doctrine applies where the motive of a foreign 
sovereign may give rise to embarrassment to the foreign sovereign or constitute an obstacle in the foreign relations 
policy of the United States.  Id. at 403.  The Third Circuit Court of Appeals expressed a different opinion and based 
on the State Department’s opinion held that judicial intervention in the purpose of a foreign sovereign’s acts would 
not interfere with U.S. foreign policy because in the case at issue no party had petitioned to nullify the act at issue, 
and thus reversed the District Court’s ruling.  Id. at 403-404. 
 
The Supreme Court, in an opinion authored by Justice Antonin Scalia reversed the Third Circuit.  The 
Court first framed the issue before it as “whether the act of state doctrine bars a Court in the United States from 
entertaining the cause of action that does not rest upon the asserted invalidity of an official act of a foreign 
sovereign, but that does require imputing to foreign officials an unlawful motivation (the obtaining of bribes) in the 
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G. The Taking of Evidence and The Hague
The space between obligation and judicial courtesy rarely has been more pervasively 
invaded than in addressing evidence gathering in the context of international litigation.  The case 
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. US District Court for the Southern District of 
Iowa, is eloquent on this point and by any measure must be deemed a seminal development.89 
Here, the Supreme Court identified the exquisite issue before it as “the extent to which a federal 
district court must employ the procedures set forth in the Convention90 when litigants seek 
answers to interrogatories,91 the production of documents,92 and admissions93 from a French 
adversary over whom the Court has personal jurisdiction.”94 After filing an answer to the 
 
performance of such official act.”  Id. at 401.  In answering this inquiry in the negative, the Court first engaged in a 
rather detailed analysis of its own precedent and acknowledged that the jurisprudence addressing the act of state 
doctrine has evolved and developed from a doctrine first bottomed on the concept of “international comity” (Oetjen) 
to one predicated on the separation of powers (Sabbatino). Id. at 404-405.  Moreover, the Court distinguished the 
case before it from its other opinions on the doctrine by stating that in the action sub judice the adjudication of the 
claims or defenses did not require a finding that the official act at issue was valid or invalid.  Id. at 406.  The Court 
rejected the proposition that considerations of comity extended to the acts of foreign sovereigns are of no moment 
when at issue is only the motivation of an act and not its validity or legality. Id. at 408.  In its conclusion, the Court 
explained that “[t]he act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for cases and controversies that may 
embarrass foreign governments, but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns 
taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid.  That doctrine has no application to the present case 
because the validity of no foreign sovereign act is at issue.”  Id. at 409-410.   
 
Even though this case, to some extent clarifies the doctrine’s contours in situations where it is invoked as a 
defense based upon the underlying motive of a foreign sovereign’s public acts, it also represents an affirmation of 
the tendency to sever the act of state doctrine from its original roots in comity and reconciliation, and to subject the 
doctrine to an analysis premised on the separation of powers.  As Professor Koh has stated, “the basic legal analysis. 
. . . should be respectful, but not blind deference directed at the opinion of the Executive Branch.”  Koh, supra at 
231 (adding that foreign sovereign immunity, the act of state doctrine, and the interpretation of treaties, are legal and 
not political questions that should be addressed by the Courts.)   
 
89 482 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 2542, 96 L.Ed. 2d 461 (1987).   
 
90 The term “convention” refers to the Hague Evidence Convention.  The Hague Convention on the Taking of 
Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, open to signatories on March 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. 
No. 744.   
 
91 See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 33.   
 
92 See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34.   
 
93 See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 36.   
 
94 Id.  In this case plaintiffs were French corporations organized under the laws of France (Societe Nationale 
Industrielle Aerospatiale is a corporation that belongs to the government of France.  The second defendant, Societe 
de Construccion d’Avions de Tourism is a subsidiary of Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale.)  Both 
defendants engage in the business of designing, manufacturing, and marketing airplanes.  One of its airplanes, the 
“Rallye” according to the averments, was publicly represented in advertising in the United States as “the world’s 
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complaint, defendants applied for a protective order seeking issuance of an order precluding 
plaintiffs from conducting discovery.  The motion was based on the proposition that defendants 
“French corporations, and the discovery sought can only be found in a foreign state, namely 
France, the Hague Convention dictated the exclusive procedures that must be followed for 
pretrial discovery.”  Id.  Plaintiffs did acknowledge that pursuant to French criminal law, 
defendants were proscribed from responding to the discovery demands to the extent that such 
demands were not within the Hague Convention’s purview.   
 
The motion for protective order was denied by the federal magistrate judge who noted:  
 
that [t]o permit the Hague evidence convention to override the 
federal rules of civil procedure would frustrate the Courts’ 
interests, which particularly arise in product’s liability cases, in 
protecting United States citizens from harmful products and in 
compensating them for injuries arising from use of such products.95 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals on a writ of mandamus filed by petitioners held that, 
“when the district court has jurisdiction over a foreign litigant the Hague Convention does not 
apply to the production of evidence in that litigant’s possession, even though the documents and 
information sought may physically be located within the territory of a foreign signatory to the 
convention.”96 
Significantly, the Eighth Circuit rejected the proposition that international considerations 
of comity require plaintiffs first to exhaust those procedures that the Hague Convention 
functionally outlines and only as a last resort, upon proffering futility based upon Hague 
Convention evidence taking efforts, made plaintiffs resort to the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The Eighth Circuit enunciated that the possibility of reversing orders issued by 
foreign tribunals denying the production of documents would be more prejudicial than 
whatsoever benefits would redound in promoting considerations of international comity.97 In 
this context, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the objections bottomed on the French penal 
 
safest and most economical STOL plane.”  Id. at 525.  As one may surmise upon hearing so ambitious and bold a 
statement, on August 19, 1980, a Rallye crashed in Iowa injuring the pilot and a passenger.  Three individuals 
independently filed actions in the United States Federal District Court for the Southern District of Iowa based upon 
the accident.  These plaintiffs alleged the defendant had manufactured and introduced planes in the stream of 
commerce that were defective and thus defendants were responsible based on theories of negligence and breach of 
warranty.  The three cases were consolidated before one judge and referred to a federal magistrate pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. §636(c)(1) id.
95 Id. 
96 Id.  The Eighth Circuit disagreed with defendants’ proposition that this interpretation of the treaty would be 
akin to wresting all substantive meaning from the Hague Convention.  Here the Eighth Circuit noted that the 
Convention still served the very useful purpose of being a functional mechanism for the taking of evidence from 
non-parties to the proceeding.   
 
97 Id.   
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statute should be part of a two-prong analysis.  First, consideration must be accorded to the issue 
of whether the order proscribing production of documents was appropriate even though 
compliance with the order would violate French law.  Second, it is equally necessary to 
determine what sanctions are to be imposed in the event that defendants are unable to comply 
with the order.  The appellate court held that the magistrate judge had satisfactorily addressed the 
first inquiry and that it was not yet ripe to respond to the second.98 
After canvassing the contours of the historical negotiations that led to the drafting and 
signing of the Hague Convention, and meticulously studying the material terms that govern its 
implementation, the Supreme Court affirmed the Eight Circuit’s holding.  Notwithstanding its 
affirmance, the Court held that it was necessary to analyze the interaction between the Hague 
Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Rules 26, 33, 34, and 36) concerning the 
production of documents and information.  The Court advanced this proposition, in part, because 
there exists at least four (4) interpretations that are universally recognized and used with respect 
to the relationship between the Hague Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
concerning the production of documents and the disclosure of information.99 
In elucidating the nature and character of these four (4) possible constructions of the 
Convention, the Supreme Court held that it could not “accept petitioners’ invitation to announce 
a new rule of law that would require first resort to Convention procedures whenever discovery is 
sought from a foreign litigant.”100 The Court stated that “[a]ssuming, without deciding, that we 
have the lawmaking power to do so [fashion Federal Rules of Civil Procedure], we are convinced 
that such a general rule would be unwise.  In many situations the Letter of Request procedure 
authorized by the Convention would be unduly time consuming and expensive, as well as less 
certain to produce needed evidence than direct use of the federal rules.”101 
98 Id.   
 
99 The four (4) interpretations are readily summarized.  First, there is a school of thought holding that the 
Hague Convention completely replaces and preempts the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in cases where the 
evidence is located within the jurisdiction of a foreign signatory and such evidence is earmarked for use in U.S. 
courts.  Second, the Hague Convention is susceptible to being interpreted as first applying, but not exclusively, its 
methodology.  Third, there is an interpretation of the Convention pursuant to which it supplements the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure and the convention’s functional methodologies remain as merely an option that may be exercised 
at the parties’ discretion.  Fourth and finally, the Convention can be viewed as an instrumentality adopted by 
sovereigns for purposes of facilitating the production of documents and disclosure of information such that U.S. 
courts should resort to it upon concluding that the Convention’s use is appropriate after having studied the 
specificity of the factual predicates comprising a particular case and the sui generis character of the parties, together 
with the interests of the foreign sovereign at issue.  See the court’s analysis at 482 U.S. at 533.   
 
100 Id. at 542.   
 
101 Id. Adoption of a rule that in all cases would command first resort to the Convention’s procedures, the 
Court reasoned, is inimical to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and would thus militate against “the overriding 
interest in the ‘just, speedy, and inexpensive determination’ of litigation in our courts.  See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 1.”   
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In summary, the Supreme Court concluded that having long “recognized the demands of 
comity in suits involving foreign states, either as parties or as sovereigns with a coordinate 
interest in the litigation.  [citing Hilton v. Guyot]”, the Court added, “American courts should 
therefore take care to demonstrate due respect for any special problem confronted by the foreign 
litigant on account of its nationality or the location of its operations, and for any sovereign 
interest expressed by a foreign state.  We do not articulate specific rules to guide this delicate 
task of adjudication.”102 
III. COMITY AS A UNIFYING PRINCIPLE
The Supreme Court’s holding in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale is 
disconcerting.  Notwithstanding its reference to the standard to be followed in a discovery 
comity analysis,103 the Court shied from fashioning any organizing principle that would govern 
the relationship between the Hague Convention and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the 
context of international discovery.  Quite the contrary, the Court’s analysis rests on concepts that 
are totally foreign to the principle of comity104 and fundamentally premised on a very pragmatic 
commercial contract interpretation analysis.  This reasoning and holding inevitably leave district 
and appellate courts without any guidance and encourages them to the extent that a comity 
analysis is at all applied, to do so without consideration of settled principles and considerations 
to be applied to the particularity of each individual case.   
 
102 Id. at 545.  Even though there is no consensus on a standard for the application of comity, the restatement 
of foreign relations law of the United States (revised) §437(1)(c) articulates a helpful test for any comity analysis:  
 
“(1) The importance to the. . . litigation of the documents or other information requested;  
 (2) The degree of specificity of the request; 
 (3) Whether the information originated in the United States; 
 (4) The availability of alternative means of securing the information; and  
 (5) The extent to which non-compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the 
United States, or compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where the 
information is located.”   
 
Significantly, while this rubric is helpful and laudable for purposes of facilitating a district court’s 
adjudication of a comity oriented discovery or gathering of evidence analysis, it does not bestow upon comity, nor in 
fairness does it purport to do so, any substantive meaning.   
 
103 Id. 
104 Significantly, the Court undertakes great pains to construe the Convention as merely a contract, and, thus, 
focuses its analysis on what is a rather surface contract interpretation exercise focusing on history and the text’s 
plain meaning.  This methodology finds ample precedent, but is hardly adequate in the international arena.  See e.g. 
Transworld Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 253 (1984) (applying standard contractual 
interpretation norms in international context); Ware v. Hylton, 3 D All. 199, 240-241, 1 L.Ed. 568 (1796); Air 
France v. Sachs, 470 U.S. 392, 397 (1985) (holding that the history of a treaty, the negotiations, and the practical 
construction adopted by the parties may be of relevance) (citing Choctaw Nation of Indians v. United States, 318 
U.S. 423, 431-432 (1943). 
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Of greater assistance to the practicing bar and bench would have been a reasoned opinion 
that not only underscored the importance of comity in private international law, but also one that 
sought to develop the jurisprudence of comity in this arena.105 Between an obligation and 
courtesy there is more than just a void wanting in rules of procedure and substance to be applied 
to particular cases based on the specific facts configuring each contention.  If the principle of 
comity is to play a significant and material role in private international law, it must be elevated to 
the status of a precept of reconciliation that harmoniously converges the norms and 
idiosyncrasies of different legal traditions and cultures as well as the foreign relations interests 
among members of the international community of nations.  Only by providing the doctrine of 
comity with a substantive rubric that attempts to reconcile these different premises and advance 
the principles of predictability, uniformity, party-autonomy, reasonableness, and judicial 
restrain in adjudicating civil international disputes.  Comity should be the unifying principle that 
organizes and reconciles diverse doctrinal and procedural principles that constitute the 
fundamental framework of U.S. private international procedural law and unites them under a 
common umbrella for purposes of reconciling different interests, diverse legal cultures, and 
shifting geopolitical exigencies.   
 
The dissent in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale deftly bridges the majority 
opinion’s conceptual gaps.106 These Justices sought to provide comity with substantive content:  
 
Comity is not just a vague political concern favoring international 
cooperation when it is in our interest to do so.  Rather it is a 
principle under which judicial decisions reflect the systemic value 
 
105 In a very well reasoned article a commentator has observed that international comity is often 
“misconstrued” and “poorly applied” as courts avail themselves of the doctrine for purposes of commenting on 
political issues.  The author suggests that international comity be used as “a legal doctrine that requires 
consideration of the practical needs of the forum state and the international system in creating a smoothly 
functioning mechanism for dispute resolution.”  Steven R. Swanson, The Vexatiousness of a Vexation Rule: 
International Comity and Anti-suit Injunctions, 30 Geo. Wash. J. Int’l. L. & Econ. 1, 14 (1996).  This “comity 
inclusive” approach stands in sharp relief with commentators who advocate for the complete abrogation of the 
doctrine.  See e.g. Daniel Tan, Anti-Suit Injunctions and the Vexing Problem of Comity, 45 Va. J. Int’l L. 283, 301 
205.  This author underscores the “protean” nature of comity and asserts that comity is (i) inherently uncertain, (ii) 
wanting in predictive value, (iii) under specific scenarios a distraction from a warranted equitable analysis, and (iv) 
difficult “to apply as a major substantive factor because the courts are not used to considering comity in determining 
whether to grant or deny equitable orders.   
 
Although such analyses are helpful in identifying the doctrinal incongruities arising from the application of 
a concept of comity that is devoid of any substantive elements beyond the general definition accorded to it when 
first referenced by the U.S. Supreme Court, they fail to assess the consequences stemming from the application of 
the doctrine as an organizing principle of reconciliation that may only be applied by considering such factors as (i) 
the interests of the parties, (ii) the interests of the United States, and (iii) the interests of the community of nations in 
preserving and developing an international legal rubric bottomed on uniformity, predictability, reasonableness, and 
judicial restraint.   
106 Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and O’Connor, authored the dissent.   
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of reciprocal tolerance and goodwill.107 As in the choice-of-law 
analysis, which from the very beginning has been linked to 
international comity, the threshold question in a comity analysis is 
whether there is in fact a true conflict between domestic and 
foreign law.  When there is a conflict, a court should seek a 
reasonable accommodation that reconciles the central concerns of 
both sets of laws.  In doing so, it should perform a tripartite 
analysis that considers the foreign interests, the interests of the 
United States, and the mutual interests of all nations in a smoothly 
functioning international legal regime.108 
Significantly, the dissent commented on how the venerable Justice Story applied the 
phrase “comity of nations” for purposes of expressing “the true foundation and extent of the 
obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another.”109 
Justice Story explained how “[t]he true foundation on which the administration of 
international law must rest is, that the rules which are to govern are those which arise from 
mutual interests and utility, from a sense of the inconveniences which would result from a 
contrary doctrine, and from a sort of moral necessity to do justice, in order that justice may be 
done to us in return.”110 
The dissent placed particular deference on the conflicts that arise from the different 
methodologies used in the common law system and the civil law (continental system) tradition in 
the effort to gather evidence.   
 
107 Citing to Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads, 76 Am.J.Int’l, L. 280, 281-285 (1982); J. Story 
Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws §§35, 38 (Am. Bigelo Ed. 1883).   
 
108 Id. at 555.  The dissent also critically analyzed that aspect of the majority opinion that leaves courts, 
practitioners, and commentators without any rubric or standard in a comity analysis.  The dissent was eloquent on 
this point:  
 
The principle of comity leads to more definite rules than the ad hoc approach 
endorsed by the majority.  The Court asserts that the concept of comity requires 
an individualized analysis of the interests present in each particular case before a 
court decides whether to apply the Convention.  [citation omitted]  There is, 
however, nothing inherent in the comity principle that requires case-by-case 
analysis.  The Court frequently has relied upon a comity analysis when it has 
adopted general rules to cover recurring situations in areas such as choice of 
forum, [citation omitted] maritime law [citation omitted] and sovereign 
immunity, [citation omitted] and the Court offers no reasons for abandoning that 
approach here.  Id. at 554.   
 
109 Story, supra, at §38.    
 
110 Id.  
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Accordingly, the relationship between the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning 
the production of documents and disclosure of information and its relationship with the Hague 
Convention in this field necessitates as a governing principle certainly a flexible framework but 
one having substantive content so as to render possible the reconciliation of disparate interests 
among sovereigns and different legal traditions and cultures that, at times, may appear to be in 
conflict with respect to the methodologies used to gather evidence from parties and non-parties.  
In the civil law or continental law tradition an officer of the Court is typically charged with the 
task of gathering evidence in the form of documents and testimony from parties and non-parties.  
This methodology stands in stark contrast when compared to the common law tradition where 
the parties, and not the Courts, are responsible for the production of documents and the gathering 
of information pursuant to procedural rules that may be perceived as unduly flexible and 
aggressive.111 
The application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning discovery, when 
viewed through the lens of international litigation, constitute an assault on the classic and 
traditional doctrine of territorial sovereignty, pursuant to which every sovereign enjoys a 
monopoly over the exercise of governmental powers within its national territory without the 
expectation that another sovereign shall engage in any judicial activity within a foreign 
sovereign’s national territory without first having received binding consent.112 The dissent 
explicitly referenced that the United States’ delegations to the 12th Session of the Hague 
Conference on private international law acknowledged that the taking of evidence in a country 
with laws based upon a civil law system may be construed as public judicial actions being 
undertaken by a foreign person or entity lacking authority to engage in such activity.113 The 
inevitable consequence of this common problem is not readily discernible.  By way of example, 
 
111 According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a), each party to a litigation has an obligation of providing 
the other party with (a) the name and contact information of every individual who may have relevant information 
pertaining to the facts of the case as framed by the pleadings, (b) a copy or description of all documents in the 
custody or control of a party that are relevant to the facts at issue in the dispute, (c) a computation of damages and 
prejudice averred by the party in question, and (d) any insurance contract that may provide coverage with respect to 
allegations asserted in the case.  Subsection 26(b)(1) is even more important.  That subsection establishes that the 
parties may secure discovery concerning any subject matter that is not privileged, but that is relevant to the issues in 
the litigation, again, as framed by the pleadings.   
 
112 In the paradigmatic case where this formulation is first enunciated, The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 
7 Cranch 116, 136, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812), Justice Marshall defined the concept as follows: 
 
The jurisdiction of [a] nation within its own territory is necessarily exclusive and 
absolute.  It is susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself.  Any restriction 
upon it, deriving validity from an external source, would imply a diminution of 
its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, and an investment of that 
sovereignty to the same extent in that power which could impose such 
restrictions.   
 
All exceptions, therefore, to the full and complete power of a nation within its 
own territories, must be traced up to the consent of the nation itself.  They can 
flow from no other legitimate source.  Id.
113 Id.  
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a U.S. Court’s issuance of an interlocutory order concerning property located in a foreign 
jurisdiction may likely constitute a violation of the classical traditional paradigm defining 
sovereignty.114 
This issue was very much at the forefront during the consultative drafting sessions of the 
Convention.  The process left the drafters with no alternative but to attempt to reconcile the very 
salient differences between an adversarial system and an inquisitorial regime.  This task clearly 
highlights the paradoxes to be reconciled.  What unifying principle can be fashioned for purposes 
of converging the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure concerning discovery and the Convention on 
this point?   
 
The dissent directly and explicitly addressed this issue and identified three (3) 
rudimentary interests on the part of the United States that are integrated in the Convention’s 
functional structure for the taking of evidence.  First, the dissent stated that it is “[t]he primary 
interest of the United States in this context is in providing effective procedures to enable litigants 
to obtain evidence abroad.”115 
Second, it was expressed that the United States demonstrated a meaningful interest in the 
equitable treatment of parties to a litigation.  In this connection, the dissent questioned the 
underpinnings of the majority’s assertion that use of the Convention would inevitably result in 
asymmetrical treatment favoring foreigners who would be able to avail themselves of the liberal 
discovery standards embodied in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure while U.S. citizens would 
be limited to more restrictive discovery and disclosure requirements promulgated in most civil 
law jurisdictions.  Here the dissent explained that Courts are privileged to “ ‘make any order 
which justice requires’ to limit discovery, including an order permitting discovery only on 
specified terms and conditions, by particular discovery method or with limitation in scope to 
certain matters.  Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 26(c)).”116 Likewise, the dissent made clear how the 
majority opinion erroneously focused “on the nationality of the parties, while it is actually the 
locus of the evidence that is relevant to use of the Convention: a foreign litigant trying to secure 
 
114 The dissent rightfully commented that “[u]nlike the common-law practice, which places upon the parties to 
the litigation the duty of privately securing and presenting the evidence at the trial, the civil law considers the 
obtaining of evidence a matter primarily for the Courts, with the parties in the subordinate position of assisting the 
judicial authorities.”  Id. at 557.   
 
The dissent went on to observe that “[m]any of the nations that participated in drafting the Convention 
regard non-judicial evidence taking from even a willing witness as a violation of sovereignty.”  Id. at 558.  
Moreover, it went on to explain that “[s]ome countries also believe that the need to protect certain underlying 
substantive rights requires judicial control of the taking of evidence [citing the Federal Republic of Germany as an 
example].” 
 
115 Id. at 561.   
 
116 Id. at 566. 
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evidence from a foreign branch of an American litigant might also be required to resort to the 
Convention.”117 
Third, the final prong of a comity analysis concerns the determination of whether there 
exists a methodology that advances, and not hamper the development of an orderly international 
legal system.118 These interests are common to all nations.   
 
Consonant with the dissent’s analysis, the Convention routinely promotes the 
development of multiple methodologies that contribute to the advancement of transnational 
litigation.  One such feature is that parties to the Convention do not need to rely upon diplomatic 
officials in order to communicate directly with each other concerning the typical discovery 
disputes that are endemic to the process of document production and disclosure of information.  
The ability to communicate directly between the parties has proven meaningful in the resolution 
of the more common discovery disputes.  In this same vein, Courts that avail themselves of the 
Convention shall be able to obviate the prejudices and injustices that arise when U.S. Courts 
demonstrate a lack of experience or insensitivity towards the judicial methodologies used in 
foreign jurisdictions, particularly in the arena of evidence gathering.  This problem is 
compounded and multiplied when foreign sovereigns understandably feel intimidated by U.S. 
economic, political, and military influence and, therefore, elect not to challenge U.S. 
interlocutory orders in this field.119 
117 Id.  
118 An international legal system is one that must be capable of adjudicating transnational disputes and 
promoting specific principles without which such system would be unworkable, such as uniformity, predictability, 
party-autonomy, judicial restraint, reasonableness, an incentive to promote transnational commerce, and the 
promotion of stability pursuant to clearly defined expectations and reciprocity.  Id. at 522 (citing Laker Airways, Ltd. 
v. Sabena, Belgium World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (1st Cir. 1984).   
 
119 It would be an act of naiveté to assume that countries designated as part of the “second” and “third” world, 
to the extent that this nomenclature is even appropriate after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, are not profoundly 
“influenced” in their domestic policy, foreign policy, economic structure, and social stratification, by five 
international institutions whose autonomy certainly is not without U.S. influence: (i) the “World Bank” 
(“International Bank of Reconstruction and Development”), (ii) the “I.L.O.” (“International Labor Organization”), 
(iii) the “W.H.O.” (“World Health Organization”), (iv) the “I.M.F.” (“International Monetary Fund”), and (iv) the 
“W.T.O.” (“World Trade Organization”).  Even though it is ostensibly represented that the structural goal in theory, 
practice, and execution of these organizations is to be “apolitical” and “neutral” with respect to their internal 
workings, in serving the communities of the “second” and “third” world, the practical reality is different.  The 
United States is a protagonist with greater influence than any other member of the United Nations.  By way of 
example, with respect to the World Bank and the I.M.F., multiple incidents have been meticulously documented 
concerning “the problem of conditionality.”  The I.M.F.’s Rules of Governance emphasize that the I.M.F. is 
proscribed from interfering in the internal domestic affairs of its sovereign clients.  In practice, however, the rule is 
observed in the breach.  Likewise, the “democratization” of these organizations is not only desired, but necessary.  
Significantly, the presidents and senior managers of these bodies, practically without exception, are citizens of the 
industrialized nations of the West and not representatives of the countries that they purportedly serve.  This issue is 
addressed in considerable detail in Globalization and its Discontents, by the Economics Nobel Prize winner Joseph 
Stiglitz of Columbia University.  For completeness’ sake, it should be noted that Professor Stiglitz’s views in this 
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The cumulative effect of this conduct typically fosters hostility, resentment, and long-
term want of cooperation on key issues on the part of foreign states.  All of these issues, 
nonetheless, definitively can be obviated by the United States simply by complying with the 
terms of the Convention.  This task is neither challenging nor laborious because of one simple 
reason.  The United States in the first instance committed itself to complying with the terms of 
the Convention by virtue of being a signatory to the treaty.120 Here it is only urged that federal 
courts exercise the judicial and academic integrity of complying with those obligations that their 
very sovereign, the United States, committed to honor.121 The proposition is simple: at least as 
to form.   
 
A. Comity and Three Elements of Reconciliation
Is there a unifying principle that can organize the precepts here reviewed under one 
comprehensive rubric?  Perhaps of greater importance is a second question that sharpens and best 
defines the first.  Is a unifying doctrine capable of fostering uniformity, certainty, predictive 
value, party-autonomy, reasonableness, and judicial restraint on the fundamental concepts that 
have been here recognized as U.S. procedural contributions to private international law?  The 
answer to the first question is “yes” and “no.”  The response to the second is no different than 
that to the first.   
 
work are not without reasonable critique.  See e.g., Kevin C. Kennedy, A Review of Globalization and its 
Discontents, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’l L.Rev. 251 (2003).   
 
120 Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellshaft v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988), is another dramatic example of the 
Supreme Court’s complete disregard for the legal obligations that the United States undertook concerning an 
international treaty, in this case the Hague Convention of November 15, 1965 addressing the notification and 
transfer of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil and commercial matters.  In that case the defendant filed an 
action in Illinois against a German corporation Volkswagen A.G.  Instead of serving process on the German 
defendant pursuant to the Convention, plaintiff served its subsidiary in the United States.  The Illinois Court opined 
that the subsidiary’s actions were binding on the parent German entity pursuant to an alter ego theory.  The U.S. 
Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the Illinois Courts.  The Court in its decision, despite acknowledging that the 
Hague Convention uses obligatory and not permissive language, held that the appropriate service methodology was 
governed by the law of the venue and that the Convention simply served to facilitate service of judicial documents.  
Id. at 703-705.  Justice Brennan in the dissenting opinion emphasized that the Convention’s drafters had sought to 
address and thus obviate the very conclusion that the Court now had adopted.  Id. at 710-711.  In Schlunk, rather 
than according undue deference to the autonomy of U.S. parties in the methodology pursuant to which they would 
sue a foreigner in the United States, the Court should have developed an analysis based on reconciliation pursuant to 
which the interests of the United States as well as those of a foreign sovereign with respect to service upon the 
citizens of such sovereign, together with the burdens attendant to a defendant as to compliance with the 
Convention’s procedures.  See Koh, supra, at 187.   
 
121 Kennedy, supra.
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Five case studies have been examined in considerable detail:122 all Supreme Court 
opinions.  Aside from the specific facts of each case, they collectively address (i) an international 
dispute giving rise to an interlocutory order issued in a foreign jurisdiction,123 (ii) a foreign 
sovereign’s refusal to issue a passport to a U.S. citizen working within that sovereign’s national 
territory,124 (iii) the extent to which an executive decree and legislative enactment precipitated 
confiscations in a foreign jurisdiction and changes in the material terms of a contract may be 
susceptible to challenge in U.S. courts when the confiscations/expropriations occurs within a 
foreign sovereign’s national territory without issuance of a decree, resolution, legislation, or 
other judicial indicia on the part of the foreign sovereign that would trigger application of the act 
of state doctrine,125 and (v) the rules and precepts governing the relationship between the Hague 
Convention concerning the “taking of evidence” and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
concerning this same issue.126 Underlying these issues there appears to be a common effort to 
incorporate doctrines that at times appear to be meta-juridic in order to strike a balance among 
doctrines that frequently appear to be irreconcilable.   
 
In Hilton v. Guyot and Underhill v. Hernandez the Supreme Court appears to exert 
extraordinary effort in attempting to fashion a test that would facilitate the convergence and 
reconciliation of different legal systems, while at the same time executing this undertaking in a 
way that would give rise to predictability, consistency, and certainty, such that the opinions 
would not only comport, but actually promote, U.S. foreign policy.  Obviously, these two 
opinions are contemporaneous with the writings of Justice Story and are meaningfully influenced 
by his thinking.  This effort transcends the classical paradigm that draws a significant distinction 
between right and positive law.127 The five case studies suggest a need to use the principle of 
 
122 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 
(1897); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 396, 84 S.Ct. 923, 11 L.Ed. 2d 804 (1964); Alfred Dunhill 
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1976); Societé Nationale 
Industrielle Aereospatial v. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987).   
 
123 Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895).   
 
124 Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 18 S.Ct. 83, 42 L.Ed. 456 (1897).   
 
125 Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 48 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1976). 
 
126 Societé Nationale Industrielle Aereospatial v. District Court, 482 U.S. 522, 107 S.Ct. 2542 (1987).   
 
127 In France the difference between droit and loi remains an important part of French civil law jurisprudence.  
Similarly, in Germany the same concept is applied under the terms recht and gesetzt.  Positive law is here defined as 
legislation having its final expression in the form of a statutory enactment.  The normative foundation of all positive 
law is the actual legislative process, i.e. the procedure pursuant to which a proposal is enacted into a final expression 
of law in the form of legislation.  The legislation is thus binding because of its procedural history and not its intrinsic 
content.  Therefore, under a positive law theory a law that is contrary to basic principles generally shared by a 
community, that is to say a “bad” or “immoral” law still must be followed and obey.  Legitimacy is a product of 
procedure under a positive law rubric or analysis.  In a sociopolitical context, most notably in India under British 
colonization, positive law was directly challenged by the assertion that “bad” or “immoral” legislation, despite being 
procedurally irreproachable as to the actual legislative process pursued, need not be obeyed if such legislation 
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comity as a unifying concept that does not rest either in positive law or natural law. The first 
principle of this doctrine of comity must be the imperative of developing a framework of civil 
procedure for private international law rooted in a concept of reconciliation as a determinative 
precept.128 A common law analysis in this arena demonstrates a penchant favoring the 
integration of foreign doctrines and the global dissemination of classical principles of U.S. civil 
procedure, particularly in the area of document production and disclosure of information.   
 
B. Party Autonomy: The Normative Value of Contractual Autonomy in an 
International Context: Bremen and Comity
The concept of party autonomy is as prominent in U.S. private procedural international 
law as the doctrines of comity and judicial restraint.  Party autonomy as a procedural concept 
 
constitutes an affront to human dignity or deprives citizens of “inalienable rights, such as the rights to self-
determination, self-defense, and to private property.”  See M.K. GANDHI, NON-VIOLENT RESISTANCE 
(SATYAGRABA) (Dovic Publications, Inc, 2001).   
 
By way of contrast, the concepts of recht and droit do not acquire juridic legitimacy or a normative 
foundation by dint of a codification or legislative process irrespective of content.  Here process is irrelevant to 
legitimacy and the normative nature of such precepts.  The literature on this issue is vast, profound, and lapidary.  In 
general terms, scholars and commentators have sought to bestow conceptual content to these norms based on 
theories of natural law.  See as classical examples Plato’s The Republic; Perpetual Peace by Immanual Kant; 
Principles for a Philosophy of Right by G.W.F. Hegel; Natural Law by G.W.F. Hegel; The Concept of Law by 
H.L.A. Hart c.f. Introduction to the Problems of Legal Theory by Hans Kelsen; Principles of International Law by 
Hans Kelsen.   
 
Significantly, the concept of comity cannot be classified or explained pursuant to either of these doctrinal 
currents to the extent that comity does not rise to the level of an obligation, the concept is devoid of any vestige 
relating to the normative mandate of positive law.  Similarly, to the extent that comity is less than a mere courtesy 
implying little more than “respect” accorded to foreign and final judgments, decrees, or interlocutory orders, comity 
lacks normative elements that are fundamental to natural law and that require universal application without 
consideration to such “collateral issues” as tactical methodologies in its application or formation.  Even the most 
cursory analysis of those Supreme Court opinions that purportedly were premised on the concept of comity, 
establishes that a comity analysis must include consideration of four rudimentary tenets: (i) U.S. foreign policy 
objectives and interests, (ii) the interests, domestic and international, of the foreign sovereign(s) at issue, (iii) the 
mutual interests of the community of nations in promoting a rational international legal order, and (iv) the 
convergence of dual (without limitation) legal systems both substantively and procedurally.  Consideration of these 
imminently pragmatic factors are not encompassed by the classical traditional theories of natural or positive law. 
128 In the course delivered at the Hague Academy of International Law, Professor Lowenfeld proposes the 
adoption of a principle of “reasonableness” for private international procedural law.  LOWENFELD, supra at 292.  
Under this rubric of “reasonableness”, Courts or states must consider the values and interests of other states, private 
interest, but not abstract interests of sovereignty.  Id. at 293.  This principle does not greatly differ from the concept 
of comity or reconciliation here proposed.  Professor Lowenfeld cites as an example of the proper application of the 
principle of “reasonableness” §442 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law concerning the disclosure of 
information by foreign parties.  According to §442, a judge, in deciding if she or he shall order a foreign party 
subject to the Court’s jurisdiction to produce documents must first consider such factors as (i) the importance of the 
documents relative to the merits of the case, (ii) the specificity advanced in the request for production, (iii) the 
genesis of the information, (iv) the availability of alternative methods of obtaining the same information, and (v) the 
interest of the foreign venue and sovereign where the information is located.  Id. at 249-250.   
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was first addressed by the Supreme Court in 1972,129 despite its rather long history and trajectory 
of conflicting opinions among the circuit courts.130 The M/S The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore 
Co. stands as a seminal case that decisively is premised on a new economic horizon having an 
international nature.  Indeed, there the Supreme Court finds that the global character of 
commercial transactions in which the United States is a protagonist necessitates the development 
of a corresponding jurisprudence.  Thirty years before the reality of globalization the mandate to 
fashion rules that would accommodate a world economy was articulated in The Bremen.   
There the issue before the Court was whether a forum selection clause in a contract 
stating that “[a]ny dispute arising must be treated before the London Court of Justice,” is 
controlling when the U.S. parties to the contract files an action against another party to the 
agreement (a German corporation) in a federal district court in the United States.131 In 
November 1977 plaintiff, Zapata Off-Shore Company (“Zapata”) a corporation headquartered in 
Houston, Texas, signed a contract with defendant Unterweser, a German corporation, with the 
business purpose of transporting an oceanic oil drill belonging to Zapata christened Chaparral 
from Louisiana to a port in the outskirts of Ravenna, Italy, in the Adriatic sea.  Zapata had 
contracted to drill specific oil reserves.  The transportation contract that the parties executed 
contained two very relevant clauses.  First, both parties had agreed that any dispute arising from 
the contract had to be adjudicated before the London Court of Justice.  Second, two additional 
interactive clauses having the effect of indemnifying Unterweser concerning any contractual 
liability or tort regarding the execution of the terms of the agreement by the parties was also 
agreed to as part of the contract.132 Relying on precedent from the Fifth Circuit Court of 
Appeals,133 the District Court held that defendant Unterweser had to comply with equitable 
principles and abstain from prosecuting the parallel litigation that had been filed before the 
 
129 407 U.S. 1, 92 S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed. 2d 513 (1972).   
 
130 Compare: Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Montrosa, 254 F.2d 297 (5th Cir. 1958); The Ciano, 58 F.Supp. 
65 (E.D. Pa. 1944) (disavowing forum selection clauses) with Wm. H. Muller & Co. v. Swedish American Line Ltd. 
224 F.2d 806 (2nd Cir. 1955); Cerro de Pasco Copper Corp. v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 187 F.2d 990 (2d. Cir. 1951) 
(holding that a forum selection clause must be enforced, and not applying a “significant relationship” test). 
 
131 Id. 
 
132 On January 5, 1968 Unterweser’s deep water tug called The Bremen left Venice, Louisiana with the 
Chaparral being towed towards Italy.  When The Bremen and the Chaparral reached international waters in the 
Gulf of Mexico and were affected by a severe storm.  During the storm the Chaparral lost one of its elevator legs 
that had been raised for the journey.  Moreover, the drilling platform also was seriously damaged.  The crisis led 
Zapata to instruct The Bremen to tug the Chaparral to Tampa, Florida, which was the nearest port of possible 
refuge.  Id. at 1910.  In stark defiance of the forum selection clause providing that “any dispute arising must be 
treated before the London Court of Justice,” Zapata filed a claim before the Federal District Court in Tampa alleging 
US$3.5 million in damages against Unterweser and against The Bremen, in rem, according to allegations of 
negligence and breach of contract.  Id.   
133 See Carbon Black Export, Inc. v. The Monrosa, 254 F.2d 297, 300-301 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. dismissed, 359 
U.S. 180 (1959) (holding that forum selection clauses are not binding as being against public policy because their 
objective is to wrest jurisdiction from Courts that otherwise would have exercised it).   
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London Court of Justice.  The District Court also found that it had subject matter and in 
personam jurisdiction. 
 
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court’s decision based upon the 
Carbon Black precedent, observing that the case “ ‘at the very least’. . . stood for the proposition 
that a forum selection clause ‘will not be enforced unless the selected state would provide a more 
convenient forum than the state in which the suit is brought.’”134 Based on this premise the Fifth 
Circuit also held that irrespective of the forum selection clause, the District Court limited the 
exercise of its jurisdiction by dismissing the case on the ground of forum non conveniens.135 The 
majority of the Panel of the Fifth Circuit136 approved the District Court’s ruling, which was 
premised on five dispositive observations:  
 
(i) The flotilla never left the Fifth Circuit’s mare nostrum and the accident took place 
in the District Court’s vicinity,  
 
(ii) A considerable number of prospective witnesses, including the entire crew of the 
Zapata, resided in the area close to the Gulf of Mexico [the “Gulf”]; 
 
(iii) All pre-voyage preparation work, including inspection and repairs, were 
undertaken in the vicinity of the Gulf; 
 
(iv) the testimony of the Bremen’s crew was readily available by deposition; and  
 
(v) other than the forum selection clause, England had no interest in any of the issues 
configuring the case or contacts with the parties.137 
134 Id. at 1912.   
 
135 The doctrine of forum non conveniens, in part, provides a Court with discretion to dismiss the case in favor 
of a more convenient alternative forum so long as such ruling advances the equitable principles of justice by 
minimizing costs and maximizing access to evidence.  The doctrine was first articulated by the venerable case Gulf 
Oil Co. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947) in a brilliant opinion authored by Justice Jackson.  The doctrine was later 
developed within the context of international litigation in Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).  In 
Piper Aircraft Co., the Supreme Court reversed the Third Circuit, which had denied a petition to dismiss on the 
ground of forum non conveniens merely because the Court found Scottish law to be less favorable to plaintiff than 
the law of the forum.  The Supreme Court applied an analysis similar to the one advanced in this essay with respect 
to the concept of “reconciliation” pursuant to which a Court must first consider certain private and public interests 
so as to determine whether plaintiff’s choice of forum imposes an undue burden on the defendant or the Court.  In 
accordance with this analysis the public interest component includes both the interests of the forum as well as those 
of the alternative forum.  See Born, supra at 341-366, for the development and actual status of the doctrine of forum 
non conveniens.
136 The Fifth Circuit’s original opinion issued from a Panel divided two to one.  In fact, defendant filed a 
motion for reconsideration and hearing en banc before all fourteen judges of the Fifth Circuit.  Six of the fourteen 
judges dissented with a “majority” opinion of eight judges affirming the district court.   
 
137 Id.  
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In Bremen the Fifth Circuit also observed that Zapata was a U.S. corporation and 
therefore the trial court’s discretion to dismiss the case in favor of a foreign forum, particularly 
where it was likely that English courts would recognize as binding the contract’s exculpatory 
clauses.  The majority of the Fifth Circuit judges opined that such clauses were against public 
policy and therefore unenforceable based on long-settled Supreme Court precedent.138 
The Supreme Court exercised certiorari jurisdiction arising from a direct and explicit 
conflict among the circuits on the specific question concerning the extent to which parties to a 
contract have autonomy to select a foreign forum, independently of the situs where the alleged 
breach of contract or negligence occurred.  The Supreme Court reversed the Fifth Circuit and 
bottomed its analysis on eight fundamental tenets.   
 
First, the Court underscored that for at least two decades there has been a significant and 
material expansion in global commerce and transnational commercial activities by firms based in 
the United States.139 In this context the Court emphasized that the barriers of distance that once 
limited commercial transactions now comprised but a “modest territory” and have practically 
disappeared.   
 
Second, there are numerous United States companies specialized in transporting heavy 
equipment and machinery across thousands of nautical miles and oceans that constitute a 
fundamental part of every day international commerce.140 
Third, as a general policy U.S. industries shall be disadvantaged and stifled in their 
expansion and development if, “notwithstanding solemn contracts, we insist on a parochial 
concept that all disputes must be resolved under our laws and in our Courts.”141 
138 Id.  The Fifth Circuit explicitly found analytic support for this proposition in Bisso v. Inland Waterways 
Corp., 349 U.S. 85, 75 S.Ct. 629, 99 L.Ed. 911 (1955), y Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Crescent Towing & Salvage Co.,
372 U.S. 697, 83 S.Ct. 967, 10 L.Ed. 2d 78 (1963).   
 
The Court’s public records contained affidavits by British lawyers opining that exculpatory clauses in 
contracts under English law were deemed “prima facie valid and binding” against Zapata because of an illegal 
action filed in England in which Zapata alleged that Unterweser’s breach of contract or negligence caused damages 
to the Chaparral.   
139 Id. at 8.  Here the Court referenced the two decades between 1953 and 1973.  This argument is of greater 
significance and relevance today in light of a socioeconomic policy of globalization, the fragmentation and 
dissolution of the former Soviet Union, the economic integration of China with one-third of the global population 
and a growing economy that from 1985 to 2005 has expanded at an unprecedented rate of eight percent per annum 
(the highest sustained growth of any economic model in modern history), and the renaissance of a Europe without 
borders that finds itself negotiating merely logistics towards the implementation of a European constitution that will 
recognize multiple membership categories.  See e.g. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time, by 
Jeffrey D. Sachs, Professor at Columbia University.   
 
140 Id. at 9.  
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Fourth, the analysis enunciated by the Fifth Circuit in Carbon Black is inapplicable in the 
context of international commerce; “[w]e cannot have trade and commerce in world markets and 
international waters exclusively on our terms, governed by our laws, and resolved in our 
Courts.”142 
Fifth, eight years earlier, the Supreme Court in National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. 
Szukhent 143 held that a party to a federal district court proceeding may be susceptible to service 
of process in a district where the party otherwise could not be served pursuant to the parties’ 
voluntary designation of an agent for purposes of accepting service of process in that 
jurisdiction.  The Court noted that: 
 
[It] is settled, as the courts below recognized, that parties to a 
contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a 
given court, to permit notice to be served by the opposing party, or 
even to waive notice altogether [citation of authority omitted].144 
The Supreme Court stated that the case sub judice merely constituted the other side of the 
very same proverbial coin.  Put simply, forum selection clauses pursuant to which any 
contractual dispute or civil obligation in the context of an international transaction is to be 
adjudicated in a foreign venue must be absolutely binding upon the parties.  Indeed, the only 
exception to this ironclad pronouncement is when adherence to the particular clause at issue 
inevitably leads to an “irrational” result under the facts and circumstances of a specific case.145 
Sixth, in the case before the Court the subject forum selection clause was negotiated at 
arm’s length in a commercially reasonable manner by sophisticated and experienced persons.  
Accordingly, but for a finding of fraud, other similarly compelling circumstances or valid 
grounds establishing that the negotiation process was materially asymmetrical and, therefore, 
inherently unfair, the clauses negotiated by the parties shall be binding.146 
141 Id. at 9. 
 
142 Id.  
143 375 U.S. 311 (1964).  
 
144 375 U.S. at 315-316. 
 
145 Id. at 10.  
 
146 Id. at 12.  Significantly, the Court rejected the proposition asserting that forum selection clauses are but 
illegal methodologies used to wrest from and divest Courts of jurisdiction to administer  justice equitably.  The 
Supreme Court enunciated that such propositions are rooted on a historical legacy pursuant to which Courts resist 
“any attempt to reduce the power and business of a particular court and has little place in an era when all courts are 
overloaded and when businesses once essentially local now operate in world markets.”  The Court further asserted 
that “[n]o one seriously contends in this case that the forum selection clause ‘ousted’ the District Court of 
jurisdiction over Zapata’s action.  The threshold question is whether that court should have exercised its jurisdiction 
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Seventh, the record overwhelmingly demonstrated beyond cavil that the forum selection 
clause had been “a vital part of the agreement, and it would be unrealistic to think that the parties 
did not conduct their negotiations, including fixing the monetary terms, with the consequences of 
the forum clause figuring prominently in their calculations.”147 
Finally, notwithstanding the inconveniences inherent in filing and prosecuting a cause in 
a remote and ostensibly inconvenient forum (one that maximizes the expenditure of resources 
and minimizes access to proof and other evidence), the Court underscored that the party 
opposing the forum selection clause must meet a high and difficult burden of proof.  Adherence 
to a forum selection clause is particularly unnecessary in cases concerning international 
commerce and that do not entail merely domestic parties seeking the adjudication of a local 
(national) controversy.148 
The appropriate construction to be placed on the clause, according to the Court, is one 
where full force and effect is to be accorded to the clause unless the party challenging the forum 
is capable of demonstrating with clarity and specificity that enforcement of the clause would be 
irrational and unjust, or that the clause is null and void on grounds of fraud or material disparity 
in the parties’ ability to negotiate the subject matter in question.149 
Significantly, the Supreme Court nowhere mentions four rudimentary tenets that remain 
latent, but pervade, its own analysis and holding: (i) comity, (ii) judicial self-restraint, (iii) party 
autonomy, and (iv) judicial predictability.  In fact the Bremen was decided consonant with the 
very principle of reconciliation that has been identified as fulcrum and first premise of the 
penumbra resting between a legal obligation (juridic normative mandate) and a courtesy that may 
be accorded to a foreign sovereign or judicial tribunal.   
 
The holding in Bremen, like Socrates’ legendary cloak that is said to have been riddled 
with holes that vastly diminished the visible presence of any fabric, reveals more than it 
conceals.  Despite a quite elaborate emphasis concerning the “the sanctity of contractual 
 
to do more than give effect to the legitimate expectations of the parties, manifested in their freely negotiated 
agreement, by specifically enforcing the forum selection clause.”  Id.  
147 Id. at 14.   
 
148 Id. at 17-19.  “We are not here dealing with an agreement between two Americans to resolve their 
essentially local disputes in a remote alien forum.  In such a case, the serious inconvenience of the contractual forum 
to one or both of the parties might carry greater weight in determining the reasonableness of the forum clause. . . .” 
 
“This case, however, involves a freely negotiated international commercial transaction between a German 
and an American corporation for towage of a vessel from the Gulf of Mexico to the Adriatic Sea.  As noted, 
selection of a London forum was clearly a reasonable effort to bring vital certainty to this international transaction 
and to provide a neutral forum experienced and capable in the resolution of admiralty litigation.”   
 
149 Id. at 18-19. 
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obligations,” the analysis is framed by emphasis on the presence of international commerce and 
the proliferation of United States multinationals that principally conduct transnational business.  
It is patently with keen regard for these two factors that the Court accorded weight to the parties’ 
autonomy and to the legitimacy of the foreign selection clause.  The principle of party autonomy 
could have been articulated more comprehensively and coherently within the context of a 
procedural test that rested on the unifying precept of reconciliation that here has been ascribed to 
the tenet of comity. This proposition commands sustained analysis.   
 
In identifying the elements of comity, judicial self-restraint, party autonomy, and 
predictability as first principles that govern international civil procedure in United States courts, 
it follows that it is imperative for these precepts to be organized within a conceptual rubric 
characterized by its ability to generate legal analysis and holdings that distinguish themselves for 
their uniformity, reasonableness, and predictive value.  These precepts become progressively 
critical to the development and application of fundamental principles of comity, party autonomy,
and judicial restraint. Analytical support and application based on this rubric rests on the 
principle of reconciliation endemic to the concept of comity, such as reconciliation and comity 
have been here defined.  The Bremen provides for a fruitful and prodigious case study that 
allows the careful reader to examine the manner in which the concept of reconciliation inherent 
in comity serves to further the precepts of uniformity, reasonableness, and predictability.   
In the comity analysis that Justice Brennan detailed150 a five part standard is set forth for 
purposes of determining whether comity rendered viable and binding the act of state doctrine as a 
defense.  Furthermore, the Supreme Court also elucidated a juridic criteria significantly more 
abbreviated, but still bottomed on comity, as an organizing principle to be used in determining 
the viability of the act of state doctrine.  This standard focuses analysis on three basic elements: 
(i) the extent to which U.S. interests would be affected, (ii) analysis of the interests germane to 
the foreign sovereign at issue, and (iii) the extent to which a specific holding would harmonize 
with the interests of the community of nations in developing, promoting, and preserving a 
reliable and efficacious system of international law.  The distinct presence of party autonomy 
found in the court’s opinion in The Bremen is very much susceptible to a comity analysis as here 
identified, without the need to consider basic principles of contract interpretation.  Application of 
standard and commonplace methodologies of contractual construction to international disputes 
that may entail depriving a court of competent jurisdiction by dint of an agreement between the 
parties is of little moment to most foreign jurisdictions.  This “solution” or “resolution” is 
parochial in nature and one that the very norms of contractual interpretation never even could 
have contemplated.   
 
In underscoring the “new” international commercial environment, as well as the (albeit 
embryonic by contemporary standards) proliferation of multinational corporations, the Supreme 
Court without articulating it is using the very concept of reconciliation that vests the principle of 
comity with content.  The use of this principle is brought into sharp focus when observing that 
the Court deemed it necessary to accord it greater content and materiality rather than merely 
 
150 See the dissenting opinion in First National City Bank, supra at 788.   
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engaging in a contractual interpretative analysis based on simplistic commercial doctrines of 
contract interpretation, and instead incorporating global commercial considerations, the 
international juridic character and function of emerging multinational corporations, and the 
palpable reduction of logistical obstacles in the trafficking of transnational commerce.  Here the 
Court seeks to reconcile party autonomy, the conflicts between the substantive law of the U.K. 
and that of the U.S. with respect to the dispute at issue, and the “new” protagonism of 
multinational corporations, but without ever relying upon a doctrinal standard capable of setting 
an analytical precedent that would preserve and contain the elements of comity, judicial self 
restraint, predictability, reasonableness, and party autonomy such that the use of these precepts 
within a framework resting on reconciliation would lead to a result characterized by the desired 
tenets of reasonableness, uniformity, reasonableness, and predictability. 
C. Comity and International Arbitration
The principle of party autonomy in the context of an international dispute151 rises to the 
level of an acknowledged precept in cross-border litigation only one year after issuance of The 
Bremen opinion.  In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co152 the Supreme Court exercised certiorari 
jurisdiction in this cause on the ground that it was faced with an issue of great public importance.  
The specific question that the Court addressed was whether its holding in Wilko v. Swan,153 that 
“an agreement to arbitrate could not preclude a buyer of a security from seeking a judicial 
remedy under the Security Act of 1933, in view of the language of Section 14 of that Act, barring 
‘(a)ny condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to waive 
compliance with any provision of this subchapter.’”154 
The issue reached the Court after the Seventh Circuit disavowed an arbitration clause 
contained in a contract between a U.S. plaintiff and a German defendant residing in Switzerland,
where the contract at issue was executed in Austria with respect to three corporations organized 
under the laws of Germany and Liechtenstein.155 
151 It should be noted that the Supreme Court interprets as synonymous the terms “international contract” and 
“dispute or international controversy.” 
 
152 417 U.S. 506, 94 S.Ct. 2449, 41 L.Ed. 2d 270 (1974).   
 
153 346 U.S. 427, 74 S.Ct. 182, 98 L.Ed. 168 (1953).   
 
154 Scherk, 417 U.S. 506 at 510.  See also 48 Stat. 84, 15 U.S.C. s.77n.  
 
155 Contrary to considerable scholarly opinion purporting to trace the origins of interstate arbitration to U.K. 
jurisprudence, arbitration as a methodology for the equitable administration of justice in an international context 
finds its genesis in Greece, primarily in the Hellenistic and not the Classical period.  There are numerous examples 
of sophisticated and quite detailed and comprehensive interstate arbitral agreements during this period that only 
recently have surfaced, see e.g. Interstate Arbitration in Greece by Sheila Ager, despite more accessible sources that 
have been amply documented by even the very early iterations translated from Attic Greek.  By way of example, 
Thucydides recounts that the Peloponnesian war could have been averted had Sparta adhered to an interstate 
arbitration clause that it had entered into with Athens.  The First Book of Thucydides’ History of the Peloponnesian 
War, Chapter XXVIII, lines 2 to 3 states: 
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In reversing the Seventh Circuit’s pronouncement, the Court observed that the arbitration 
agreement at issue was binding, dispositive, and controlling with respect to any dispute relating 
to the subject international commercial transaction, irrespective of the mandate of Section 14 of 
the Securities Act, proscribing all stipulations such as those concerning arbitration that would 
conflict with this provision.156 The Supreme Court meticulously enunciated that the (i) plaintiff 
was a U.S. corporation conducting most of its business activities in the United States, (ii) 
defendant was a German national whose companies were organized under the laws of Germany 
and Liechtenstein, (iii) negotiations led to the execution of the contract at issue in Austria and the 
closing of the transaction in Switzerland, the United States, England, and Germany, and (iv) 
subject matter of the contract principally concerns the sale-purchase of companies organized 
under the laws of European countries and that conducted business mostly, if not exclusively, 
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“Should they advance a claim with respect to Epidamnus [“�µ	”] they 
would be willing, or so they allege, to submit the matter to arbitration to any of 
the Pelopenisian states selected by each of the parties, and also to the party to 
whom the colony (Epidamnus), to which the colony pertains.  They were also 
willing to dispute to the oracle in Delphi.”   
 
Regrettably, Sparta elected to disavow the arbitration agreement as well as any 
prospective pronouncement by the Delphic oracle, and pursued war as the 
appropriate methodology for international dispute resolution.  The text contains 
multiple references to a resolution of this “international” dispute by having it 
submitted to a non-judicial process in a neutral forum, elected by the parties, so 
long as the parties were of a single mind in adhering to a neutral methodology 
for the unanimous selection of arbitrators and in agreement in respecting 
whatsoever award would issue from such arbitration.  Put simply, despite the 
aura of “modernity” that attaches to arbitration as a “new” methodology for 
international dispute resolution, its roots are deep and ancient particularly when 
understood as preceding the industrial revolution by approximately 2,300 years.   
 
Historically, English tribunals disfavored and undermined arbitration 
agreements under the theory that they illicitly “divested” judicial tribunals of 
subject matter and personal jurisdiction that they otherwise may have 
competently exercised.  This juridic tradition with respect to arbitration 
influenced U.S. courts until 1924 when the United States Arbitration Act, see 
H.R. Rep. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess., 1, 2 (1924), was passed.  See e.g. Sturges 
and Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United 
States Arbitration Act, 17 Law and Contemp. Prob. (1952).   
 
156 417 U.S. at 513. 
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directed at European markets.157 Clearly the international character of the facts framing the issue 
before the Court materially distinguished the case from the Court’s prior ruling in Wilko, where 
all of the parties were U.S. entities.   
 
As in The Bremen, the Court emphasized that certainty is a necessary and indispensable 
element in the context of international transactions.  Additionally, the Court highlighted that “[a] 
contractual provision specifying in advance the forum in which disputes shall be litigated and the 
law to be applied is, therefore, an almost indispensable precondition to achievement of the 
orderliness and predictability essential to any international business transaction.”158 The Court 
added that “such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the agreement might be 
submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of the parties or unfamiliar with the problem 
area involved.”159 
In Scherk the Supreme Court found a conceptual link between party autonomy and (i) 
risks endemic to international commerce, (ii) the need for uniformity in adjudicating 
international disputes of this ilk, and (iii) the will and ability to finance and bring to fruition 
international agreements.160 Despite the analytical support that the Court was able to extrapolate 
 
157 Id. 
 
158 Id. at 516.   
 
159 Id.  See also f.n 10 stating that:  
 
Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L.J. 1049, 
1051 (1961).  For example, while the arbitration agreement involved here 
provided that the controversies arising out of the agreement be resolved under 
‘(t)he laws of the State of Illinois,’ [citation omitted], a determination of the 
existence and extent of fraud concerning the trademark would necessarily 
involve an understanding of foreign law on that subject.   
 
160 In footnote 15 of the opinion the Court detailed post Wilko changes that analytically corroborated its 
decision.  This footnote commands citation in its totality.   
 
FN15.  Our conclusion today is confirmed by international developers and domestic legislation in the area 
of commercial arbitration subsequent to the Wilko decision.  On June 10, 1958, a special conference of the United 
Nations Economic and Social Council adopted the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards.  In 1970 the United States acceded to the treaty, (1970) 3 U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, and 
congress passed Chapter 2 of the United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. s201 et seq., in order to implement the 
Convention.  Section 1 of the new chapter, 9 U.S.C. s 201, provides unequivocally that the Convention ‘shall be 
enforced in the United States courts in accordance with this chapter.’  The goal of the Convention, and the principal 
purpose underlying American adoption and implementation of it, was to encourage the recognition and enforcement 
of commercial arbitration agreements in international contracts and to unify the standards by which agreements to 
arbitrate are observed and arbitral awards are enforced in the signatory countries.  See Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, S. Exec. Doc. E, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); Quigley, 
Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards, 70 Yale L.J. 1049 (1961), Article II (1) of the Convention provides: 
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from its decision in The Bremen, the fulcrum of the Court’s opinion is the somewhat 
extraordinary juridic weight that it placed on the concept of an “international contract”, and the 
extent to which the precept of party autonomy is deemphasized and subordinated to the new 
guidepost (“international contract”).
The Bremen and Alberto-Culver Co. decisions reach a similar, if not identical, conclusion 
with respect to the clauses there at issue and the global economic considerations to be weighed in 
rendering a coherent opinion suitable for developing transnational commerce, as well as the need 
to promote the principles of reasonableness, uniformity, and predictability,  particularly in the 
context of private international law.  Despite having these premises in common, the analytical 
methodology applied was significantly distinguishable.  In both analyses, underscored by its very 
absence, is the concept of reconciliation, which promotes uniformity, predictability, and  
reasonableness. It is the very concept of reasonableness that bestows substantive judicial import 
on the precept of comity. The application of these precepts likely would not alter the holdings 
here at issue, but unequivocally enunciate the appropriate standard to be followed in analyzing 
international disputes without having to resort to ascribing undue juridic weight to the mere 
presence of an “international contract.”  The use of  the significance of an international contract 
as an organizing principle in transnational dispute resolution is a disconcerting analytical tenet 
susceptible to numerous permutations and iterations depending on the particularity of the facts 
framing the case at issue.161 
‘Each Contracting State shall recognize an agreement in writing under which the 
parties undertake to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have 
arisen or which may arise between them in respect of a defined legal 
relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning a subject matter capable of 
settlement by arbitration.’ 
 
In their discussion of this Article, the delegates to the Convention voiced frequent concerns that courts of 
signatory countries in which an agreement to arbitrate is sought to be enforced should not be permitted to decline 
enforcement of such agreements on the basis of parochial views of their desirability or in a manner that would 
diminish the mutually binding nature of the agreements.  See G. Hague, Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards: Summary Analysis of Record of United Nations Conference, May/June 
1958, pp. 24-28 (1958). 
 
Without reaching the issue of whether the Convention, apart from the considerations expressed in this 
opinion, would require of its own force that the agreement to arbitrate be enforced in the present case, we think that 
this country’s adoption and ratification of the Convention and the passage of Chapter 2 of the United States 
Arbitration Act provide strongly persuasive evidence of congressional policy consistent with the decision we reach 
today.   
 
It is worth noting that the most successful international law treaty in recorded history with the greatest 
number of signatories, even when one considers the success of the multiple Hague Conventions, is the treaty 
commonly referred to as the “New York Convention”. 
161 Independent of its character and nature as an “international contract,” international agreements raise 
distinct  issues, possible points of contention, and challenges concerning the equitable administration of justice.  An 
international construction contract, for example, is materially different from an international distribution agreement, 
and both stand in radical contrast  with respect to an international asset based sale-purchase contract.  The varying 
economic considerations in the manner in which the “internationalism” of each of these agreements projects itself as 
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The Supreme Court finds itself facing a daunting challenge rife with conceptual 
paradoxes.  It must reconcile a new “international economic order” (now globalization) with 
party autonomy and the archaic prejudice against having private parties divesting judicial 
tribunals of jurisdiction  by dint of forum selection clauses and even arbitration clauses162 
resulting from legitimate arms-length negotiations between sophisticated and industry savvy 
parties.  It is precisely at this delicate crossroads that the principle of reconciliation as here used 
together with comity that the precepts of uniformity, predictability, and reasonableness not only 
with respect to the methodology to be applied in the analysis of legal issues, but also in giving 
rise to consistent and coherent opinions that inevitably shall serve as dispositive standards to be 
followed by tribunals and multinational corporations and private individuals serving as 
protagonists in the theater of multinational commerce. 
 
It is necessary to explore the extent to which the principles of comity, judicial restraint,
party autonomy, and reasonableness have spawned different doctrinal rubrics commonly used in 
international private procedural law.  By briefly tracing the contours of these developments it is 
possible to detail a methodology that may lead to a unified doctrinal theory pursuant to which the 
consistent and methodical application of these tenets, based upon the principle of comity as a 
concept of reconciliation typically in three distinct arenas (the common law system, the Roman-
Germanic civil code system, and material transformations in global economics at macro and 
micro levels), shall promote (i) the interests of foreign states, (ii) the interests of the United 
States, and (iii) the interest of the community of nations in preserving, developing, and 
enhancing a reliable, predictable, and uniform corpus of international conventional and 
customary law.   
 
IV. JURISDICTION TO PRESCRIBE: THE EXTRATERRITORIAL  
APPLICATION OF U.S. STATUTORY LAW. 
 
As archaic as the very concept of sovereignty  itself is the classical issue delineating  the 
extent to which the laws of one sovereignty may be applied to acts or omissions undertaking by 
foreigners within the national territory of a foreign state.163 The gamut of points of departures 
pursuant to which scholars and courts have attempted to approach this issue is as manifold and 
sui generis as the nature of the concept of sovereignty and the normative basis of laws 
 
well as the extent to which the different underlying policy considerations affect public policy, certainly would 
materially alter a decision and leave courts and practitioners without an analytical Polestar.  Put simply, the almost 
infinite permutation of international commercial agreements renders flawed and resounding in folly the use of “an 
international contract” as an organizing principle.   
 
162 Courts have treated arbitration clauses as no different from forum selection clauses such that they may be 
deemed one and the same.  See e.g.  
 
163 This analysis shall not address the issues and intricacies inherent in concerns that parties to an international 
treaty, such as the 1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Accord, routinely must address. 
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themselves.  The fundamental nature of this issue reflects its complexity rather than the 
simplicity that typically characterizes the configuration of first principles.
Identifying the rudimentary difficulty inherent in the issue is simple enough.  What right 
or normative basis does a sovereign have for purposes of engrafting its laws so as to administer 
equitably justice arising from the acts or forbearances undertaken by foreigners within the 
national territory of a foreign sovereignty?  If such a right or normative foundation in facts 
exists, is it based on natural law, the processes that give rise to legislative enactments that 
ultimately rest on a constitutional premise, the stare decisis of the common law, custom, or on a 
combination of some or all of these factors?  Does the extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
based upon acts and omissions occurring within the national territory of a foreign sovereign 
require a treaty or convention between the respective countries imposing a condition of 
reciprocity as a predicate?  Without purporting to resolve in any conclusive manner these 
questions, or even submit them to sustained and exhaustive analysis, here the more modest task 
of analyzing the various standards developed in the United States concerning the issue of 
extraterritorial application, which is developing exponentially in the framework of international 
commerce at a pace that finds no historical precedent in a global context defined by porous 
economic boundaries and pervasive globalization, is relevant and necessary. 
 
Significantly, U.S. jurisprudence dictates that courts in the United States may exercise 
jurisdiction over activities  undertaken within the national territory of a foreign sovereign.  To be 
sure the extraterritorial application of U.S. law has been the subject matter of spirited debate, 
controversy, and in many cases consternation on the part of other countries.  Opinions issued by 
federal courts requiring the execution of judgments based upon the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law has been interpreted as a direct and explicit violation of the sovereignty of foreign 
nations.164 The judicial intervention of U.S. Courts in the realm of sovereignty pertaining to 
foreign nations has given rise to significant, and in some cases, strident protests and objections, 
particularly during the last forty-five (45) years.165 
The extraterritorial application of U.S. law commands a unique place within the analysis 
of jurisdiction. Standing in sharp relief with respect to personal jurisdiction166 and subject-
 
164 In the analysis infra. of 28 U.S.C. §1782, concerning the disclosure of documents and information, the 
extent to which issuance of an order by a U.S. Court may weigh in the administration of justice by a foreign 
sovereign concerning a judicial or administrative proceeding unrelated to non-parties residing in the United States 
shall become clear. 
 
165 See, e.g. A. Neale, The Antitrust Laws Of The United States Of America, 365-72 (2d Ed. 1970); Assn. of the 
Bar of the City of New York, National Security and Foreign Policy in the Application of American Antitrust Laws 
to Congress with Foreign Nations, 7-18 (1957); Zwarensteyn, The Foreign Reach of the American Antitrust Laws, 3
AM.BUS.L.J. 163, 165-69 (19665). 
 
166 Here personal jurisdiction is defined as a court’s ability to adjudicate a claim against a defendant(s) and 
issue a final judgment that would be binding against such a defendant(s) or the defendant’s assets.  The exercise of 
personal jurisdiction requires compliance with two rudimentary premises.  First, there must be a normative basis 
providing the courts of a particular forum with personal jurisdiction over a specific defendant.  Typically a 
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matter jurisdiction,167 jurisdiction to prescribe168 refers to the authority of a state to have its laws 
applied to persons or activities in a foreign state.  Jurisdiction to prescribe explicitly refers to the 
authority of the legislative branch to legislate laws having extraterritorial application.169 Article 
I, Sec. 8, Cl. 3 of the U.S. Constitution provides congress with considerable latitude to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations.170 The Supreme Court consistently has ratified the 
constitutionality of congressional authority to legislate laws having extraterritorial application 
within the national territory of a foreign nation so long as the United States is affected by the acts 
or omissions at issue.171 Legislation of this ilk applies equally to U.S. citizens and foreign 
nationals alike.172 
legislative norm in the form of a state’s long-arm statute would supply this legal ground.  Also, Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(2), 
which is applicable to certain cases concerning a federal question serves a similar, if not identical, role.  Second, 
exercise of a long-arm statute must comport with the due process requirements of the Fifth or Fourteenth 
Amendments, depending on the particular case.  The authority tracing the Constitutional limits of the exercise of 
personal jurisdiction by U.S. Courts is legion.  Moreover, the exercise of personal jurisdiction may be bottomed on 
specific personal jurisdiction or general personal jurisdiction. See e.g. Burham v. Superior Court,  495 U.S. 604 
(1990); Asahi Metal Indus. v. Supreme Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Helicopteros Naciones de Colombia, SA v.  
Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Shaffer v. Heitner, 
433 U.S. 1986 (1977); Hanson v. Denckla, 355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 
310 (1945). 
 
167 A federal district court may not exercise subject-matter jurisdiction absent a federal statute valid pursuant 
to Article III of the U.S. Constitution.  Subject-matter jurisdiction may only be exercised under two narrow 
conditions (i) where the controversy concerns “a federal question” pursuant to the U.S. Constitution, federal 
legislation or regulations, see 28 U.S.C. §1331; or (ii) pursuant to diversity jurisdiction created by U.S. citizens 
residing in different states (28 U.S.C. §1332 (a)(1)); or between U.S. citizens and foreign citizens (28 U.S.C. § 
1332(a)(2) & (3)).  For a comprehensive analysis of personal jurisdiction in the context  of domestic and 
international disputes see BORN, supra at 7-13.   
 
168 Also known as legislative jurisdiction: see E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 253, 111 
S.Ct. 1227, 1233; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) CONFLICTS OF LAWS §60 (1934). 
 
169 The greater part of the jurisprudence that has developed concerning jurisdiction to prescribe, not 
surprisingly, concerns antitrust legislation.  See e.g. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,  475 U.S. 
574, 582 N.6, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1354, N.6, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and 
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 682 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1962);  United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 
268, 47 S.Ct. 592, 71 L.Ed. 1042 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,  148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
 
170 Despite arguable constitutional foundation, jurisdiction to prescribe does not necessarily follow from the 
language of Article I, Sec. 8. Cl. 3 of the Constitution.  It is widely acknowledged that commerce among nations can 
be regulated by virtue of methodologies based upon party consent (i.e. a treaty), or as is typically implemented in the 
international arena, with the adoption of commercial barriers imposing tariffs.  These two methodologies, however, 
are materially different from the regulation of activities taking place within the national territory of a foreign 
sovereign without the consent of the foreign nation affected by the judicial decree at issue.   
 
171 See e.g. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 621-623, 47 S.Ct. 531, 540-541, 71 L.Ed. 793 (1927); United 
States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98-99, 43 S.Ct. 39, 41, 67 L.Ed. 149 (1922); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit 
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359, 29 S.Ct. 511, 514, 53 L.Ed. 826 (1909). 
 
172 See United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945). 
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Because of the exceptional nature of the legislative authority bestowed on congress 
concerning extraterritoriality, it is necessary and illustrative to examine the interpretative 
methodology used in studying legislation that purports to be susceptible to extraterritorial 
application, together with the different standards or rubrics that U.S. federal courts have 
enunciated.  In connection with this second point, it becomes indispensable to analyze the extent 
to which the doctrine of comity such as we have here developed it, may serve as an organizing 
principle for purposes of systematizing and unifying an analytical discipline that engenders so 
much international attention and touches upon the deepest concerns of states because it 
(extraterritoriality) is inextricably tied to the very concept of foreign sovereignty, the wisdom of 
the international community of nations and, therefore, the actual dignity of the members of this 
international and interactive community.   
 
A. Legislative Interpretative Methodology
In contrast to the generalized boiler-plate assertions by commentators, jurists, and 
lawyers steeped in the Roman-Germanic civil code system, in broad strokes Anglo-American 
common law has developed multiple principles of interpretation and construction so as to render 
clear what may be otherwise opaque or ambiguous specific mandates contained in complex 
legislative rubrics.173 As a point of departure it is necessary to observe that “[t]he canon of 
construction which teaches that legislation of congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant 
to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, [citation omitted] is a valid 
approach whereby unexpressed congressional intent may be ascertained.”174 
A second principle of statutory construction is triggered once the presumption against 
extraterritorial application has been met or otherwise rendered inapplicable.  This principle states 
 
173 In some legal disciplines, such as constitutional law, the study of jurisdiction, criminal procedure, and Title 
VII, even more specialized interpretative precepts have been developed consonant with the particularity and 
specificity of the subject matter in question.   
 
174 Foley Bros., Inc., et al. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 285, 69 S. Ct. 575 (1949).  In fact, in EEOC v. Arabian 
American Oil Company, et al., 499 U.S. 244, 111 S.Ct. 1227 (1991), the Supreme Court held that the statutory 
precursor to Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§2000e-2000e17 (1988ed) did not extend beyond the 
national territory of the United States despite the statute’s broad provisions covering any activity, business, or 
industry affecting commerce.  499 U.S. at 249, 111 S.Ct. at 1231 (relying on 42 U.S.C. §2000e(h)).  Likewise, the 
Supreme Court also underscored that “the intent of congress as to the extraterritorial application (of the statute at 
issue) must be deduced by inference from boiler-plate language which can be found in any number of congressional 
acts, none of which have ever been held to apply overseas [citing authority].”  Id. at 251. 
The Sherman Act also contains boiler-plate language very similar to those embodied in Title VII, but the 
Supreme Court in this context, however, observed that the presumption against the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law is overcome with respect to antitrust legislation.  It is well recognized that the Sherman Act, by way of 
example, enjoys extraterritorial application.  See e.g. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 
U.S. 574, 582 N.6, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1354, N.6, 89 L.Ed. 2d 538 (1986); Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide and 
Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 682 S.Ct. 1404, 8 L.Ed. 2d 777 (1962); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 
268, 47 S.Ct. 592, 71 L.Ed. 1042 (1927); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).   
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that “[a]n act of congress ought never to be construed to violate the laws of nations if any other 
possible construction remains.”175 It is important to note that this precept is “wholly 
independent”176 of the presumption against extraterritorial application.  This tenet is necessary 
for purposes of mapping the substantive ambit of domestic legislation, particularly as the “law of 
nations” or international law, acknowledges limitations on the normative bases that nations have 
with respect to jurisdiction to prescribe.177 Generally, there is no presumption suggesting that the 
U.S. congress is vested with authority exceeding the traditional limits of private international 
law.  Yet, it is also assumed that in legislating statutory authority susceptible to extraterritorial 
application congress is acting well within the purview of its powers.  Additionally, congress is 
endowed with constitutional authority to fashion legislation intended to transcend customary 
limits of international private law by dint of congressional fiat to legislate jurisdiction to 
prescribe.178 In the context of the well-recognized presumption against congress exceeding the 
limits of private international law pursuant to its authority to legislate jurisdiction to prescribe, 
the Supreme Court has stated that “even where the presumption against extraterritoriality does 
not apply, statutes should not be interpreted to regulate foreign persons or conduct if that 
regulation will conflict with principles of international law.”179 
As the Supreme Court highlighted in Hartford,180 its analysis of applicable law, was 
bottomed on the standard enunciated in Lauritzen v. Larsen.181 This cause also concerned a 
Jones Act claim on behalf of a non-U.S. sailor against a non-U.S. foreign manager.  Notably, the 
Court seized the opportunity that this action presented to identify the fundamental difficulty 
attendant to the extraterritorial application of this statute; if (the Jones Act) is to be interpreted 
 
175 See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 2 C. Ranch 64, 118.  2 L.Ed. 208 (Chief Justice Marshall).   
 
176 See Aranco, 499 U.S. at 264, 111 S.Ct., at 1239. 
 
177 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§401-416.   
178 See Hartford Fire Ins. Co., et al. v. California Merrett Underwriting Agency Management Ltd., et al., 509 
U.S. 764, 815, 113 S.Ct. 2891 (1993).   
 
179 Id.  In articulating this principle the Supreme Court cited as illustrative precedent issued thirty-two years 
earlier, Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 79 S.Ct. 468, 3 L.Ed.2d 368 (1959).  In 
Romero the plaintiff was a seaman from a Spanish city who lost consciousness while working on a vessel that sailed 
under the Spanish flag and belonging to Spanish citizens.  The plaintiff filed an action pursuant to the Jones Act 
against his superiors.  Because that claim was predicated on a statutorily imposed obligation and not a breach of 
contract, the presumption against the extraterritorial application of a U.S. federal statute was deemed inapplicable 
where, as in that case, all material acts took place within the confines of U.S. territorial waters.  See Id. at 383, 79 
S.Ct. at 486.  The Supreme Court held that “in the absence of a contrary congressional direction, it would apply 
principles of choice of law that are consonant with the needs of a general federal maritime law and with due 
recognition of our self-regarding respect for the relevant interests of foreign nations in the regulation of maritime 
commerce as part of the legitimate concern of the international community.”  Id. at 383, 79 S.Ct. at 486.   
 
180 Supra at 816. 
 
181 Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953).   
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literally, it then must follow that congress had conferred a cause of action on U.S. citizens that 
can be asserted in a U.S. court, and where the cause of action only required that plaintiff meet the 
mere predicate of being “any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his 
employment.”182 It is rather transparent that this premise is juridically unacceptable.  Put simply, 
it would constitute an aberration that frontally militates against even the most rudimentary 
principles of sovereignty that private international law recognizes.   
 
The Supreme Court limited its jurisdiction to prescribe and identified a construction 
placed on the statute pursuant to which it would “apply only to areas and transactions in which 
American law would be considered operative under prevalent doctrines of international law.”183 
The methodology used to fashion a standard for jurisdiction to prescribe that would be 
compatible with a system of international law capable of uniting the community of nations is 
subject to a simple exegesis consisting of two rudimentary rules of interpretation, together with 
two doctrinal premises that comport with these rules and that are central to the extent to which 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law may be viable in a particular case.184 First, when a 
statute is bereft of any clear intent to the contrary, all congressional enactments should be 
exclusively applied within the national territory subject to the jurisdiction of U.S. courts.  Second, 
congressional enactments can never be interpreted so as to violate the laws of nations so long as 
an alternative construction is possible within the confines of reasonableness. Despite the want 
of analytical depth with which the Supreme Court addressed these two principles, one may glean 
that they rest on the tenets of judicial restraint, reasonableness, and comity as a principle of 
reconciliation.
The first precept invites a jurist to discern and articulate an intent contrary to the 
territorial application of a statute that would be limited by a U.S. court’s ability to exercise 
personal jurisdiction.  This challenge is conceptually indistinguishable from that which the 
second precept identifies; i.e., ensuring that international law will not be violated by the 
extraterritorial application of a congressional enactment so long as a reasonable alternative 
interpretation is at all possible.  It is critical to underscore that only when limiting a 
congressional enactment to U.S. national territory within the jurisdiction of federal courts is 
irrational or incapable of being sustained under any reasonable hypothesis of logic, law, fact, or 
equity, shall extraterritoriality ensue.   
 
The principle that necessarily serves as a standard for these two precepts is the concept of 
reasonableness. This concept, however, is in dire need of a substantive rubric if it is to have any 
content or meaning beyond that of the formal and formulistic paradigm of mere syllogistic 
discourse.  The doctrine of comity as a principle of reconciliation can supply this much needed 
 
182 Id. at 576, 73 S.Ct., at 925.   
 
183 Id. at 577, 73 S.Ct., at 926.   
 
184 See Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. at 813-816, for a Supreme Court analysis detailing the two 
presumptions together with the two tenets of statutory construction.   
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substantive juridic content as an analytical instrument to be applied in the interpretation and 
construction of legislation that may have extraterritorial consequences.   
 
If these two rules of statutory construction are to serve as limiting factors in the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. law, it is necessary in establishing limits framed by national 
territory where U.S. courts may exercise jurisdiction, to analyze three fundamental principles of 
reconciliation that provide the doctrine of comity with predictability and uniformity: (i) the 
judicial and economic interests of the United States, (ii) the judicial and economic interests of 
foreign sovereignties, and (iii) the interest of the community of nations in nurturing a system of 
international private law that would not only protect and preserve but also promote and enhance 
commerce and the well-being of all members of a global economic community.  Absent 
consideration of these premises, neither of the two precepts could even purport to justify with 
any uniformity or predictive value the necessary restraint on behalf of the three branches of 
government that typically comprise a representative democracy.   
 
Hence, it is through the prism of comity, viewed as a principle of reconciliation, that the 
judicial branch is capable of harmonizing the policies and efforts of congress with the foreign 
policy of the executive branch such that the resulting consequence would lead to the recognition 
and respect of the independence of foreign sovereignties.  Without comity’s analytical rubric it 
would be quite difficult, if not altogether impossible, to accomplish this goal with respect to the 
international community of nations while advancing the desirable principles of reasonableness, 
uniformity,  predictability, judicial restraint, and party autonomy.
The twin presumption that are attendant to the two precepts of statutory construction and 
interpretation here referenced are also lucidly defined.  First, it is assumed that in the very 
activity of legislating (i.e. the creation of positive law in the classical jurisprudential tradition) 
congress deliberately engages in an exercise of self-restraint so as to avert piercing the limits of 
international law.  Second, even when the presumption against the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law is of no moment, legislative enactments should never be interpreted as having as its 
objective the mission of regulating the conduct of foreigners within their national territory where 
such regulation may interfere with international law.  The twin presumption comports with and 
are susceptible to analyses predicated on (i) reasonableness, (ii) comity, (iii) judicial self-
restraint, and (iv) party autonomy.185 
Without purporting to engage in an oversimplified schematic of the methodology 
necessary for the equitable consideration and implementation of the extraterritorial application of 
U.S. law, the configuration detailed below presents a clear summary of the various normative 
foundations that lead to an understanding of this issue: 
 
185 Here party autonomy refers to the acts and omissions of foreigners within their national territory.   
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The precept of reason
Formal reasoning that comports with
Hegelian logic and Aristotelian categories
The Precept of comity as a principle of
reconciliation
The Precept of judicial self-restraint
a) Consideration of national interests,
b) Consideration of foreign interests, and
c) Consideration of the interest of the community of nations in maintaining and
enhancing a system of private international law,
d) Consideration of legal systems and convergence.
Legislative Branch Judicial Branch
Two interpretative principles of statutory
construction that render possible:
a) predictability
b) uniformity
c) judicial self-restraint
d) reasonableness
e) party autonomy
Executive Branch
(Department of State policies and
interests)
(Policies and interests of the Pentagon)
Substantive justification of reason renders possible and viable
Harmonize Harmonize
First Presumption
Respect for the limits of
the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law
absent clear congressional
intent to the contrary
Second Presumption
Congressional enactments
are only to be applied
within U.S. national
territory except where this
interpretation would lead to
an irrational conclusion
Judicial Compatibility with the Community of Nations
Conclusion
(a), (b), + (c) = cause
the harmonization of the three
branches of government with
respect to extraterritoriality and
jurisdiction to prescribe
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B. The Many Faces of the Standards Governing the Adjudication of 
Jurisdiction to Prescribe and the Concept of Comity to Prescribe
The exigent need to limit the extraterritorial application of congressional 
enactments has required the development of complex doctrines than the two principles of 
statutory construction and attendant presumptions here analyzed.  This orthodox analysis 
has been amended by adding the doctrine of comity but now under the new name of 
comity to prescribe.186 
Despite the proliferation of jurisprudence addressing jurisdiction to prescribe, 
particularly in the realm of antitrust law,187 the standard governing the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, even when viewed in its most favorable light, remains in a state 
of complete conceptual chaos.  The magnitude of this disarray is extraordinary.   
 
In Timberlane 188 the lack of conceptual unity and consensus is regrettably all too 
eloquent.  In that case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a trial court ruling that 
dismissed the claims of four consolidated plaintiffs on two grounds: lack of personal 
jurisdiction and forum non conveniens.  The Ninth Circuit held that the Sherman Act189 is 
 
186 The concept of comity to prescribe or to legislate (“prescriptive comity”) was first enunciated by 
the Supreme Court in Hartford Fire Insurance Co., 509 U.S. 764, 817, in an effort to underscore the 
differences between the use of comity in contexts where judges refrain from exercising jurisdiction over 
cases that theoretically would be best judicially processed in another foreign venue and the use of comity in 
the arena where reciprocity and the mutual respect of nations constitutes the basis for limiting 
extraterritoriality; “[C]omity is exercised by legislatures when they enact laws, and Courts assume it has 
been exercised when they come to interpreting the scope of laws their legislatures have enacted.  It is a 
traditional component of choice-of-law theory.”  Id. at 817. 
 
In the lapidary work by Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Conflicts of Laws, Section 38 (1834), 
draws a very precise distinction between the “comity of the courts” and the “comity of nations.”  It is this 
latter concept (“comity of nations”) that the jurist defines as “the true foundation and extent of the 
obligation of the laws of one nation within the territories of another.”   
 
Despite the significant didactic value in drawing a distinction between the “comity of the courts” 
and the “comity of nations” both concepts in theory and praxis need to be rooted in a single principle.  
Irrespective of whether the concept of comity is administered by a judicial tribunal, an administrative 
agency, or a sovereign’s instrumentality, the penumbra in which the concept of comity currently finds itself 
enmeshed must be substantiated by elements and principles that inevitably will lead to uniformity and 
predictability.  Simply stated, “comity of the courts” and the “comity of nations” is but a “difference 
without a distinction” because of the lack of content that courts have ascribed to comity by not having 
infused it with the principle of reconciliation as here defined.   
 
187 See e.g. Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabina Belgian World Airlines, 235 U.S. at D.C. 207, 236, 109, 731 
F.2d 909, 938, 109 (1984); Montreal Trading Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864, 897-871 (10th Cir. 1981); 
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287, 1294-1298 (3rd Cir. 1979); Timberlane Co. v. 
Bank of America, N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597, 608-615 (9th Cir. 1976); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific 
Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 814, and N. 31 (1968).   
 
188 Timberlane Co. v. Bank of America, N.T. and S.A., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).   
 
189 Sherman Anti-Trust Act, §§1 et seq.; as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§1 et seq.  Section 6(a) of the Act 
provides that it shall not be applied to commerce among nations unless the conduct in question has a direct, 
57 
not circumscribed to restrictions on commerce that have an effect (i) direct and (ii) 
substantial on U.S. foreign commerce. The Ninth Circuit issued this ruling despite a 
record rife with allegations asserting violations committed by non-U.S. citizens taking 
place in Honduras, and having the most direct and significant effect on Honduras.  
Indeed, the Ninth Circuit narrowed the issue before the Court as raising “important 
questions concerning the application of American anti-trust laws to activities in another 
country, including actions of foreign government officials.”190 
C. Seven Standards and One Problem: From Bad to Worse
Remarkably, the Ninth Circuit identified no less than eight standards for purposes 
of addressing the issue identified before the Court prior to engaging in the laudable effort 
of crafting a tripartite test.  The various standards command meticulous analysis.   
 
As a point of departure the Court reiterated the “direct and substantial effect” test 
concerning U.S. foreign commerce that the District Court had applied, and observed that 
this very formula had generally been followed by a number of federal courts.191 
substantial, and reasonable effect on (a) domestic commerce in the United States, or (b) foreign commerce 
undertaken by an entity that conducts business in the United States.   
 
190 549 at 600-601.   
 
191 Id. at 610, citing Swiss Watch case, 1963 Trade Cases P. 70,600; United States v. R.T. Oldham 
Co., 152 F.Supp. 818, 822 (N.D. Cal. 1957); General Electric, 82 F. Supp. at 891.  The Ninth Circuit also 
noted that the “direct and substantial effect” test had been lauded by several commentators.:  See e.g. W. 
FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 30, 174 (2d Ed. 1973); J.VAN CISE,
UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS, 204 (1973 Ed.); and also cited to the REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY 
GENERAL’S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 76 (1955) (applying the standard of 
“substantial anticompetitive affects”); and the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE 
UNITED STATES §18.  This section reads: 
 
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching 
legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory 
and causes an effect within its territory, if either (a) the 
conduct and its effect are generally recognized as constituent 
elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have 
reasonably developed legal systems, or (b) (i) the conduct and 
its effect are constituent elements of activity to which the rule 
applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it 
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside 
the territory, and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the 
principles of justice generally recognized by states that have 
reasonably developed legal systems. (emphasis added) 
 
The requirements of “direct” and “substantial” effect derive from Commentaries (b) (ii) and (iii) 
to this section, which specifically state, notwithstanding that the test only applies to foreigners and that U.S. 
citizens may be deemed bound by their nationality, that the standard exclusively applies when there is no 
significant conduct taking place within the United States, otherwise personal jurisdiction easily could be 
exercised pursuant to contemporary standards of general personal jurisdiction or specific personal 
jurisdiction. Id. at n.18.  
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In its effort to continue to trace the historical and contemporary contours of 
extraterritorial jurisprudence, the Ninth Circuit asserted that “[o]ther courts have used 
different expressions, however.192 After careful analysis, it can be established that the 
Ninth Circuit makes special reference to no less than seven additional formulations.   
 
Second, extraterritoriality is appropriate when the combined effect of the acts and 
omissions taking place in a foreign jurisdiction has an effect on U.S. foreign 
commerce.193 
Third, extraterritorial application of U.S. law is justified when the acts or 
omissions at issue within the territory of a foreign jurisdiction have an effect on U.S. 
imports and exports.194 
Fourth, where facts demonstrate that a conspiracy undertaken within the national 
territory of a foreign jurisdiction has an effect on U.S. commerce, jurisdiction to prescribe 
is warranted.195 
Fifth, extraterritoriality is appropriate where the acts or omissions at issue within 
the national territory of a foreign jurisdiction caused a direct effect and influenced U.S. 
commerce with other nations.196 
Sixth, when the activity at issue in a foreign country causes a direct or substantial 
effect, or when the activity at issue within the national territory of a foreign country 
causes any effect that is not insubstantial and indirect, extraterritoriality is legitimate.197 
Seventh, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law is juridically viable if (i) the 
effect takes place during the course of foreign commerce, or (ii) the extraterritorial acts or 
 
192 Citing to Thomsen v. Cayser, 243 U.S. 66, 88, 37 S.Ct. 353, 360, 61 L.Ed. 597 (1917) (“the 
combination affected the foreign commerce of this country”); Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444 (“intended to affect 
imports and experts (and) . . . is shown actually to have had some effect on them”); [FN19] *611 United 
States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F.Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951) (“a conspiracy. . .  
which affects American commerce”); United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F.Supp. 284, 309 
(N.D. Ohio 1949), modified and affirmed, 341 U.S. 593, 71 S.Ct. 971, 95 L.Ed. 1199 (1951) (“a direct and 
influencing effect on trade”).  See also citations in 1 J. von Kalinowski, Antitrust Law and Trade 
Regulation s. 5.02(2), at 5-120.   
 
193 See Thompson v. Cayer, 243 U.S. 66, 88, 37 S.Ct. 353, 360, 61 L.Ed. 597 (1917).   
 
194 Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. 
 
195 United States v. Imperial Chemical Industries, Ltd., 100 F.Supp. 504, 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).   
 
196 See Koh, supra, at 56 (proposing that Timberlane suggests that the effect on U.S. commerce 
should not be trivial, but rather reasonably direct and substantial, and thus the Court held in an effective 
manner that a party may not invoke jurisdiction to prescribe unless it has alleged a valid claim pursuant to 
jurisprudence protecting free trade and competition.”   
 
197 Occidental Petroleum v. Butlers Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff’d on 
other grounds, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950, 93 S.Ct. 272, 34 L.Ed. 2d 221 (1972).   
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forbearances in question substantially affect commerce between the United States and the 
foreign nation at issue, or (iii) domestic U.S. commerce.198 
The last standard enunciated in favor of the extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
is when the activity at issue takes place within a foreign national territory substantially 
and adversely has an effect on commerce among the various states of the United 
States.199 
Notably, despite the court’s exhaustive analysis of the jurisprudence governing 
extraterritoriality, particularly in the context of antitrust legislation, the term 
“reconciliation” fleetingly appears despite the overwhelming, and practically exclusive, 
emphasis on such nomenclature as “effects,” “direct,” and “significant,” all articulated in 
different standards that often seem to be inconsistent in furthering different economic 
policies and legal issues.  “Reconciliation” is referenced rather vaguely and without 
pretense of bestowing upon the term any juridic content, or otherwise treating it with 
jurisprudential rigor.  The Court limits itself to the observation that while “courts have 
spoken in terms of the Restatement and of congressional policy, findings that an 
American effect was direct, substantial, and foreseeable, or within the scope of 
congressional intent, have little independent analytic significance, instead, cases appear 
to turn on a reconciliation of American and foreign interests in regulating their respective 
economies and business affairs.”200 In Timberlane, however, we do see the seed of the 
concept of comity as some form or permutation, yet to be defined, of reconciliation.
Regrettably, the analysis is frustrated at its very inception.   
 
The standards or formulas premised on the “effects” principle is fundamentally 
flawed inasmuch as it altogether fails to consider the wider and more global concerns of 
the community of nations or rudimentary precepts of international conventional and 
customary private international law.  Likewise, this standard ignores the nature of the 
very parties to a dispute.  By way of example, the extraterritorial application of U.S. law 
based upon acts or omissions undertaken by U.S. citizens within the national territory of a 
foreign nation clearly has material implications that are different and substantially less 
problematic with respect to international law and U.S. foreign policy, than would the 
identical set of facts but arising from the acts or omissions of non-U.S. citizens.201 
198 See Rahl, Foreign Commerce Jurisdiction of the American Antitrust Laws, 43 Antitrust L.J., 521, 
523 (1974).  Here the Court observed, borrowing from Dean Rahl that “(t)here is no agreed black-letter rule 
articulating the Sherman Act’s commerce coverage in the international context.  Id. at 611.   
 
199 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195, 95 S.Ct. 392, 42 L.Ed. 2d 378 (1974); 
United States v. Employee Plasters Assn., 347 U.S. 186, 189, 74 S.Ct. 452, 98 L.Ed. 618 (1954). 
 
200 549 F.2d at 611, citing Note, American Adjudication of Transnational Securities Fraud, 89 Harv. 
L. Rev. 553, 563 (1976) (emphasis supplied).
201 See Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804, 815 (D.C. Cir. 1969) 
(holding that the standard or formula governing extraterritoriality must focus on the nexus between the 
parties, their activities, and the United States, and not on the formulistic circumstantial mechanics of 
“effects” that a particular set of facts may have on U.S. imports and exports).   
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Curiously, after first having raised the “notion” of “reconciliation,” at least in the 
context of using this word, the Ninth Circuit explicitly mentions comity. Based upon its 
own exegesis of the Alcoa opinion, the Court stated that a standard based upon 
“substantial effects” could be susceptible to the incorporation of additional concepts such 
as “substantial” and thus give rise to a more flexible standard that may vary when 
considered together with other factors.202 
The analysis of the multiple standards and tests set forth in Timberlane is 
loquacious in establishing the lack of conceptual consistency that pervades the arena of 
jurisdiction to prescribe.  Critical terms such as “effects” and “direct” are wholly bereft of 
content and consistent meaning.  Also, the opinion reveals inexplicable arbitrariness in its 
lack of commitment to endowing such terms as “other factors to consider,” with any 
degree of specificity that may serve as meaningful precedent.  The want of reference or 
sustained analysis to such critical issues such as political and geopolitical concerns that 
may be at stake, the nationality of the parties, the effect of extraterritoriality on 
international customary and conventional private international law, and the interests of 
the community of nations as a whole, all compound and multiply the problem and lead to 
confusion for those commentators, courts, and practitioners seeking consistency, 
uniformity, party-autonomy, reasonableness, judicial restraint, and reconciliation among 
the multiple interests that inevitably are touched upon whenever extraterritoriality takes 
place.   
 
The opinion does not answer a very simple question.  Under what circumstances 
is the extraterritorial application of U.S. law appropriate based upon the acts or 
forbearances occurring within the national territory of a foreign jurisdiction?  The 
question is valid, warranted, and necessary.  So too should be its answer.   
 
D. The Tripartite Standard: Some Light in the Midst of Chaos
Faced with conceptual inconsistencies and disarray, the Ninth Circuit’s visceral 
analytical penchant in Timberlane was to fashion a tripartite standard that would 
theoretically embody sufficient flexibility so as to reconcile the multiple interests and 
variables that must be considered in determining jurisdiction to prescribe.  The effort 
doubtless represents a step in the right direction and thus merits consideration in its 
entirety:  
 
*613 [13] A tripartite analysis seems to be indicated.  As 
acknowledged above, the antitrust laws require in the first 
instance that there be some effect actual or intended on 
American foreign commerce before the federal courts may 
legitimately exercise subject matter jurisdiction under those 
statutes.  Second, a greater showing of burden or restraint 
may be necessary to demonstrate that the effect is 
 
202 549 F.2d at 612.  Here the Court observed that “[t]he intent requirement suggested by Alcoa, 148 
F.2d at 443-44, is one example of an attempt to broaden the Court’s perspective, as is drawing a distinction 
between American citizens and non-citizens.”   
61 
sufficiently large to present a cognizable injury to the 
plaintiffs and, therefore, a civil violation of the antitrust 
laws.  [authority omitted] Third, there is the additional 
question which is unique to the international setting of 
whether the interests of, and links to, the United States 
including the magnitude of the effect on American foreign 
commerce are sufficiently strong, vis-à-vis those of other 
nations, to justify an assertion of extraterritorial 
authority.203 
The Ninth Circuit’s virtuosity in crafting this test is laudable and impressive, 
notwithstanding the mechanical incorporation of the very debilities that the very court 
observed in other analyses.  Regrettably, the tripartite test is conceptually inapplicable 
and theoretically unacceptable.  No less than five fundamental premises contribute to the 
new standard’s shortcomings as a viable and binding precedent that may be followed by 
courts, practitioners, states, multinationals, entrepreneurs, and the community of nations.   
 
First, the terms “some effect actual” or “intended” enunciated in the first 
premise of the tripartite test lack significance at even a philological level, let alone 
juridically.  The mere presence of some intent on the part of private entities engaging in 
acts or omissions within the national territory of a foreign sovereignty concerning U.S. 
foreign commerce, without more, constitutes an impoverished foundation on which to 
repose subject matter jurisdiction.  In fact, the caselaw is bereft of any precedent 
supporting so extraordinary a proposition.  Similarly, “some effect actual” is hardly a 
guidepost to be followed.   
 
Second, the term “sufficiently large” that the tribunal so acutely criticized as 
inappropriately and “blindly” raised by other courts in the context of international 
transactions is here incorporated without being meaningfully articulated.204 
Third, the tripartite standard is devoid of any reference to the status or nationality 
of the actors at issue.  Already it has been noted that the relationship between U.S. 
citizens and the acts or forbearance in question as well as the connection between the 
activity at issue and non-U.S. citizens, is simply indispensable to an extraterritoriality 
analysis.  It is remarkable that comity forms no part at all of the standard.  Despite having 
underscored the importance of this doctrine in the context of substantiation, the Court 
elected to ignore in its entirety the issue of comity and thus avert facing the challenge of 
bestowing upon it a material and substantive foundation that would facilitate the 
adjudication of extraterritoriality issues.   
 
Fourth, the tripartite formula’s third premise does not contemplate the need to 
reconcile the competing and conflicting interests that are inevitably generated by issues 
concerning the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.  The Court merely limited itself to 
 
203 Id. at 613 (emphasis supplied). 
 
204 Id. at 613.   
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referencing the “magnitude of the effect on American foreign commerce . . . vis-à-vis 
those of other nations,” for purposes of determining the propriety and legality of 
jurisdiction to prescribe.205 A deeper analysis is necessary.  It is analytically impossible 
to premise a test concerning jurisdiction to prescribe that must necessarily harmonize 
economic interests among and between nations on so subjective and elusive a term as 
“magnitude.”  The gravity of this problem is compounded and made worse when 
understood as taking place in a completely unilateral context.  A test purporting to be 
bottomed on more “objective criteria” is not only warranted but indispensable.  The 
suggestion of “magnitude” leads to such an inference.  Moreover, the need to modify 
materially this third prong of the tripartite standard grows in importance when 
considering such factors as the elements of a global economy purporting to have porous 
economic borders consonant with a universal policy of “equitable globalization.”   
 
If the elements of reciprocity and reconciliation, as basic points of departure are 
to play a material role in redefining and applying comity, the doctrinal rubric governing 
the extraterritorial application of U.S. law must be severely modified to incorporate these 
concepts.  Reliance on the theoretical and pedagogical construct holding that the common 
law gradually modifies and purifies itself pursuant to the mere passage of time so as to 
adapt to changing social, political, and economic historical tenets, thus purifying itself 
continuously through the evolution and development of stare decisis is here unavailing.  
Instead of creating theoretical and practical schemes that may address this complex issue 
that compels consideration of factors beyond the mere allocation of wealth, the common 
law has given rise to a proliferation of standards and tests that, certainly in some 
instances, show themselves to be internally contradictory and inimical to the very goals 
that it purports to further.  Other examples of the standards and tests that the “perfect 
workings” of the common law demonstrate are tests and standards that are of little or 
dubious utility in the promotion of judicial restraint, party autonomy, predictability,
reciprocity, and reconciliation, or of addressing the growing exigencies that pervade a 
global economy that defines itself in terms of globalization and such multilateral treaties 
as NAFTA, Mercosur, and The Andean Pact, to mention only some of the agreements 
that define the economic and judicial scenario confronting Latin America.206 
205 Id. at 613. 
 
206 In Hartford Fire Insurance, the Supreme Court lost an invaluable opportunity to legitimize and 
adopt the Timberlane analysis, which although flawed, constitutes the most comprehensive effort on the 
subject.  Plainly, the Supreme Court failed in clarifying the circumstances in which comity would serve as a 
factor in limiting jurisdiction to prescribe.  In fact, after its decision in Hartford Fire Insurance, a foreign 
party seeking to dismiss a complaint on the ground of comity appears only to have to aver that the acts or 
forbearance that the United States has declared as being illegal are actually legal within the jurisdiction of 
the foreign country at issue.  In addition, the Hartford Fire Insurance precedent also may suggest that a 
movant seeking dismissal in addition to establishing that the alleged illegal act is legal in the foreign 
jurisdiction in question, but also that the legislation of the foreign country caused the movant to act in the 
manner deemed illegal by the United States.    
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V. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES AND ATTENDANT 
EXCEPTIONS 
 
A. The Absolute Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity
Practically from its very foundation as a constitutional democracy the United 
States provided virtually absolute immunity to foreign sovereignties from the exercise of 
jurisdiction by U.S. courts.  This theory of absolute immunity was first articulated by the 
U.S. Supreme Court in 1812, scarcely sixty-seven years after securing independence from 
the United Kingdom.207 
In The Schooner Exchange, the Court’s first Chief Justice premised his analysis 
on a classical territorial doctrine of analytical jurisprudence.  Justice Marshall observed 
that so long as a foreign state acted within the confines of its national territory “[i]t is 
susceptible of no limitation not imposed by itself,”208 and that the United States implicitly 
had waived jurisdiction over the activities of a foreign nation undertaken under these 
circumstances.  The analysis of the case arose from the very specific facts pertaining to 
the determination of whether U.S. Courts could exercise jurisdiction over a navy vessel 
belonging to a foreign sovereign that was not hostile to the United States and did not 
demonstrate any badges of belligerency.  It was in this context that the absolute theory of
foreign sovereign immunity was first pronounced.209 
Significantly, in The Schooner Exchange there is no reference at all to the 
doctrine of comity.  Even a surface reading of the opinion, however, reflects that Justice 
Marshall predicated his opinion (without so articulating it) on the very reasoning that 
underlied the Court’s holding in Hilton v. Guyot, that caused the creation of a new 
normative space in jurisprudence: “less than an obligation but more than a courtesy.”  In 
fact, in 1983, 160 years after the ruling in The Schooner Exchange, the Supreme Court 
underscored Justice Marshall’s analysis as one in which “foreign sovereign immunity is a 
matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States, and not a restriction imposed 
by the constitution.  Accordingly, this Court consistently has deferred to the decisions of 
the political branches – in particular, those of the Executive Branch – on whether to take 
jurisdiction over actions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities [citations 
omitted].”210 
207 See The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116, 3 L.Ed. 287 (1812).   
 
208 Id.  
 
209 See e.g. Berizzi Brothers Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 46 S.Ct. 611, 70 L.Ed. 1088 (1926).   
 
210 Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed. 2d 81 
(1983) (emphasis supplied).  Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange highlights the need to engage in 
judicial restraint in deference to the political branches of government.   
 
The arguments in favor of this opinion which have been drawn from 
the general inability of the judicial power to enforce its decision in 
cases of this description, from the consideration, that the sovereign 
power of the nation is alone competent to avenge wrongs committed by 
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It is significant that Justice Marshall did not cite to any judicial precedent in 
crafting The Schooner Exchange opinion, but did premise his analysis on precepts 
founded on concepts of natural law and “principles” adopted by “civilized nations.”  The 
first articulated statement concerning the absolute theory of sovereign immunity 
expressed in a U.S. Supreme Court opinion was eloquently and succinctly pronounced by 
Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange:
The jurisdiction of the nation within its own territory is 
necessarily exclusive and absolute. It is susceptible of no
limitation not imposed by itself.  Any restriction upon it, 
deriving validity from an external source, would imply a 
diminution of its sovereignty to the extent of the restriction, 
and an investment of that sovereignty to the same extent in 
that power which could impose such restriction. 
 
____________________________ 
 
The world being composed of distinct sovereignties, 
possessing equal rights and equal independence, whose 
mutual benefit is promoted by intercourse with each other, 
and by an interchange of those good offices which 
humanity dictates and its wants require, all sovereigns have 
consented to a relaxation in practice, in cases under certain 
peculiar circumstances, of that absolute and complete 
jurisdiction within their respective territories which 
sovereignty confers.211 
The absolute theory of sovereign immunity typifies the paradigmatic “child of his 
times.”  The “absolute” component of the theory is as rigid as the doctrinal inflexibility 
that accompanies, and may be inferred from, the concept of “territoriality.”  The 
analytical formation and transformation evinced by the conceptual movement from 
 
a sovereign, that the questions to which such wrongs give birth are 
rather questions of policy than of law, that they are for diplomatic, 
rather than legal discussion, are of great weight, and merit serious 
attention.  7 Cranch at 146. 
 
211 Id. at 136 (emphasis added).  It is worth noting that in The Schooner Exchange the concept of 
absolute sovereign immunity was applied to a French navy vessel docked in a U.S. port.  Pursuant to 
Justice Marshall’s analysis, the Court decreed that “the Exchange, being a public armed ship, in the service 
of a foreign sovereign [Emperor Napoleon], with whom the government of the United States is at peace, 
and having entered an American port open for her reception, on the terms on which ships of war are 
generally permitted to enter the port of a friendly power, must be considered as having come into the 
American territory, under an implied promise, that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a 
friendly manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.”  Id. at 147.  Curiously, in the 
very first challenge to the absolute theory of sovereign immunity concerning a foreign sovereign, the 
immunity actually was amplified to cover property of a foreign nation located within the national territory 
of the United States.  The standard now had been clearly established.   
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“territoriality” to “material contacts and significant relations” in the arena of jurisdiction 
and conflicts of law also highlighted the frailties inherent in doctrines that are not 
sufficiently maleable to adopt political policies and economic changes that render 
policies of international isolationism archaic and unworkable.  The advent of “economic 
transnationalism,” the growth of information technology, and the failure of an 
international legal system that revealed its embryonic state of development and want of 
practical application with respect to serving as a rational guiding principle in the 
relationship among nations based upon its inability to derail two world wars, together 
created a need for a radical and substantial change concerning the rudimentary precepts 
surrounding the underlying jurisprudence governing the absolute theory of sovereign 
immunity. 
 
This theory lost its relevance and functional ability together with the carriage 
powered by marvelous equines and the flickering light of the last gas-powered lamps.  
We learn that the process of self-elimination arising from new technologies and 
competition leading to the “purification” of the marketplace, provide a sufficient factual 
basis from which to infer that both the last carriage and lamp must have been of the most 
excellent quality, but their time has passed.  Likewise, the static concept of territoriality 
in the context of foreign sovereign immunity had to yield to the precept of relativity best 
characterized by the elements of “effects,” “significant relations,” and universal norms 
that find their reason for being in the protection of human dignity and humanitarian 
rights.  The permutation that governed jurisdictional doctrines simply could not sever 
itself from the “other side of the coin:” the immunity accorded to nations. 
 
The absolute theory of sovereign immunity remained as a dispositive rubric until 
1952.  In fact, during this period, the Supreme Court meticulously emphasized the 
distinction between judicial questions that appropriately fell within the ambit of the 
judiciary and so deemed the issue of immunity accorded to foreign sovereignties and 
concerns that are more appropriately framed as political questions to be addressed by the 
executive branch of government.212 
B. The Restrictive Theory of Sovereign Immunity: The Separation of 
Powers
It was not until 1952 that the United States Department of State typically would 
issue petitions invoking immunity as to all legal proceedings filed against any foreign 
state with whom diplomatic relations were “friendly” or “positive.”  This policy 
presented a harmonized and consistent rubric between the executive branch and the 
absolute theory of sovereign immunity that the Supreme Court had first adopted in The 
Schooner Exchange. On May 19, 1952, however, acting legal adviser for the U.S. State 
Department, Jack B. Tate, who at the time was charged with providing legal counsel to 
Attorney General Phillip B. Perlman, drafted a letter that contained the state department’s 
new and official policy with respect to foreign sovereign immunity.  This novel position 
 
212 See e.g. Ex Parte Perú, 318 U.S. 578, 586-590, 63 S.Ct. 793, 798-800, 87 L.Ed. 1014 (1943); 
Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30, 33-36, 65 S.Ct. 530, 531-533, 89 L.Ed. 729 (1945). 
66 
materially altered the absolute theory of sovereign immunity and introduced the new 
restrictive theory.  Jack Tate’s missive is commonly referred to as the “Tate letter.”213 
Significantly, it was not until 1976 that congress enacted legislation, 28 U.S.C. 
§§1602-1611, and 28 U.S.C. §1330, known as the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (the 
“FSIA”).214 The FSIA provides federal district courts with the solitary and exclusive 
ground for exercise of jurisdiction over a foreign sovereignty.  
 
It was not until 1989, three years after having enacted the legislation, that the 
Supreme Court clarified the FSIA’s monopoly on jurisdiction over a foreign nation.215 
The transformation from an absolute theory of sovereign immunity to a restrictive rubric, 
despite the primacy of the absolute theory from 1812 until 1952, signified that “a state is 
immune from the jurisdiction of foreign courts as to its sovereign or public acts (jure 
imperii), but not as to those that are private or commercial in character (jure gestionis).216 
The Supreme Court established that a foreign sovereignty as a matter of law participates 
in a “commercial activity” pursuant to the restrictive theory “a foreign state engaging in 
 
213 See 26 Dep’t of State Bull, 984-985 (1952); In Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 
682, 711, 96 S.Ct. 1854, 1869, 48 L.Ed. 2d 301 (1976) (opinion drafted by Justice White).   
 
214 §1330, entitled “Actions against foreign states” was enacted by congress on October 21, 1976 
(see eight of Pub.L. 94-583), for purposes of being applied to §1602.  §1330 vests federal district courts 
with subject matter: 
 
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in controversy of any non-
jury civil action against a foreign state as defined in section 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in 
personam with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-
1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement. 
 
(b) Personal jurisdiction over a foreign state shall exist as to every claim for relief over which the district 
courts have jurisdiction under subsection (a) which service has been made under section 1608 of this title.  
 
(c) For purposes of subsection (b), an appearance by a foreign state does not confer personal jurisdiction 
with respect to any claim for relief not arising out of any transaction or occurrence enumerated in sections 
1605-1607 of this title.   
 
It is impossible to comment exhaustively and in detail on the FSIA in a single article.  Accordingly, here 
only the contours of the legislation are traced in order to explore the measure in which application of a 
substantive concept of comity, as a doctrine of reconciliation in the arena of procedural international law 
may serve as a fundamental premise and first principle towards a unified theory that purports to foster 
predictability, uniformity, reasonableness, judicial restraint, and party autonomy to private international 
law.  
 
215 See Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 443, 109 S.Ct. 683, 693, 
102 L.Ed. 2d 818 (1989) (“we hold that the FSIA provides the sole basis for obtaining jurisdiction over a 
foreign state in the courts of this country.”)  See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, P. 12 (1976) (H.R. Rep); 
S.Rep. No. 94-1310, pp. 11-12 (1976) (S.Rep.), U.S. Code Cong. And Admin. News 1976, pp. 6604, 6610 
(FSIA “intended to preempt any other state and federal law [excluding applicable international agreements] 
for according immunity to foreign sovereigns”).   
 
216 See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, at 359-360, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed. 2d 47 (1993).   
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‘commercial’ activities does not exercise powers peculiar to sovereigns; rather, it 
exercises only those powers that can also be exercised by private citizens.”217 
Accordingly, a foreign nation pursuant to the restrictive theory shall be deemed to be 
engaging in a “commercial activity” only when it acts “in the manner of a private citizen 
or a corporation” in the marketplace.218 
The statutory rubric creates a presumption of immunity in favor of foreign nations 
unless a showing is proffered demonstrating that the nature of the activity in question 
falls within the ambit of a specific exception under this legislative paradigm.219 In 
applying an exception within the confines of the restrictive theory, in applying an 
exception enunciated by the restrictive theory, a district court would lack subject matter 
jurisdiction, as set forth in the very anatomy of the statute pursuant to §1330, to affirm 
the original jurisdiction of federal courts bottomed on the FSIA.  
 
The point of departure for any analysis concerning the immunity from jurisdiction 
in U.S. courts to be accorded to a foreign nation is configured by a presumption of 
immunity absent a showing that the acts or forbearances at issue fall within the realm of 
any of the seven very narrowly limited exceptions that the FSIA prescribes.220 Despite, 
 
217 See Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 , 112 S.Ct. 2160, 2166, 119 L.Ed. 
2d 394 (1992). 
 
218 Id.  In Weltover, the Supreme Court underscored that the dispositive standard in a foreign 
sovereign immunities analysis is the nature of the foreign nation’s activity and not the underlying motive 
that may be identified at issue.  This distinction between nature and motive (or purpose) is explicitly 
articulated in the very legislation, which defines “commercial activity” as “a regular course of commercial 
conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.  The commercial character of an activity shall be 
determined by reference to the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than 
by reference to it’s purpose.”  28 U.S.C. §1603(d) (emphasis supplied).   
 
Federal district courts are of a single voice in holding that when a foreign nation exercises its 
“police powers” it shall not be deemed to be engaging in a “commercial activity” within the meaning of the 
FSIA.  See e.g. Nelson, 113 S.Ct. at 1480; John Doe I v. UNICAL Corp., 963 F.Supp. 880 (C.D. Cal. 1997) 
(abuse of a sovereignty’s police powers constitutes activity particularly pertaining to the acts of a sovereign 
by its very nature and, therefore, does not fall within the purview of the FSIA’s commercial activity 
exception”; Granville Gold Trust-Switzerland v. Commissiones del Fullimento/Interchange Bank, 924 
F.Supp. 397 (E.D.N.Y. 1996); Aguas Viva v. Iberia Lineas Aereas de España, 937 F.Supp. 141 (D.P.R. 
1996) (holding that the use of police power by a foreign nation has long been established as endemic to the 
nature of a sovereign pursuant to the restrictive theory); Habtemicael v. Saudi a/k/a Saudian Arabian 
Airlines, 1995 WL 443940 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (holding that abuse of police power falls squarely within the 
domain of a sovereign’s nature); Intercontinental Dictionary Series v. DeGruyter, 882 F.Supp. 662, 674-
676 (the research and development of an academic treatise covering the lives of many academicians in the 
field of linguistics over time is not a typical commercial activity and, therefore, the government 
instrumentality of the Australian government undertaking such a task merits FSIA immunity); Mol, Inc. v. 
The Peoples Republic of Bangledesh, 572 F.Supp. 79, 84 (D.Ore. 1983) (finding that the use of a state’s 
police powers constitutes an activity essential to the undertakings of a sovereign).   
 
219 See for example, Verlinden B.V., 461 U.S. 480, 488-489, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 1968-1969, 76 L.Ed. 2d 
81 (1983).   
 
220 The seven exceptions may be summarized as follows:  
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(a) “a foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the United States or of the 
states in any case –  
 (i) when the foreign sovereignty “has waived its immunity either explicitly or by 
implication, notwithstanding any withdrawal of the waiver which the foreign state may purport to effect 
except in accordance with the terms of the waiver” [Section 1605(a)(1)]; 
 
(ii) “in which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the 
United States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity in a foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act outside the territory of the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that state causes a direct effect in 
the United States [Section 1605(a)(2)]; 
 
(iii) in which rights in property taken in violation of international law are in issue 
and that property or any property exchanged for such property is present in the United States in connection 
with a commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state; or that property or any 
property exchanged for such property is owned or operated by an agency or instrumentality of a foreign 
state and that agency or instrumentality is engaged in a commercial activity in the United States [Section 
1605(a)(3)]; 
 
(iv) in which rights in property in the United States acquired by succession or gift or 
rights in immovable property situated in the United States are in issue [Section 1605(a)(4)]; 
 
(v) not otherwise encompassed in paragraph (2) above, in which money damages 
are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or damage to or loss of property, occurring in 
the United States and caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any official or 
employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of his office or employment, except this 
paragraph shall not apply to [Section 1605(a)(5)]: 
 
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to 
exercise or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be based, or  
 
(B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, 
slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights; 
 
(vi) in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state 
with or for the benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or 
which may arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, 
concerning a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to 
confirm an award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitration, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is 
intended to take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or 
other international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of 
arbitral awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a 
United States court under this section or section 1607, or (D) paragraph (i) of this subsection is otherwise 
applicable [Section 1605(a)(6)1], and  
 
(vii) not otherwise covered by paragraph (2), in which money damages are sought against a 
foreign state for personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft, 
sabotage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or resources (as defined in section 2339A of 
title 18) for such an act if such act or provision of material support is engaged in by an official, employee, 
or agent of such foreign state while acting within the scope of his or her office, employment, or agency, 
except that the court shall decline to hear a claim under this paragraph.  [Section 1605(a)(7)].   
 
This seventh exception is qualified by two provisions providing that a court shall not have 
jurisdiction to prosecute a cause against a foreign nation where the foreign state (a) “was not designated as 
a state sponsor of terrorism under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of 1979 (citation omitted) 
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however, the scope of the operative exceptions affording foreign states immunity, the 
plethora of authority has been generated by the “commercial activity” exception of 
Section 1605(2).   
 
C. The “Direct Effect” Element of “Commercial Activity”
It is of little surprise that the “commercial activity” exception provides the most 
illustrative paradigm of the FSIA’s immunity scheme. 
 
The mere diminution of value or even an economic loss that a U.S. plaintiff may 
aver, without more, does not suffice to overcome the FSIA’s presumption of immunity 
despite clear circumstances where the “commercial activity” upon which the claim rests 
is “direct” but does not constitute an “effect.”  By way of example in Kline v. Kaneko,221 
an action was based on the official conduct of Mexico’s Secretary of Government.  There 
plaintiff alleged that he had been expelled from Mexico by that nation’s Secretary of 
Government, who in turn pursued an agenda of promoting economic interests contrary to 
those of the plaintiff.  In addition, plaintiff alleged that the expulsion took place without 
engaging in any formal extradition proceeding and lacked all vestiges of due process 
attendant to such proceedings.  In dismissing the complaint, the district court observed 
that “the expulsion of foreign nationals from sovereign nations is not an activity 
customarily carried out for profit by private persons.222 Furthermore the Court noted that 
it was not appropriate for it to engage in an inquiry into and judgment of Mexico’s 
immigration laws.223 
Also illustrative is the holding in Mol, Inc. v. The People’s Republic of 
Bangledesh224 where the Court examined “the issue [of] whether Bangladesh’s regulation 
of the capture and export of game is a ‘commercial’ or ‘governmental’ activity.”225 Here 
plaintiff challenged the revocation of a hunting and exportation license that the 
 
or Section 620A of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (citation omitted) at the time the act occurred, 
unless later so designated as a result of such act or the act is related to Case Number 1:00CV03110 (E.G.S.) 
in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia; and  
 
(b) even where the foreign state at issue is designated as a sponsor of terrorism, the act in 
question occurred within the national territory of a foreign state and that state was not accorded an 
opportunity to arbitrate pursuant to international law or “neither the claimant nor the victim was a national 
of the United States [citation omitted] when the act upon which the claim is based occurred.” 
 
Conditions under which an action in admiralty may be brought are also set forth in the subsections 
to section (vii).   
 
221 685 F.Supp. 386 (S.D.N.Y 1988).   
 
222 Id. at 391.   
 
223 Id. at 389.   
 
224 572 F.Supp. 79 (D.Ore. 1983). 
 
225 Id. at 83.   
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government of Bangledesh issued for purposes of capturing Rhesus monkeys and 
exporting them to the United States.  The legally secured license allowed plaintiff to 
export the magnificent animals at bargained-for set prices and quantities regulated by 
government officials.  In 1977, after the government of India proscribed the exportation 
of similar monkeys, Bangledesh became the solitary source for the exportation of Rhesus 
monkeys and the global prices of the animals significantly increased.226 Shortly after the 
appreciation of the value of the Rhesus, in 1978 Bangledesh cancelled its agreement to 
export the species.   
 
The district court held that Bangledesh enjoyed immunity pursuant to the FSIA: 
 
[The Court] conclude[s] that Bangladesh’s granting of the 
License to plaintiff in this case was not a “commercial 
activity,” but a sovereign act not subject to suit in United 
States courts.  The granting of such a license as part of a 
comprehensive regulation of wildlife under the police 
power is an action in which the sovereign power is 
essential.  Likewise the granting of an export license, like 
the power to exclude imports to regulate exports in general, 
is a power possessed only by sovereigns, not private 
parties.  I find that the activity in suit here is by its “nature” 
sovereign activity.227 
Plaintiff’s analysis in this cause merits consideration.  It is significant to note that 
plaintiff averred that the license’s fundamental purpose was to generate income for the 
state of Bangladesh and, therefore, must be deemed commercial in nature.  Yet the Court 
overwhelmingly rejected this proposition and criticized the analysis by emphasizing that 
“[t]he purpose of the activity is irrelevant under the statute.”228 
The precept that mere diminution in value or economic loss is insufficient to meet 
the “direct effect” element so as to overcome the presumption of immunity provided to a 
foreign state has been firmly established.229 
226 Id. at 81.   
 
227 Id. at 84. 
 
228 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 
229 See United World Trade, Inc. v. Mangyshlakneft Oil Production Ass’n, 821 F.Supp. 1405, 1409 
(D.Co. 1993), aff’d, 33 F.3rd 1232 (10th Cir. 1994) (cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1112, 115 S.Ct. 904, 130 L.Ed. 
2d 787 (1995) (holding that mere economic loss suffered by plaintiff in the United States as a result of the 
conduct of a foreign state does not constitute a “direct effect” and, therefore, cannot, without more, give 
rise to subject matter jurisdiction in conformance with Section 1605(a)(2) (FSIA)).  See also H.Rep. Dr. 
No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S.S.C.A.N. 6604, 6616 (underscoring that the term 
“commercial” must include “substantial contact” with the United States so as to reflect a degree of contact 
between the conduct at issue on behalf of a U.S. citizen or U.S. resident and the plaintiff); Granville Gold 
Trust-Switzerland v. Commissione, 924 F.Supp. 397, 408 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding that when the role of 
the “Commissione” is limited to securing assets and liquidating claims, and a contract was in place between 
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It is important to note that even when the commercial activity exception applies, 
the immunity protection only attaches so long as a direct effect is not present in the 
United States.  The case of Drexel Burnham Lambert Group, Inc. v. Committee of 
Receivers for A.W. Galadari230 is useful in demonstrating the inapplicability of the 
commercial activity exception in the absence of any direct effect, notwithstanding 
economic loss.  There, plaintiffs filed a complaint against the Emirate of Dubai alleging 
mismanagement of plaintiffs’ collateral during the liquidation of the insolvent Bank of 
Dubai.  The receiver’s committee in Drexel was constituted by four (4) Dubai citizens.  
The government had formed this committee and also retained authority to liquidate the 
Bank’s assets as well as to file and to defend all legal actions on the Bank’s behalf.231 
The Second Circuit held that the FSIA proscribed the prosecution of all claims at 
issue because even though “these activities might be regarded as commercial, they are not 
activities that caused a direct effect in the United States.”232 As is the case with the 
doctrine of extraterritoriality, the immunity accorded to a foreign state pursuant to the 
restrictive theory raises more conceptual questions and paradoxes than it answers or 
otherwise satisfactorily addresses.  This problemata is best exemplified highlighting ten 
(10) fundamental premises that characterize it.   
 
defendants, the court lacked FSIA subject matter jurisdiction); Antares Aircraft, Ltd. v. Federal Republic of 
Nigeria, 948 F.2d 90 (2d Cir. 1991), vacated 505 U.S. 1215, 1112 S.Ct. 3020, 120 L.Ed. 2d 892 (1991), 
reaff’d, 999 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1993), cert denied, 510 U.S. 1071, 114 S.Ct. 878, 127 L.Ed. 2d 74 (1994) 
(affirming a finding of want of subject matter jurisdiction over controversy arising from a plane pertaining 
to a U.S. company that was detained in Nigeria; the economic loss that the U.S. company suffered did not 
qualify as a “direct effect” for purposes of meeting the “commercial activity” exception and thus 
overcoming the presumption of immunity).   
 
230 12 F.3d 317 (2d Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1069, 114 S.Ct. 1644, 128 L.Ed. 2d 365 (1994).   
 
231 Id. at 319. 
 
232 Id. at 330.  The holding of the district court for the Northern District of Illinois in Magnus 
Electronics, Inc. v. Royal Bank of Canada, 620 F.Supp. 387, 390 (N.D. Ill. 1985) traces the parameters of 
the “direct effect” requirement:  
 
As for “direct effect,” [Plaintiff] seeks to read that requirement as 
though mere economic impact on a United States party, caused by a 
foreign government’s actions on its own soil, were enough to subject 
the foreign sovereign to suit here.  That construction of course would 
prove too much: It would eliminate sovereign immunity altogether, for 
all the United States plaintiff would have to show would be damages 
caused by the alleged wrongful conduct of the foreign government in 
its own territory.  Due process constraints preclude such a broad sweep 
against private litigants (see e.g., State Security Insurance Co. v. Frank 
B. Hall & Co., 530 F.Supp. 94, 98-100 (N.D. Ill. 1981)), and it would 
be anomalous indeed if a foreign nation could be haled into court here 
on so slender a connection where a non-sovereign could not.   
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D. More than an Achilles’ Heel in the Restrictive Theory of Foreign 
Sovereign Immunity
First, the transition from the absolute to the restrictive theory of foreign sovereign 
immunity gave rise to a need to create applicable standards that would necessarily yield 
predictability, uniformity, party autonomy, reasonableness, and judicial restraint on a 
consistent basis.  The FSIA’s seven rudimentary and rather narrow exceptions indeed 
provide greater flexibility than could ever be aspired to under the absolute theory, but 
they are wanting in analytical consistency so as to meet the basic objectives pursued in 
the development of jurisprudence resting on stare decisis.   
Second, the commercial activity has been the most prolific of the seven 
exceptions in generating caselaw.233 
Third, the use of a standard based upon analysis of the character or nature of the 
particular facts at issue so as to determine whether they constitute acts that may be 
undertaken by a private entity, as opposed to those actions that are endemic to a 
sovereign’s exercise of sovereignty (such as the use of police power, enactment of 
immigration laws, and issuance of licenses), constitutes a basic premise on which the 
restrictive theory rests.   
 
It is important to emphasize that conceptually this standard is materially 
distinguishable, but parallel to the concept of commercial activity.  Here, curiously, the 
“commercial effect” of the facts at issue are irrelevant.  Accordingly, pursuant to some 
paradigms, the very elements of the doctrine of foreign sovereign immunities appear to 
be internally inconsistent.  Even a modest exercise of the imagination readily gives rise to 
scenarios where a foreign state undertakes acts capable of being ascribed to a private 
actor but lacking any economic consequence.  Likewise, the corollary does not present 
the imagination with much of a challenge.  There are multiple circumstances where a 
foreign state exercising acts and forbearances inherent to sovereignty itself, within its 
national territory, is rendered susceptible to the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws 
with respect to the activities of its very citizens or those of U.S. citizens (a distinction that 
the standard does not recognize) so long as economic consequences flow from such 
activities such that they materially, in some sense not defined with any mathematical or 
juridic rigor, touch or concern the United States’ national or international commerce.  
 
Fourth, the restrictive theory is predicated on an analysis of the nature of the facts 
at issue and not their purpose or motive. This standard or element of the restrictive 
theory is also somewhat problematic and capable of leading to fundamental doctrinal 
inconsistencies.  For example, despite the emphasis that the Supreme Court places on this 
 
233 There is a common denominator among the (i) Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, (ii) Act of 
State Doctrine, and (iii) Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.  Despite the conceptual integrity and 
independence of each of these doctrinal precepts they are somewhat related and overlapping in that all 
three, to some extent, are governed by economic factors and considerations.  Indeed, their application is 
profoundly influenced, if not altogether governed, by the extent to which acts and forbearances taking place 
within the national territory of a foreign state affect either the national or international commerce of the 
United States.   
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standard in the context of analyzing “commercial effects” on the United States, the 
underlying intent giving rise to the acts at issue also has been highlighted as a relevant 
and material component of the analysis.  It is analytically impossible simultaneously to 
sustain the propositions that the purpose of the acts in question should not be considered 
in the analytical jurisprudence of the application of foreign sovereign immunity, but that 
the intent must be deemed part of the dispositive legal criteria.  The anomaly is evident.  
Here too it becomes clear that the rubric that follows from the restrictive theory 
establishes, in the best of scenarios, that it is wanting in significant doctrinal 
development, and in the worst of circumstances, it reveals itself to be internally 
inconsistent.  Neither scheme is acceptable.  
 
Fifth, the conexity or nexus between the facts at issue within the territory of a 
foreign state and the commercial consequences of those acts or forbearances are 
conceptualized under the restrictive theory as necessarily having to be “direct.”  
Regrettably, however, the jurisprudence has not developed, let alone defined, the 
nomenclature “direct.”234 Therefore, the elements of predictability, uniformity, party 
autonomy, judicial restraint, and reasonableness, are reduced to the status of mere 
aspirational goals in the context of this jurisprudence as well as that concerning the 
analysis of extraterritoriality.   
 
Sixth, the rubric of the restrictive theory mandates an economic effect as a 
predicate to the application of the commercial activity exception.  The FSIA’s 
impoverished legislative history does not define “effect.” As with the paradigm of “direct 
effect” that forms part of the analytical construct addressing the extraterritorial 
application of U.S. law, the Supreme Court studiously has averted the challenge of 
providing this precept with a substantive content so as to articulate an objective precedent 
giving rise to meaningful predictive value and objectivity, while wresting from the 
analysis of extraterritoriality all vestiges of happenstance that tend to be intrinsic to 
analyses bottomed on the idiosyncrasies of each individual case.235 
Seventh, the facts at issue only fall within the purview of the commercial activity 
exception if these facts are “based upon” a commercial activity.  The frailties of the 
“based upon” component became evident in the Supreme Court’s pronouncement in 
 
234 By way of example, in the jurisprudence concerning civil negligence the term “direct” is 
encompassed within a traditional legal definition of proximate cause, which is deemed to be one of the 
necessary elements to state a claim premised on negligence.  See e.g. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TORTS Section 430 (1965).  The most recent draft of the Restatement (Third) concerning the law of 
personal injury observes that a defendant’s liability is limited by the harm arising from risks that the 
defendant undertook, which may have risen to the level of negligence.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) LIA. 
PHYSICAL HARM §29 (P.F.D. No. 1 2005).  The jurisprudence addressing foreign sovereign immunity 
should develop a conceptual standard that integrates a “direct effect” component related to the precept of 
necessary proximate cause, much like the rubric present in the legal constructs governing the law of 
negligence.  The integration of this concept would lead to a greater objective standard that inevitably would 
bestow considerable predictive value on analyses in this arena.   
 
235 At least on school of thought in contemporary analytical jurisprudence tends to disfavor particular 
normative tenets arising from “particular norms” as opposed to “general norms” most commonly identified 
with legislative enactments.  See e.g. Hans Kelsen, The General Theory of Law and State (put cite).   
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Saudi Arabia v. Nelson.236 Despite its best efforts, the Supreme Court in Nelson hardly 
elucidated the meaning of the term “based upon” despite meticulously and painstakingly 
having reviewed the legislative intent suggestive of a distinction between a complaint 
“based upon commercial activities” and claims alleged to be “based upon acts performed 
in connection with such activity,” the distinction only serves to promote even greater 
 
236 See Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 113 S.Ct. 1471, 123 L.Ed. 2d 47 (1993).  In Nelson 
plaintiff, a U.S. citizen employed by a hospital in Saudi Arabia (“Saudi Hospital”) filed an action against 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and U.S. investors who purchased the hospital.  The action sought 
compensatory damages arising from personal injury and economic harm that plaintiff allegedly suffered as 
a direct consequence of having been incarcerated and tortured without cause by the Saudi government.  The 
complaint was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida and was presided by the 
late distinguished jurist, the Honorable Leonore Carrero Nesbitt.  The district court dismissed the complaint 
for want of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to the FSIA.  The Eleventh Circuit, however, reversed 
holding that the acts undertaken by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and Saudi Hospital were of such 
character and nature so as to fall within the FSIA’s commercial activity exception.  On appeal the Supreme 
Court reversed the Eleventh Circuit and affirmed Judge Nesbitt’s district court ruling.  Specifically, the 
district court had rejected plaintiff’s claim that subject matter jurisdiction rested on the first clause of 
§1605(a)2, because the complaint “was one ‘based upon a commercial activity’ that petitioners had ‘carried 
on in the United States.’ ”  Id. at 354.   
 
The specific facts in Nelson together with the Supreme Court’s analysis represent the most 
eloquent jurisprudence in demonstrating the multiple problems inherent in the element of “based upon” a 
commercial activity.   
 
In Nelson plaintiff had responded to an employment advertisement published in the United States 
for a job in Saudi Hospital.  After consulting the advertisement, plaintiff interviewed in Saudi Arabia for 
the position and later returned to the United States where he executed an employment contract with Saudi 
Hospital.  All recruitment undertakings, together with employment training and orientation, were 
administered by The Hospital Corporation of America, Ltd. (“HCA”). 
 
In December 1983, plaintiff traveled to Saudi Arabia and commenced working at Saudi Hospital 
in the capacity of supervisor charged with supervising “all facilities, equipment, utilities, and maintenance 
systems to ensure the safety of patients, hospital staff, and others.”  Id. at 352.   
 
During his employment, plaintiff communicated on numerous occasions to hospital officials 
multiple defects that placed at risk the security of the patients as well as hospital staff.  Plaintiff also 
published this information to the Saudi government.  Id. at 353.   
 
Allegedly, Saudi government agents arrested plaintiff.  The allegations also assert that plaintiff 
was deprived of food for four days, tortured, and beaten.  The record reflects averments stating that plaintiff 
was forced to sign a declaration in Arabic, despite his lack of knowledge of the language.  Id.  It was not 
until two months had elapsed under these conditions that plaintiff was freed, largely because of the private 
efforts of a U.S. senator and finally allowed to leave Saudi Arabia.  
 
Notwithstanding a record that compellingly demonstrated that plaintiff was recruited in the United 
States, executed a contract in the United States, and that his hiring and advertising on the part of Saudi 
Hospital constituted “commercial activities within the United States,” the Supreme Court emphasized that 
congress in enacting the commercial activity exception “manifestly understood there to be a difference 
between a suit ‘based upon’ commercial activity and one ‘based upon’ acts performed ‘in connection with’ 
such activity.”  Id. at 358.  The Court also noted that plaintiff only had averred a breach of an obligation 
and not a contractual breach.  These factual predicates, the Court held, constituted the basis of the 
complaint and are not the “activities [that] led to the conduct that eventually injured the Nelsons, they are 
not the basis for the Nelsons’ suit. . . , [t]hose torts, and not the arguably commercial activities that 
preceded their commission, formed the basis for the Nelsons’ suit.”  Id. at 358.   
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uncertainties in what was already an ill-defined and vague standard.  Moreover, as with 
the fifth proposition here enumerated, the jurisprudence is opaque on the “extent to 
which” the facts at issue may be found to be “in connection with” a commercial activity, 
rendering it conceptually impossible to draw a line distinguishing a claim “based upon” a 
commercial activity and another action “based upon acts performed in connection with a 
[cognizable] commercial activity.”  The talisman simply does not exist with sufficient 
refinement so as to provide for the likely moving scale.   
 
Eighth, the term “diminution” pervading the jurisprudence in this area concerning 
the restrictive theory is, even when viewed with extreme generosity, imprecise.  The 
concept of “diminution” lacks a standard for objective quantification.  While the Supreme 
Court commands that “mere diminution” and the effects on commerce in the United 
States is insufficient for purposes of triggering the commercial activity exception, a 
definition of “diminution” that has not been sufficiently developed or, to be more precise, 
developed at all.  Substantial and material questions linger that must be answered if the 
aspirational goal of developing a standard that shall find its productive workings.  By 
way of example, is the concept of diminution to be treated as insubstantial where at issue 
is a small percentage affecting an exceptionally high volume of commerce?  Likewise, 
the corollary to this inquiry raises the same conceptual uncertainty.  Is the “diminution”
component limited only to a specific economic sector at issue in a particular case?  It is 
also worth asking whether “diminution” is to be understood in the context of domestic 
commerce as concerns international commerce?  In the same event, the issue of 
“diminution” certainly cannot be analytically severed from the “nationality” of the actors 
concerned.   
 
Finally, the scienter or intent component is also devoid of meaning within the 
restrictive theory’s rubric as applied by the Supreme Court in the commercial activity 
context.  It is not at all clear, for example, whether intent in this context is synonymous 
with “party consent” that is part of the formation of a binding contract.  The degree of 
intent necessary even to allege, let alone prove, common law fraud, or the extent of the 
intent required to establish a criminal delict, considerably vary.  The Supreme Court 
nowhere articulates the weight to be accorded to the element of intent in a case where 
there is present only a “mere diminution” in either foreign or domestic commerce, but not 
both simultaneously in connection with the same acts or forbearances.   
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A schematic of the doctrinal development of the precept of foreign sovereign immunity is simple and of considerable didactic value:
a) b) c) d)
1812: The Schooner Exchange
establishes The Absolute Theory
of Foreign Sovereign Immunity.
The holding is premised on
precepts of comity even though
there is no mention of this term.
1976: The Tate letter is
“codified.” Put simply, the
Restrictive Theory of Sovereign
Immunity is enacted in 28
U.S.C. §§1602-1611, and 28
U.S.C. §1330.
1952: The Tate letter issues
reflecting a change in State
Department policy (Executive
Branch) causing a
transformation in the judicial
branch’s analysis of sovereign
immunity. The Restrictive
Theory of Sovereign Immunity
is introduced.
1989: Argentina Republic v.
Amerada Hess Shipping Corp.:
For the first time the Supreme
Court issues an opinion holding
that the only manner in which a
federal district court may
exercise subject matter
jurisdiction and personal
jurisdiction over a foreign state
is pursuant to the strictures of
the FSIA.
77 
 The Restrictive Theory of Foreign Sovereign Immunity creates an uncertain framework 
that, in many cases, proves to be internally inconsistent.  The doctrine of comity is segregated 
from the restrictive theory despite comity’s potential in helping to create greater precision and 
reliability with respect to the very elements used to determine the applicability of the commercial 
activity exception within the meaning of the FSIA.  Subjecting a foreign state to the jurisdiction 
of U.S. courts in a civil proceeding, as with the extraterritorial application of U.S. law based 
upon acts and omissions occurring within a foreign nation’s territory, is readily susceptible to an 
interpretation pursuant to which a direct and explicit challenge to a foreign state’s sovereignty is 
effectuated.  This challenge would be susceptible to meaningful mitigation were the restrictive 
theory to incorporate comity in its analysis as a fulcrum of analytical reconciliation, which in 
turn would compel sustained consideration of the need to scrutinize the interests of foreign states 
as well as those of the community of nations in desiring to maintain and develop a system of 
private international law that would promote predictability, uniformity, party autonomy, 
reasonableness, and judicial restraint.
E. Economic Diminution
Curiously, the formation and transformation from the absolute to the restrictive theory 
did not occur in a demographical or economic vacuum.  The last two centuries witnessed an 
unprecedented growth in global population, which increased by sixty percent (60%) in this time 
frame alone, reaching a figure of 6.1 billion world inhabitants at the commencement of the third 
millennium.237 Notably, parallel to this staggering growth, the average global income per capita 
grew even more aggressively by nine hundred percent (900%) during the identical period 
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between 1820 and the year 2000.238 Since 1820 the difference in income per capita between rich 
industrialized nations and the less fortunate countries is best measured by using the most 
industrialized country of that period (the United Kingdom) as a paradigm together with the 
poorest region of the world (Africa) as the source for a ratio that would yield a four (4) to one (1) 
relationship in wealth measured by per capita income.  Put simply, the abysmal difference 
between “rich” and “poor” nations is a relatively new phenomenon that is a characteristic of very 
contemporary history.  When measured as of 1998, the economic gap between the richest and 
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Second Graph:  Average World Income Per Capita
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most industrialized nation “the United States” and the poorest region of the world (Africa) 
reflects an arresting twenty (20) to one (1) ratio.239 
Viewing this analysis in the context of the metamorphosis from the restrictive theory first 
enunciated in 1812 until 1989, when the Supreme Court first ruled that only pursuant to the FSIA 
would a federal district court be capable of exercising subject matter jurisdiction and personal 
jurisdiction over a foreign state, it becomes evident that the industrial revolution also gave rise to 
transnational commercial activity.  This new “economic order,” characterized by porous 
economic borders comports with an imperative to develop a new juridic methodology that would 
render foreign states responsible for their actions or forbearances once they elected to enter the 
stream of international commerce.  The profound connection between economic development, 
industrialization, globalization, and private international law cannot be ignored behind the 
subtleties militating against an analysis based upon “causation” in favor of one fraught with 
greater rational uncertainties that aspires to seek clarity based upon mere “happenstance.”   
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Third Graph: Gross Domestic Product Per Capita in 1820 and 1998
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VI. INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL ASSISTANCE: 28 U.S.C. §1782
Possibly the most novel U.S. contribution to private international law is found in 28 
U.S.C. §1782.  This statute authorizes the use of federal rules of civil procedure governing the 
discovery of documents and information in U.S. federal courts240 for purposes of assisting a 
foreign tribunal or investigation secure documents or deposition testimony from persons or 
entities located in the United States.241 
A. Section 1782 and its Elements
The fundamental propositions governing Section 1782 can be summarized by citing 
edited sections of the very statute:  
 
(a) The district court of the district in which a person resides or is found may 
order him to give his testimony or statement or to produce a document or other 
thing for use in a proceeding in a foreign or international tribunal, including 
criminal investigations conducted before formal accusation.  The order may be 
made. . . upon the application of any interested person and may direct that the 
testimony or statement be given, or the document or other thing be produced, 
before a person appointed by the court (emphasis supplied).242 
240 The following federal rules of civil procedure principally apply in this context: Fed.R.Civ.P. 26 (general 
provision governing the discovery process), Fed.R.Civ.P. 30 (depositions); Fed.R.Civ.P. 33 (written interrogatories); 
Fed.R.Civ.P. 34 (production of documents and things, together with inspection of property), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 36 
(requests for admissions).   
 
241 Pursuant to the methodology set forth in the Hague Convention governing The Gathering of Evidence 
Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters, the judicial authority of a signatory state may petition the competent 
authority of another signatory state, pursuant to issuance of letters rogatory, the gathering of evidence.  See Art. 1.
Even though this system represents a remarkable development in the arena of international judicial assistance, it is 
less than satisfactory in terms of effectiveness and efficiency.  Yet, the use of the Convention forces the petitioning 
party to surrender control of the discovery process pursuant to its domestic procedural rules, and shifts the burden to 
the authorities of the producing nation receiving the letter rogatory to comply with the request in conformance with 
its status as a signatory state.  See Art. IX. Section 1782, however, allows a non-U.S. party to a non-U.S. proceeding 
or investigation to circumvent the cumbersome letters rogatory methodology and directly to apply to a United States 
federal district court and petition discovery consonant with the federal rules of civil procedure from a U.S. located 
entity within the jurisdiction of the particular federal district court where the petition was filed.  It is today patent 
that the United States has undertaken a protagonistic role in providing global access to its federal court system for 
the limited purpose of providing foreign tribunals with assistance in the context of discovery and the gathering of 
evidence.  For a list of obstacles raised by nations with judicial systems based upon the Roman-Germanic Civil 
Code, see Born, supra, at 847-849.   
 
242 The current iteration of §1782 was modified in 1964.  Courts have observed that §1782 was amended “to 
facilitate the conduct of litigation in foreign tribunals, improve international cooperation in litigation, and put the 
United States into the leadership position among world nations in this respect.”  See In Re: Bayer A.G., 146 F.3d 
188, 191-92 (3d Cir. 1998).  According to the Senate Report that accompanied the final iteration of the draft that 
eventually became the current version of §1782 “congress hoped to encourage foreign countries to revise their 
judicial procedures similarly.”  See In Re: Application of Asta Médica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 5 (First Cir. 1992) (citing to 
S. Rep. 1850, 88 Cong. 2d Sess., also published in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 372, 3788 (1964)). 
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Analysis of the opinions that federal courts have issued construing §1782 establishes that 
they are of a single voice in holding that this provision aspires to the “twin goals” of: (i) 
providing an efficient means for the assistance of interested persons engaged in international 
disputes so as to provide them with direct access to federal district courts, and (ii) encouraging 
foreign courts to provide comparable means of foreign assistance to those litigants in U.S. courts 
seeking the production of documents and information in foreign jurisdictions.243 The Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the “legislative history shows that the purpose 
behind the proposal [the 1964 amendments to §1782] was to encourage other nations to follow 
the lead of the United States and to adjust their procedures in order to improve practices of 
international cooperation in litigation.”244 In tracing the legislative intent underlying §1782, the 
Eleventh Circuit in Trinidad and Tobago asserted that congress deliberately had amplified the 
statute’s scope to (i) include not only depositions and written interrogatories, but also the 
discretion to secure documents and other tangible evidence, (ii) permit federal district courts to 
assist proceedings in “foreign tribunals,” without limiting the meaning of “foreign tribunals”
within the statute to courts or exclusively judicial fora, (iii) permit “interested persons” (and not 
just foreign tribunals as is the case in less efficient proceedings pursuant to Hague Convention 
strictures) directly to petition a federal district court for judicial assistance, and (iv) eliminate the 
requirement that the discovery process used be applicable only while there is a “pending 
proceeding,” and that the documents and information produced only be used by a foreign 
tribunal.245 
243 See Schmitz v. Bernstein, Liebhard & Lifhsitz, LLP, 376 F.3d 79, 84 (2d Cir. 2004).  The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals has emphatically underscored that the twin goals of Section 1782 can be succinctly synthesized 
and stated as “providing efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation in our federal courts 
and encouraging foreign countries by example to provide similar means of assistance to our courts.”  See Lancaster 
Factory Co., Ltd. v. Mangone, 90 F.3d 38, 41 (Second Cir. 1996) (citing F. Rep. No. 1580, 88th Cong., 2nd Sess. 2 
(1964) reprinted in 1964 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3782, 3783); In Re: Gianoli Aldunte, 3 F.3d 54, 58 (2nd Cir. 1993) (same 
proposition); In Re: Ishihara Chemical Co., 251 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing the twin goals of §1782 as (i) 
providing efficient means of assistance to participants in international litigation pursuant to our federal courts and 
(ii) encouraging foreign countries by dint of this example to promote similar or analogous assistance to U.S. 
litigants); In Re Edelman, 295 F.3d 171, 175 (2d. Cir. 2002) (“at bottom, this statute affords access to discovery of 
evidence in the United States for use in foreign proceedings.”); In Re Letter Rogatory from the Nedenes District 
Court, Norway, 216 F.R.D. 277, 279 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (“therefore, granting a motion to compel [party] to provide a 
blood sample would efficiently assist a request made by the Norwegian Court and would encourage Norway to 
provide similar assistance to our courts.”); In Re Application of Grupo Gamma, S.A. de C.V., 2005 W.L. 937486, *1 
(S.D.N.Y. April 22, 2005); In Re Request of Oric, 2004 W.L. 2980648 (N.D. Ill. 2004); In Re Application of 
Servicio Panamericano de Protección, S.A., 354 F.Supp. 2d 269. 273-74 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); In the Matter of the 
Application of Procter & Gamble Co., 334 F.Supp. 2d 1112, 1113 (E.D. Wis. 2004); In Re Application of Guy, 2004 
W.L. 1857580 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).   
 
244 In Re: Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 848 F.2d 1151 (11th 
Cir. 1988).   
 
245 In Trinidad and Tobago, the Court analyzed with extraordinary scholastic skill §1782’s legislative history.  
Here the Court in painstaking detail observed that “the Act of March 2, 1855 first authorized federal courts to assist 
foreign tribunals.  This statute granted federal courts the power to compel the testimony of witnesses in order to 
assist foreign courts.  “In Re Letter Rogatory from the Justice Court, District of Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d 562, 
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It is critical to note that 28 U.S.C. §1782 petitions are subject to the absolute discretion of 
federal district courts.246 
Even though it is less than clear from the jurisprudence, courts tended to limit grant of a 
28 U.S.C. §1782 petition only to those cases where a showing that the information or documents 
sought would also be discoverable in the foreign jurisdiction initiating the petition.247 This 
fundamental tenet categorically was rejected by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals.  The court 
in In The Matter of the Application of Euromepa, S.A. v. Esmerian, Inc.,248 elucidates this 
premise as well as the concept of symmetrical reciprocity in the production of documents and 
information pursuant to a §1782 petition.   
 
In that case the Second Circuit reversed a trial court ruling that denied a §1782 petition.  
The reversal was predicated on a finding of “abuse of discretion.”249 The court observed that “to 
 
564 (6th Cir. 1975).  The passage of the Act of March 3, 1863, however, soon restricted this first statute.  The 1863 
Act allowed the United States courts to obtain testimony to assist foreign courts only if such testimony was for use 
in suits (1) which pertained to the recovery of money or property, (2) which were pending in a foreign country with 
which the United States was at peace, and (3) in which the government of the foreign country was a party or had an 
interest.  This 1863 statute, with its limitations, remained relatively unchanged until 1948. 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
Beginning in 1948 congress enacted several amendments that broadened the scope of the statute.  The 1948 
amendment deleted the requirement that the foreign government be a party or have an interest in the suit.  Congress 
also changed the limitation that the “suit [be] for the recovery of money or property” and eventually only required 
that the action be a “judicial proceeding.”  See Act of May 24, 1949, ch. 139, §93, 63 Stat. 103.  During this time, 
however, congress retained the requirement that the judicial proceeding be pending in a foreign country with which 
the United States was at peace. 
 
_________________________________________ 
 
In 1964, congress enacted the most recent amendments to section 1782.  These modifications marked a 
significant departure from congress’ cautious approach to international judicial assistance.  Letter Rogatory from 
Montreal, Canada, 523 F.2d at 565.  Congress adopted, without objection, a set of proposals submitted by the 
Commission on International Rules of Judicial Procedure which revised section 1782.  The legislative history shows 
that the purpose behind the proposals was to encourage other nations to follow the lead of the United States and to 
adjust their procedures in order to improve practices of international cooperation in litigation [citation omitted].  Id. 
at 1153-1154.   
 
246 See United Kingdom v. United States, 238 F.3d 1312, 1318-19 (11th Cir. 2001); Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 
F.2d 1564, 1565-66 (11th Cir. 1988) (holding that congress has granted federal district courts wide discretion under 
§1782).  Hence, even where all of the statutory elements are met, only an affirmative showing that the trial court 
engaged in abuse of discretion shall a ruling be reversed.   
 
247 See e.g. In Re Application of Asta Médica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1992); Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 
F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988).   
 
248 51 F.3d 1095 (2nd Cir. 1995).   
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say that a district court may or may not, in its discretion, order discovery, does not mean that it is 
free to do so on inappropriate grounds.  In this case, we conclude that the district court 
misapplied our guiding precedents, and misperceived the extent to which it should construe 
foreign law in deciding whether to order discovery.”250 In fashioning its holding the Second 
Circuit dispensed with four premises that purported to constitute the dispositive standard in 
adjudicating a §1782 petition.  As an analytical point of departure the court highlighted that in 
enacting §1782 congress crafted “a one-way street.”251 Otherwise stated, the legislation “grants 
wide assistance to others but demands nothing in return.”252 
Appellate courts for a considerable time were in disarray as to the issue of whether the 
exhaustion of remedies in the petitioning foreign jurisdiction constituted a predicate to the filing 
of a §1782 petition.  The Second Circuit underscored that it had already rejected “any implicit 
requirement that any evidence sought in the United States be discoverable under the laws of a 
foreign country.”253 Accordingly, the Second Circuit suggested that the discoverability of the 
documents or information sought in the “petitioning foreign jurisdiction” is but a factor to 
consider in adjudicating such a request.   
 
Finally, the court sweepingly removed any doubt concerning the extent to which a district 
court must first research the procedural or substantive law of the petitioning foreign jurisdiction 
also as a predicate to the adjudication of a §1782 petition.  Precedent from other circuits holds 
that discovery would be proscribed where such gathering of evidence would offend the laws of 
the relevant foreign jurisdiction.  Here the court highlighted that it is neither necessary nor 
desirable to engage in an exhaustive analysis of foreign law for purposes of somehow divining 
the attitudes of foreign nations with respect to efforts seeking judicial assistance in the 
production of documents or information in the United States.254 This precept does not purport to 
 
249 Id. at 1097.   
 
250 Id. 
 
251 Id. at 1097.   
 
252 Id. citing In Re: Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 F.2d 97, 99 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 861, 113 S.Ct. 
179, 121 L.Ed. 2d 125 (1992).  See also John Deere Ltd. v. Sperry Corp., 754 F.2d 132, 135 (3rd Cir. 1985) (holding 
that §1782 “does not require reciprocity as a predicate to the grant of a discovery order.”)   
 
253 Id. at 1098, citing In Re Application of Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54, 59 (2nd Cir.) (“if congress had intended to 
impose such a sweeping restriction on the District Court’s discretion, at a time when it was enacting liberalizing 
amendments to the statute, it would have included the statutory language to that effect.”), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 965, 
114 S.Ct. 443, 126 L.Ed. 2d 376 (1993).   
 
254 The conclusion concerning this critical precept rested on the commentaries of one of the principal architects 
of the current version of §1782:  
 
[The statute’s] drafters realized that making the extension of American 
assistance dependent on foreign law would open a veritable Pandora’s box.  
They definitely did not want to have a request for cooperation turn into an 
unduly expensive and time-consuming fight about foreign law.  That would be 
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state that a district court should disregard in its totality consideration of foreign law and the 
attitudes of foreign countries with respect to the particular issues that may be raised in a §1782 
petition.  Engaging in explicit reference to the legislative history as to the “nature and attitudes of 
the government of the country from which the [discovery] request emanates,” the Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals interpreted the drafters’ language and intent with respect to this issue as 
“authoriz[ing] district courts to scrutinize the underlying fairness of the foreign proceedings to 
ensure that they comply with notions of due process.”255 
In Euromepa, the Second Circuit adopted the Third Circuit’s exegesis on this point and 
concluded that “it is unwise-as well as in tension with the aims of section 1782-for district judges 
to try to glean the accepted practices and attitudes of other nations from what are likely to be 
conflicting and, perhaps, biased interpretations of foreign law.”256 
Euromepa established four principles as a dispositive standard in adjudicating a Section 
1782 petition, but remained in direct and express conflict with the First Circuit Court of Appeals’ 
pronouncement three years earlier in the matter of In Re Application of Asta Médica, S.A., et 
al.257 In that case the First Circuit reversed the trial court’s ruling in favor of a petition that 
sought from a person residing within the district court’s own jurisdiction documents and 
deposition testimony.  The court premised its analysis on opinions entered by the (i) Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals, (ii) Third Circuit Court of Appeals, (iii) Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, and (iv) the Federal District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, all of which 
interpreted the dispositive standard as requiring consideration of the issue of whether the 
discovery sought in the United States would be discoverable and permissible in the country of 
origin.258 The conflict between the holdings in Asta Médica, S.A. and Euromepa, was decisively 
 
quite contrary to what they sought to be achieved.  They also realized that, 
although civil law countries do not have discovery rules similar to those of 
common law countries, they often do have quite different procedures for 
discovering information that could not properly be evaluated without a rather 
broad understanding of the subtleties of the applicable foreign system.  It would, 
they judged, be wholly inappropriate for an American district court to try to 
obtain this understanding for the purpose of honoring a simple request for 
assistance. 
 
Hans Smit, Recent Developments in International Litigation, 35 S.Tex.L.J. 215, 
235 (1994).   
 
255 Id. at 1099, citing to John Deere, Ltd., 754 F.2d 136 N.3 (in turn citing to Senate Report, d. 3788).   
 
256 Id. at 1099.   
 
257 In Re: Application of Asta Médica, S.A., 981 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1992).   
 
258 See Id. at 6 (citing In Re: Request for Assistance from Ministry of Legal Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago), 
848 F.2d 1151, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (“the district court must decide whether the evidence would be discoverable in 
the foreign country before granting assistance”); Lo Ka Chun v. Lo To, 858 F.2d 1564, 1566 (11th Cir. 1988) 
(reversing the trial court with instructions for the district court to determine whether the evidence sought in the 
United States is discoverable in the country of origin [Hong Kong 1988]); John Deere, Ltd., 754 F.2d 132, 136 (3rd 
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and exhaustively addressed by the Supreme Court in Intel Corporation v. Advanced Micro 
Devices, Inc.259 
B. Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices: Uniformity and Predictability
The doctrinal quagmire that obscured the dispositive standard to be followed in the 
adjudication of Section 1782 petitions was considerably addressed in 2004 in the now seminal 
Supreme Court case of Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices.  This ruling fashioned clear and 
flexible standards for the consideration of Section 1782 applications.  In exercising its 
jurisdiction,260 the Supreme Court identified the issue before it as one that as “concern[ing] the 
authority of federal district courts to assist in the production of evidence for use in a foreign or 
international tribunal.”261 
After a detailed review of the action’s procedural history, the Court noted that pursuant to 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ pronouncement, a claimant before the Director-General for 
Competition of the Commission of the European Communities (“European Commission” or 
“Commission”) qualified as an “interested person” for purposes of Section 1782.  Additionally, 
the Supreme Court observed that the “Commission” “is a tribunal” when acting in the capacity of 
a “first-instance decision-maker.”  Likewise, the Court held that the “discovery. . . sought under 
Section 1782(a) must be in reasonable contemplation, but need not be ‘pending’ or ‘imminent’” 
(emphasis in original).  Finally, the Supreme Court reasoned that “Section 1782(a) contains no 
threshold requirement that evidence sought from a federal district court would be discoverable 
under the law governing the foreign proceeding.”262 
This ruling simplifies and makes clear the applicable standard in adjudicating a Section 
1782 petition.  Only three requirements are necessary for purposes of meeting this test; (i) the 
 
Cir. 1985) (same); In Re: Court of the Comm’r of Patents for Republic of South Africa, 88 F.R.D. 75, 77 (E.D.Pa. 
1980) (“few actions could more significantly impede the development of international cooperation among courts 
than if the courts of the United States operated to give litigants in foreign cases processes of law to which they were 
not entitled in the appropriate foreign tribunals.”)  See also In Re: Application of Malev Hungarian Airlines, 964 
F.2d 97 (2d Cir. 1992) (holding that trial court abused its discretion in ruling that a party filing a Section 1782 
petition first must attempt to secure a ruling from a Hungarian court in a case where the information sought under 
the petition would be readily discoverable in conformance with Hungarian rules.”)   
 
259 542 U.S. 241, 124 S.Ct. 2466, 159 L.Ed. 2d 355 (2004).   
 
260 The Court exercised certiorari jurisdiction “in view of the division among the circuits on the question of 
whether Section 1782(a) contains a foreign discoverability requirement.”  The Court also granted review on two 
other questions.  First, does Section 1782(a) make discovery available to complainants. . . , who do not have the 
status of private ‘litigants’ and are not sovereign agents?  [citation omitted].  Second, must a ‘proceeding’ before a 
foreign ‘tribunal’ be ‘pending’ or at least ‘imminent’ for an applicant to invoke Section 1782(a) successfully?”  124 
S.Ct. 2466, 2476.   
 
261 Id. at 2472.   
 
262 Id. at 2472-73. 
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person or entity from whom information is sought must be present within the jurisdiction of the 
federal district court where the petition is filed, (ii) the intent underlying the use of the 
information elicited pursuant to the petition must be limited to providing assistance to a foreign 
tribunal, and (iii) the juridic entity must be an “interested person,” within the meaning of Section 
1782.263 This holding represents a succinct and readily applicable restatement of the legislative 
elements comprising the statute, and now constituting binding judicial precedent, or, in the 
terminology of analytical jurisprudence, a binding individual norm.264 
Beyond the three prong test that the Court enunciated as a predicate to grant of a Section 
1782 application, a second precept bottomed on the very principles that congress sought to 
develop in enacting Section 1782 also was articulated.  Upon a finding by a district court that the 
three prong standard has been met, a court must then exercise its discretion in adjudicating the 
merits of the petition.  As briefly noted, a district court is not compelled to grant a petition 
“merely” because the dispositive standard has been met.265 The Supreme Court undertook great 
pains to emphasize the dispositive factors to be considered by federal district courts in the 
exercise of their discretion in adjudicating Section 1782 petitions.  These elements include: (i) an 
evaluation of whether the “person”266 or “entity” who is the target of the petition for production 
of documents and disclosure of information is a party to the foreign proceeding.  If the answer to 
this simple inquiry is in the affirmative, the need to provide judicial assistance generally will not 
be as apparent as when evidence is sought from a person or entity that is not a party to the 
proceeding at issue; (ii) “the nature of the foreign tribunal, the character of the proceedings under 
way abroad, and the receptivity of the foreign government or the court or agency abroad to U.S. 
federal-court judicial assistance;” and (iii) whether the petition has been confected to circumvent 
extant foreign restrictions concerning the gathering of evidence or other public policies of the 
foreign state or the United States, or the information elicited is “unduly intrusive or burdensome 
[and] may be rejected or trimmed.”267 
The Supreme Court’s opinion not only elucidates the statute’s elements and the manner 
in which they have been interpreted by federal courts, such as the term “interested parties,”268 the 
 
263 This rubric comports with the Second Circuit’s holding in In Re Application of Aldunate, 3 F.3d 54 (2d Cir. 
1993), cert. denied sub nom. Foden v. Aldunate, 114 S.Ct. 443 (1993).   
 
264 See In Re Bayer AG, 146 F.3d at 193; In Re Application of Esses, 101 F.3d 873, 875 (2d Cir. 1996); In Re 
Letter Rogatory from the First Court of First Instance in Civil Matters, Caracas, Venezuela, 42 F.3d 308, 310 (5th 
Cir. 1995).  
 
265 Id. at 2483. 
 
266 The legislation commonly referred to as the “The Dictionary Act” contains definitions that govern the 
meaning of terms and words codified in congressional enactments (federal legislation).  This statute provides that 
“unless the context indicates otherwise-” the word “person” includes “corporations, companies, associations, firms, 
partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”  1 U.S.C. §1.   
 
267 124 S.Ct. at 2483.   
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nature and character of a “proceeding” before a “foreign tribunal,” but also amplifies the 
dispositive standard by observing that pursuant to §1782 federal district courts may adjudicate 
such petitions more liberally and with less restrictions in applying the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.  The very definition of the term “tribunal,” as used by the Court in the first prong of 
the standard that it promulgated demonstrates that it had interpreted congressional intent in 
crafting §1782 in conformance with a literal reading of the statute’s terms.  Both a plain-meaning 
construction of the terms embodied in §1782 and that statute’s legislative intent suggest a liberal 
and not a restrictive application.   
 
C. The Case Consejo de Defensa del Estado de la República de Chile v. Augusto 
Pinochet and the Doctrine of Comity
Despite the proliferation of literature analyzing §1782269 none of the commentators or 
courts addressing this provision have purported to link §1782’s normative basis with the precepts 
that define jurisdiction to prescribe (the extraterritorial application of U.S. law).  Simply stated, 
even though it has not been implicitly, let alone explicitly articulated, the very normative 
grounds providing for the extraterritorial application of U.S. law triggered by activities or 
forbearances undertaken either by U.S. citizens or foreign nationals within the national territory 
of a foreign state also render conceptually viable the nature and character of foreign assistance 
granted under 28 U.S.C. §1782, where federal district courts have no connection with the 
“foreign proceeding,” “foreign tribunal,” “interested person,” or any other aspect of the case or 
investigation being undertaken in the country of origin.  Although never analyzed through this 
conceptual prism, §1782 is a paradigmatic example of the extraterritorial application of U.S. law, 
 
268 See Ishihara Chemico Co. Ltd. v. Shipley Company, et al., 251 F.3d 120, 124 (2d Cir. 2001) (observing that 
Section 1782 provides sufficient means for assistance to parties involved in international litigation before federal 
courts); Lanchaster, 90 F.3d 38, 42 (holding that the agent of a trustee appointed by the court to protect the interests 
of a foreign debtor is an “interested person” within the meaning of Section 1782; “the legislative history to Section 
1782 makes plain that ‘interested person’ includes ‘a party to the foreign. . .  litigation.  Senate Report at 8, 1964 
U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3789”); In Re Application of Esses, 101 F.3d 873, 875-876 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that the sibling 
of a person who died without a testament in a foreign state is “an interested person” for purposes of the statute: 
Section 1782); In Re Letter of Request from the Crown Prosecution Service of the United Kingdom, 870 F.2d 686 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (adjudicating that a foreign minister of legal affairs, a general prosecutor, or other prosecutor (have 
been recognized on numerous occasions as persons or entities within the ambit of §1782 as “interested persons”; 
federal courts unanimously have indicated that a party in interest to the foreign proceeding may serve as a petitioner 
or “interested person” within §1782’s purview without need of first securing an order from the foreign tribunal of 
origin authorizing the production of documents or disclosure of information.); In Re Malev Hungarian Airlines v. 
United Tech. Int’l, Inc., 964 F.2d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1992) (“we believe it was improper for the district court to 
predicate its denial of an application for discovery under 28 U.S.C. §1782 on the absence of a request for assistance 
from the Hungarian court”).   
 
269 See e.g. Hans Smit, The Supreme Court Rules on the Proper Interpretation of Section 1782: Its Potential 
Significance for International Arbitration, 14 AM. R. INT’L ARB. 295 (2003); Hans Smit, American Assistance to 
Litigation in Foreign and International Tribunals: Section 1782 of Title 28 of the U.S.C. Revisited, 25 SYRACUSE J. 
INT’L L. & COM. 1 (1998);  Note, In Re Request for Judicial Assistance from the Federative Republic of Brazil: A 
Blow to International Judicial Assistance, 41 CATH. U. L. R. 545 (1992); Walter B. Stahr, Discovery Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1782 for Foreign and International Proceedings, 20 VA. J. INT’L L. 597 (1990). 
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only that at issue with that statute is U.S. procedural and not substantive jurisprudence.  Hence, 
here two fundamental precepts intercept. 
 
First, the separation of the political branches is highlighted as a critical protagonist by 
congress’ enactment of 28 U.S.C. §1782.  In the process of crafting this legislation, a vast record 
reflecting the statute’s legislative history demonstrating the goals of §1782 within the context of 
the international arena remains.  In developing this legislative history, congress articulated the 
archaic question that pervades jurisdiction to prescribe.  Does 28 U.S.C. §1782 give rise to legal 
or political issues?  Does it spawn questions that simultaneously overlap into the legal and 
political arenas?  Is it at all clear that encouraging the transnational proliferation of U.S. federal 
discovery rules, without regard to diverse and sometimes divergent legal cultures, customs, 
traditions, and expectations harbored by foreign sovereign states, is merely a legal issue, without 
more?  The answers to these questions, as the very questions themselves, linger in a penumbra.  
Does congress have the normative authority based on precepts of conventional or customary 
international law, or constitutional jurisprudence, to fashion legislation providing “interested 
persons” within foreign states plain access to U.S. district courts to apply the federal rules of 
discovery?  This issue is conceptually indistinguishable from the concern underlying even the 
most surface analysis of jurisdiction to prescribe.  Restructuring the inquiry; does congress have 
authority derived from constitutional or international tenets to legislate substantive or procedural 
norms to be applied extraterritorially to the activities or forbearances undertaken within the 
national territory of a foreign state?   
 
To the extent that this extraordinary and unprecedented access comprises a political and 
not a legal issue, then the policies and objectives of the executive branch, typically through the 
Department of State, should govern any analysis so as to ensure a consistent foreign policy.  
Likewise, a constitutional crisis is inevitable when the parameters of the three branches of 
government are blurred.  This model of obfuscation most frequently manifests itself when courts 
find themselves attempting to engage in the equitable administration of justice in the context of 
statutory issues that in turn do not provide the judiciary with any alternative but to address 
political rather than legal issues.270 
270 This concern was placed in high relief when observing the development and transformation from an 
absolute theory of sovereign immunity, as first articulated by Justice Marshall in The Schooner Exchange case, to a 
restrictive theory arising from the Tate Letter in 1952, and codified in the FSIA.  Irrespective of its judicial opinion 
and jurisprudential considerations, the Supreme Court made clear in its opinion the need not only to preserve but to 
enhance respect for the independence of the different branches of government.  Prior to being codified in 1976, for a 
period of twenty-four years (between 1952 and 1976), the Supreme Court acknowledged as dispositive a policy 
outlined by the Department of State that deemed the issue of immunity accorded to sovereign states a political and 
not a legal question and, therefore, within the ambit of the executive and not the judicial branch of government.   
 
Here too is present the penumbra attendant to the methodology pursuant to which issues are classified as 
either legal or political in nature.  The question that follows from this analysis is simple to articulate but virtually 
impossible to answer decisively under any sustained analysis.  What standard is used and by whom to determine the 
answer to this inquiry?  How is the issue debated and in which forum?  Are representatives from the three branches 
of government present in the deliberative process that compels the Department of State to instruct the judiciary that 
an issue is either political or legal? The methodology and the standard used to arrive at a classification of issues as 
either political or legal by the different branches of government is less than clear.  Was the judiciary privileged to 
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Second, the doctrine of comity may be used as a normative basis from whence a reasoned 
analysis that would lead to certainty, uniformity, and predictability with respect to the political 
component underlying §1782 that congress underscored, as well as shed light on the uncertainty 
attendant to the absolute lack of standard and methodologies used by the branches of government 
in defining when an issue is to be deemed political or legal in nature.  Congress’ twin 
aspirational goals of (i) rendering accessible to the rest of the world federal procedural rules 
governing discovery in the context of offering foreign assistance and (ii) encouraging the 
community of nations to adopt procedural rules of discovery or evidence gathering similar to 
those of the federal rules of civil procedure and thus foster reciprocity and transparency in 
transnational litigation, are best explained within the framework of comity as a precept of 
reconciliation.  Despite whatsoever measure of good faith that may be ascribed to the “noble 
intent” to proliferate the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as to discovery so that they may be 
universally embraced subject only to minor limitations and restrictions, such intent shall 
inexorably constitute a genesis of incongruencies and resentment among the community of 
nations.  By way of example, the exclusion of the requirement that the subject matter of a §1782 
petition need be susceptible to discovery in the country of origin by the “interested person” as a 
predicate to grant of such an application, is susceptible to being construed as a tenet seeking to 
circumvent the national laws and rules of the country of origin.   
 
A scenario pursuant to which U.S. laws trump those of a foreign state where United 
States courts lack personal and subject matter jurisdiction over the underlying claim being 
processed in a foreign jurisdiction, and the U.S. has no interest in the merits of the investigation 
or proceeding at issue, cannot but give rise to a compelling inference that the very fundamental 
character of a foreign state’s sovereignty (i.e. its judiciary) is being undermined, if not altogether 
elided.  This critique is endemic to any analysis of 28 U.S.C. §1782 and to the entire conceptual 
rubric upon which jurisdiction to prescribe rests.  Whether “procedural” or “substantive” the 
concern remains patent.  On what jurisprudential basis arising from customary international law 
can the exportation of U.S. procedural or substantive laws rest?  Indeed, there is no absence of 
commentators who have asserted in a serious and consistent manner that the twin goals contained 
in the 1964 amendments to §1782 are misguided.  These commentators never even address the 
issues concerning the normative basis of such legislation or the questions of constitutional 
consequences that they necessarily embody.271 
disagree with the Tate Letter, let alone reject it?  Were the legislative and judicial branches consulted prior to 
issuance of the Tate Letter?  There is less than a paucity of material addressing this issue.   
 
271 In light of these U.S. cases and the disarray among the appellate courts, together with largely unaltered 
foreign discovery practices (particularly noticeable in civil law countries), it has been suggested that neither of the 
objectives of the 1964 amendments to Section 1782 have been fully achieved.  With regard to the first goal – that of 
facilitating the district court’s handling of foreign requests for discovery of evidence located in the United States – 
the federal courts clearly have not been able to agree fundamentally on the grounds for permissibility of 
applications.  With regard to the second goal – that of encouraging other nations, by example, to facilitate U.S. style 
discovery abroad through adjusting their own procedures – no such adjustments have materialized.  In retrospect, 
because the scope for evidence-gathering in the United States is well recognized to be far broader than in most other 
jurisdictions, it is not entirely surprising that other governments did not expedite similar legislation.  The same 
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In defining the doctrine of comity as one that promotes the reconciliation of interests that 
appear to be ostensibly opposed by applying a tripartite analysis based upon the sustained study 
of the (i) juridic, social, political, and economic interests of the United States, (ii) analysis of 
these same factors but within the context and framework of the foreign state at issue, and (iii) the 
interests of the community of nations in crafting precepts of international law that are 
predictable, reliable, uniform, and conducive to party-autonomy and judicial restraint, the 
arbitrariness and randomness endemic to the “good faith” justification of the use of §1782 would 
be meaningfully mitigated if not altogether eviscerated.  Likewise, sustained analysis of these 
factors as a guiding standard, rather than the application of vacuous policy statements concerning 
a purported desire to enhance the proliferation of U.S. discovery rules so as to promote 
reciprocity among nations, would lessen the well-founded critique that the use of §1782 is 
invasive and derogatory with respect to the concept of sovereignty.  The purported good faith 
intent somehow “destined” to give rise to reciprocity among nations in a manner yet to be 
explained is less than adequate for purposes of constituting a normative foundation legitimizing 
the universal application of §1782 and rendering moot the principal criticisms asserted against 
this extraordinary discovery device and assistance to foreign tribunals on behalf of interested 
persons.   
 
D. Section 1782 and the Pinochet Affair: A Paradigm
The 1996 legislative amendments to §1782 establish that the statute applies to criminal 
investigations before formal charges are asserted.272 Accordingly, §1782 petitions are routinely 
granted in the context of the mere existence of foreign criminal investigations.273 
governments have not been hesitant, however, to make use of Section 1782, and have increasingly done so in 
international civil litigation.  Indeed, it was largely the absence of the desired spontaneous foreign response that 
gave rise to reciprocity requirements being given statutory force in the 1994 International Antitrust Enforcement 
Assistance Act, at least for the priority area of antitrust discovery.  This law was enacted to “facilitate obtaining 
foreign-located antitrust evidence by authorizing the Attorney General of the United States and the Federal Trade 
Commission to provide, in accordance with antitrust mutual assistance agreements, antitrust evidence to foreign 
antitrust authorities on a reciprocal basis.”    See e.g. Extraterritorial Discovery and U.S. Judicial Assistance: 
Promoting Reciprocity or Exacerbating Judiciary Overload?, International Lawyer, Winter 2003, 37 Int’l Law. 1055 
at 1064. 
272 See §1342(b), 110 Stat. 486.   
273 See e.g. Intel, 124 S.Ct. at 2479, 2480 (observing that an investigation before an administrative tribunal, 
such as the European commission, concerning a quasi or judicial proceeding [such as a complaint asserting 
violations of antitrust laws] classifies as a “foreign tribunal” for purposes of §1782); Trinidad and Tobago, supra at 
1151 (holding that a subpoena issued at the request of the National Prosecutor of the Ministry of Legal Affairs of 
Trinidad and Tobago concerning a criminal investigation falls squarely within §1782’s ambit); U.S. v. Sealed One, 
Letter of Request for Legal Assistance from the Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation, 235 F.3d 
1200 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding that a federal district court, based upon statutory authority, is vested with discretion to 
issue formal petitions in furtherance of granting assistance to a foreign tribunal arising from a criminal investigation 
in the United States initiated by the Russian Federation based upon allegations of tax fraud); In Re Letter of Request 
from a Crown Prosecution Service, 870 F.2d 686 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that evidence was the appropriate 
subject matter of discovery pursuant to §1782 concerning a criminal investigation pending in the U.K.).   
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 One of the most eloquent and illustrative contemporary applications of §1782 within the 
framework of a criminal investigation and subsequent criminal prosecution is found in the case 
filed by Chile’s equivalent of the U.S. Department of Justice (the “CDE” or Consejo de Defensa 
del Estado de la República de Chile) against the former President and Chief of the Armed 
Forces, Augusto Pinochet.274 
The procedural history of this exceptional case is necessary.  Indulgence is asked of the 
erudite reader who has studied Augusto Pinochet’s political and juridic trajectory.   
 
The relationship between Augusto Pinochet and the rule of law constitutes a sad and 
tortuous history that, to some extent, has been globally publicized and painstakingly 
chronicled.275 
After a bloody military coup Augusto Pinochet ascended to power in Chile and ruled as 
“President” of that State since 1973 until 1990.  After stepping down as “President” in 1990, 
Augusto Pinochet remained in power and officially held the title of Commander-in-Chief of the 
Armed Forces of Chile until 1998.  At that time he retired from the military but simultaneously 
was named “Senator for Life.”   
 
During the middle part of the decade of the 1990s, Augusto Pinochet has found himself in 
the capacity of a defendant in cases filed in Spain, the U.K., Chile, and other countries.  Most of 
these cases were bottomed on averments concerning human rights violations, the violation of 
humanitarian rights, crimes against humanity, and violations of fundamental precepts of 
international law, all of which took place during his tenure as President of Chile or Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces. 
 
On July 15, 2004, the Committee on Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate 
published an investigation entitled: “Case Study Involving Riggs Bank” (“Senate Report”).276 
The Senate Report expressly stated that from 1994 until 2002 Riggs Bank had opened several 
 
274 No less than four (4) orders granting §1782 petitions issued as a result of petitions that the CDE filed 
directed at multiple financial institutions with offices in the United States for purposes of assisting the investigation 
and prosecution of two criminal proceedings that had been consolidated and remained pending before Special 
Minister Judge Sergio Muñoz Gajardo against Augusto Pinochet.  The orders are here detailed: Order Granting 
Request for Assistance, Case No. 05-61656-civ-Marra/Seltzer (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2005) (unpublished); Order 
Granting Request for Assistance, Case No. 1:05-mc-00305-JR (D.C. Oct. 17, 2005) (unpublished); Order Granting 
Request for Assistance, Index No. M-05 M 1967 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 15, 2005) (unpublished); Order Granting Request 
for Assistance, Case No. 1:05-cv-21687 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 27, 2005) (unpublished).   
 
275 There is no intent to reconfigure, let alone restate, the contours of the relationship between Augusto 
Pinochet and the Rule of Law.  To the contrary, the aspiration is considerably more modest.  It is limited to narrating 
succinctly and in the most general terms only those indispensable factual predicates necessary to place the 
referenced petitions in context.   
 
276 Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act – Case Study 
Involving Riggs Bank, Minority Staff of the Permanent Subcommittee of Investigation, Committee of Governmental 
Affairs, United States Senate (July 15, 2004).   
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bank accounts and issued multiple certificates of deposit on behalf of Augusto Pinochet and 
identifying Augusto Pinochet as a beneficiary.  Notably, the bank “turned a blind eye and a deaf 
ear” even to the most rudimentary issues pertaining to the source of the subject funds.277 The 
Senate Report identified deposits in the accounts of Augusto Pinochet in amounts that at times 
surpassed US$8 million.278 The Senate Report also underscored that Riggs Bank had assisted 
Augusto Pinochet in circumventing legal proceedings instituted against Augusto Pinochet 
seeking to freeze funds contained in that institution.279 
On March 6, 2004, The Committee On Governmental Affairs of the United States Senate 
issued a second report entitled: Supplemental Staff Report on U.S. Accounts Used By Augusto 
Pinochet (“The Supplementary Report”)280 The Supplemental Report beyond cavil demonstrates 
that the relationship between Riggs Bank and Augusto Pinochet was deeper and more complex 
than the Senate Report initially revealed.  According to the Supplementary Report, Riggs Bank 
had cultivated a “banking” relationship for twenty-five years with Augusto Pinochet, Mr. 
Pinochet’s family, and members of the Chilean army that, at minimum, comprised twenty-eight 
bank accounts and certificates of deposit directly related to Augusto Pinochet. 281 
277 Senate Report, supra at 2.   
 
278 Id.  
279 According to two Congressional Staff Reports, the financial institutions violated multiple statutes, 
regulations, and federal aspirational suggestions, including (without limitation) The Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (12 
U.S.C. §1951-59 and 31 U.S.C. §§5301-22), The Money Laundering Control Act of 1986 (18 U.S.C. §1956, the 
Federal Reserve Guidance on Private Banking, the Public Figure Treasury Regulation, and the U.S.A. Patriot Act of 
2001, 31 U.S.C. §5318.  See Senate Report; Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and 
Effectiveness of the Patriot Act, Supplemental Staff Report on U.S. accounts used by Augusto Pinochet (March 16, 
2005).  These violations, (without limitation), included: 
 
• Not having submitted a Suspicious Activity Report consonant with 12 C.F.R. §2111;  
• Having abandoned the “Know Your Customer” stricture, which, among other considerations, requires that 
banks investigate the source or sources of funds pertaining to their clients or to transactions at issue;  
• Disguising the true assets of Augusto Pinochet by using variance of the “Augusto Pinochet Ugarte” name 
for purposes of referencing a false account holder and beneficiary; 
• Facilitating Augusto Pinochet’s efforts to avoid compliance with courts exercising their competent 
jurisdiction to freeze funds and title to properties and other assets; 
• Rendering possible unusual banking transactions without conducting any due diligence concerning the 
underlying purported commercial purposes for these transactions; 
• Ignoring suggestions that would increase the scrutiny and level of due diligence directed at the opening and 
monitoring of new accounts that pertain to “Politically Exposed Persons” or “PEPs”; and  
• Actively or deliberately hiding and not disclosing the existence of Pinochet and Pinochet related accounts 
from federal banking regulators. 
 
280 Money Laundering and Foreign Corruption: Enforcement and Effectiveness of the Patriot Act – 
Supplemental Staff Report on U.S. Account used by Augusto Pinochet, Permanent Subcommittee of Investigation, 
Committee of Governmental Affairs, United States Senate (March 16, 2005).   
281 Id. at 9-10. 
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 The Supplemental Report also identified almost 100 accounts, certificates of deposit, and 
other transactions and financial institutions in the United States that conducted business with Mr. 
Pinochet on a regular basis without engaging in the requisite due diligence or transparency 
attendant to commercial activity concerning a PEP.  In his capacity as President and Commander 
in Chief of the Armed Forces, Augusto Pinochet was charged with the obligation of disclosing 
his income and assets to Chilean taxing and fiscal agencies.  Despite this uncontroverted duty, 
Chilean authorities discovered that Augusto Pinochet never reported or disclosed his U.S. bank 
accounts or transactions to any of the appropriate Chilean agencies.282 
Even though Augusto Pinochet affirmatively disclosed to Chilean governmental 
authorities that he had received less than US$1 million as compensation for his work “as a public 
servant” from 1973 until 2005, Special Minister and Judge Sergio Muñoz Gajardo’s preliminary 
investigations reflected that bank accounts in the United States alone pertaining to Augusto 
Pinochet far surpassed US$17 million.  The Chilean court also held that no logical or 
commercially reasonable relationship existed between the then “disclosed” Augusto Pinochet 
assets and his income as a public servant.283 
The Republic of Chile found itself at a crossroads that highlighted an exquisite juridic 
dilemma.  Both the CDE and the Chilean taxing authorities had initiated criminal actions against 
Augusto Pinochet.284 Despite the moral certainty concerning Augusto Pinochet’s wrongdoings 
and criminal activities, it was practically impossible logistically to prosecute Augusto Pinochet 
in Chile for these crimes because the overwhelming majority of the relevant and material proof 
was controlled by U.S. financial institutions beyond the jurisdiction of Chilean courts.  The CDE 
and the taxing authorities had recourse only to two classical paradigms for purposes of securing 
 
282 In fact, on September 21, 1973, scarcely ten days after taking control of Chile’s government, Augusto 
Pinochet executed before a Public Notary a statement of assets and liabilities.  This document was signed upon 
penalty of perjury.  Additionally, on October 19, 1989, when Augusto Pinochet was undertaking final steps to 
“disengage” from his responsibilities as Chile’s President, again he executed yet a new declaration of assets and 
liabilities before a public notary.  Remarkably, none of the assets that Augusto Pinochet had or controlled beyond 
Chile’s jurisdiction were even referenced, let alone detailed, in either of the two statements of assets and liabilities 
prepared in 1973 and 1989, respectively.   
 
283 Chile’s equivalent to the U.S. Internal Revenue Service determined that Augusto Pinochet’s non-disclosure 
of assets held in U.S. banks had caused Chile a loss in excess of 2,476,000,000 Chilean pesos (approximately 
US$4,283,737).  
 
Between 1991 and 2004 Augusto Pinochet transferred US$5,601,031.20 from his bank accounts in the 
United States to accounts opened in Chile.  The bulk of these transactions  took place by dint of no less than forty 
checks that Riggs Bank issued and that in turn were personally cashed in Chile.   
 
284 The CDE’s criminal allegations were bottomed on charges of fraud, corruption, improper appropriation of 
public funds, the exercise of self-gain arising from conflicts of interest, and conspiracy.  The charges that the 
Servicio de Impuestos Internos de Chile (Chile’s equivalent to the U.S. IRS) averred violations of Article 94, 
Number 4 of the Tax Code.  This latter prosecution was directed against both Augusto Pinochet and his longtime 
lawyer and personal aide, Oscar Aitkens as well as others linked to Augusto Pinochet who were responsible for 
filing false income tax returns during the period commencing 1998 until 2004.  The two criminal proceedings were 
consolidated before a specially appointed judge drawn from the Santiago Court of Appeals.   
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the necessary evidence.  First, discovery pursuant to Letters Rogatory constituted a realistic but 
non-workable alternative.  The Letters Rogatory methodology is antiquated, cumbersome, and 
painfully slow.  Hence, it is simply impracticable for purposes of obtaining swift production of 
documents and deposition testimony pursuant to the speedy time frame of a special criminal 
prosecution entailing a former head of state, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, and a 
Senator for Life.  This option was not even theoretically viable when the general norm is applied 
to the specific facts of the case at issue.   
 
The second option is equally unavailing.  The production of documents pursuant to the 
Hague Convention, the Inter-American Convention, or diplomatic means is as inefficient and 
dilatory as the Letters Rogatory methodology.  None of these disclosure rubrics concerning the 
taking of evidence has been amended so as to conform to an economic environment where 
porous commercial borders and a macroeconomic theory of globalization prevail.  The swift 
transfer of funds and attendant logistical communications that characterize the “communications 
revolution” commenced at the end of the Twentieth Century simply is yet to spawn a 
corresponding international system of legal assistance in the field of evidence gathering.   
 
The dilemma posed by the Pinochet predicament constitutes a paradigmatic case study 
for a scenario that currently may only be addressed pursuant to §1782.  Indeed, it was 
exclusively by filing §1782 petitions in three different jurisdictions285 that the CDE was able to 
(i) secure documents in an expedited and timely manner that comported with the procedural 
requirements of Chilean tribunals for purposes of the gathering and presentation of evidence, and 
(ii) manage to have expedited access to key witnesses designated by the various financial 
institutions and to secure these witnesses’ respective deposition testimony so that the 
memorialized statements could be presented as evidence in a time frame of less than four months 
since the date of the initial filing.   
 
Despite the well reasoned critiques of §1782 that have been chronicled by commentators 
and practitioners, there is little margin for debating the efficacy of this procedural methodology 
in facilitating the equitable administration of justice in a cross border, transnational context.   
 
The new standards that have issued, together with those clarified by the Supreme Court, 
demonstrate a meaningful trend towards and commitment to amplifying §1782’s purview.  This 
trend conceptually comports with (i) the “new” restrictive theory of foreign sovereign immunity, 
(ii) jurisdiction to prescribe, i.e. the extraterritorial application of U.S. law and congressional 
authority to legislate such jurisprudence, and (iii) the Act of State Doctrine.  These three 
doctrinal precepts (and a fourth that 28 U.S.C. §1782 embodies), appear to provide U.S. courts 
with a normative foundation for the application of substantive and procedural jurisprudence to 
acts and forbearances ascribable to foreign nationals within the physical and juridic territory of 
foreign states.   
 
285 Petitions were filed with the Federal District Court for the Southern District of Florida, the Federal District 
Court for the Southern District of New York, and the Federal District Court for the District of Columbia.   
95 
 The four doctrines are per se susceptible to violating the sovereignty of foreign states in 
multiple and diverse manners, many of which have here been identified based upon the 
construction placed on the facts and doctrine at issue.  To be sure some of these problems are 
perhaps difficult, if not altogether impossible, to harmonize.  The principle of comity, however, 
as here defined and redefined beyond the penumbra of a doctrinal tenet that is less than an 
obligation but more than a mere courtesy, may serve as a protagonist capable of at minimum 
mitigating some of the more salient difficulties that have come to light in the formation and 
transformation of the common law in the arena of private procedural international law.  The 
extant doctrinal rubrics need not be profoundly or essentially reconfigured.  To the contrary, a 
relatively simple paradigm has been proposed leading to the preservation of these tenets and 
preserving their underlying good faith substantive policies by analyzing them in the context of a 
“new” rubric of comity. The challenge remains overwhelming and the goal of harmonizing these 
principles of private international law is equally ambitious.  But it is essential to take a modest 
first step, if step at all it is, towards a coherent judicial theory in the arena of private international 
jurisprudence that will foster uniformity, predictability, party autonomy, judicial restraint, 
reasonableness, and reliability within the U.S. political framework resting on the normative 
legitimacy of the separation of powers.   
 
Conclusion
We return to the initial point of departure.  Perhaps Hans Kelsen was correct.  This past 
Twentieth Century was witness to some of the most denigrating atrocities in the history of 
mankind.  Two world wars, countless examples of genocide, unprecedented global wealth that 
every day faces the tragedy of a child dying of hunger every 2 seconds, while 44,000 more 
infants perish every month as victims of readily curable diseases, seem to argue in favor of the 
diminution of our human condition and to militate towards the stark proposition that there has 
been no progress in the moral condition of mankind despite the landmark advances in science, 
biochemistry, physics, and technology.   
 
The paradox is less than clear.  It is possible that the aborigines who sacrificed human 
lives to the gods enjoyed the same or greater ethical standing than does our “modern 
civilization.”  It is necessary, nevertheless, to highlight a perhaps significant difference between 
that civilization and the current one.  The consciousness of wrongdoing, despite the referenced 
transgressions and atrocities, may suffice to give rise to a significant and meaningful difference 
that in turn may lead to greater hope.  We do know that this hope shall never come to fruition if 
we do not confront the task before us and undertake the burden intrinsic to every effort, as 
Kelsen suggests, of attempting to initiate a judicial reform and not a revolution of the established 
international legal order.  The task at hand is terribly complex and must be approached with 
humility and the understanding that every contribution will always be miniscule and progress 
imperceptible.  But having responsibility arising from our consciousness of wrongdoing, do we 
have a choice?   
